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ABSTRACT 
 
GOD’S LAW OR STATE’S LAW:  
AUTHORITY AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW REFORM IN BAHRAIN 
Sandy Russell Jones 
Dr. Joseph E. Lowry 
 This dissertation examines the role of religious authority in the debate over the 
codification of family law in Bahrain. It analyzes the grounds upon which three sets of 
actors claim authority over family law: religious scholars, women activists, and the 
state. While the state already holds the power to determine its laws simply by nature of 
its character as an authoritarian regime, religious scholars and women activists 
challenge that power by referencing sources of authority outside the state, such as 
religious texts and institutions, international human rights treaties, and regional ideals of 
justice. Elements of Bahrain’s debate are similar to legal debates in other Muslim-
majority countries. However, Bahrain’s demography adds a layer of complexity that is 
not present in any other state. Bahrain’s Shii majority is ruled by the Sunni Ᾱl Khalīfa 
family. Therefore, the debate regarding the fate of religious law takes on a specifically 
political tone. The research involved a combination of ethnography, textual analysis, 
and archival research. A multi-disciplinary approach is used which draws upon work in 
the fields of religious studies, the history of Islamic law, anthropology, and political 
science in order to understand, primarily, the workings of power. For instance, the state 
may have the power to enact a family law, but it does not have the legitimacy to do so 
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in the eyes of many Bahrainis. For those citizens, religious scholars have legitimate 
authority over family law, however, they do not have power. Considering Foucault’s 
phrase “where there is power, there is resistance,” as well as its inverse, “where there is 
resistance, there is power,” women’s activism is analyzed here as a “diagnostic of 
power.” By discovering where and when women activists exert influence reveals 
relationships of power between and among the state and non-state actors. While the 
family law debate in Bahrain is about many things: women and the family, the role of 
sharīʻa in contemporary Muslim society, sectarian relations between a Sunni ruling elite 
and its Shii population, it is, at the broadest level, a symbolic referendum on the 
authority of the modern nation-state and its relationship to religious authority.   
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 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 In a significant departure from Bahrain’s history of allowing sharīʻa court 
judges to use independent reasoning to rule on family-related cases, the Sunni-ruled 
kingdom passed a codified family law on May 27, 2009. Lawyers, human rights 
activists, and women’s NGOs had been calling for such a law since the early 1980’s. 
The new law, however, will only apply to the nation’s Sunni population. The ruler had 
submitted two separate drafts to the Parliament, one for Sunnis and one for Shiis. 
Because members of Parliament rejected the draft applying to Bahrain’s Shiis, the 
majority Shii population will remain subject to the old system. While women activists 
applaud the passing of the Sunni law, they voice great concern about where this leaves 
Shii women. “I have some Shiʻite women who worry that their law will be forgotten,” 
said Mariam Al Ruwaie, president of the Bahrain Women’s Union.1 Examples abound 
in regional newspapers of individual Shii women in desperate legal situations who will 
not be helped by the new law. Some women feel that the situation is now even worse: 
“The passing of [the] Sunni family law is a direct act of discrimination," Amal Juma 
Abdulla told the press, “We are all Bahraini women and we all have Bahraini families - 
Sunni or Shiʻite…we are all suffering and this move is a total neglect of Shiʻites as 
human beings."2 If the Shii community, which by some counts amounts to a healthy 
sixty to seventy percent of the population, has as much need for a codified law as the 
Sunnis, why would the government not pass a law that applies to both sects? 
                                                
1 Gulf Daily News, May 28, 2009. 
2 Ibid.  
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The Kingdom of Bahrain has been struggling with the fate of its sharīʻa courts 
for nearly three decades. Having declared its independence in 1971, Bahrain’s Sunni 
rulers initially allowed its Sunni and Shii qāḍīs (religious judges) to proceed as they had 
done for centuries: to adjudicate family issues such as marriage, divorce and child 
custody by referencing Islamic jurisprudence and religious texts. In 1982, a small group 
of lawyers and women activists began to call for the reform of the sharīʻa court system. 
Citing inconsistencies in rulings, inefficiency, and even corruption, the reformists 
argued for the institution of a codified, Western-style law. At first, these calls were 
ignored by the then ruler, King ʻῙsā ibn Salmān Ᾱl Khalīfa, whose priorities did not 
include addressing social concerns. However, when ʻῙsā’s son Ḥamad was crowned in 
1999, activists saw hope for change. Immediately upon taking office, Ḥamad reversed 
some of his father’s most oppressive measures and announced a plan for far-reaching 
reforms. The women activists were pleased to learn that one of these reforms was the 
enactment of a codified family law. While the activists enthusiastically applauded the 
king’s initiative, many others opposed it. Those who most strongly opposed the idea of 
codification were Shii male religious scholars (ʻulamā’). The Shii ʻulamā’ asserted that 
codification is a Western invention, and that the reformers are secularists, aping the 
West and threatening Islam.  
At first glance, Bahrain’s family law struggle looks like the battles that have 
been fought over family law in many other Muslim-majority countries: conservative 
rijāl al-dīn (men of religion) defending an institution they have construed as 
authentically “Islamic” against modernist, secular, or otherwise Western-influenced 
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reformers pushing for change. This characterization is certainly part of the story in 
Bahrain. The women and men who began the reform movement borrowed many of their 
strategies from activist groups in other countries, within the region and in the West, and 
use the language of international human rights. Also, members of the ʻulamā’ blamed 
the West for influencing events in Bahrain. However, as Deniz Kandiyoti points out, 
“Anti-imperialistic pronouncements about the West are often a thinly disguised 
metaphor to articulate disquiet about more proximate causes for disunity.”3 Bahrain has 
a complicated history. The simple fact of the nation’s demographic make-up suggests 
that sect plays a significant role in the debate. The majority of the more than 100,000 
protesters who demonstrated against a proposed family law in 2005 were Shii, and had 
been prompted by the Shiis’ largest political organization and the council of Shii 
ʻulamā’ to participate. However, not even the intifāḍa (uprising) of the mid-1990’s, 
which specifically addressed the Shiis’ political grievances, mobilized the public to the 
extent that the family law, which deals only with the Islamic rules regarding marriage, 
divorce, and other personal issues, managed to do. 
The family law debate is not just about the rights and responsibilities husbands 
and wives retain within a marriage or the role of sharīʻa in contemporary society. Nor is 
it only about sectarian politics. The family law debate in Bahrain is a symbolic public 
referendum on the authority of the modern nation-state and its relationship to religious 
authority. In seeking to understand the basis of contemporary, popular calls to restore 
the sharīʻa, Wael Hallaq, a major historian of Islamic law, submits that the Muslim 
                                                
3 Deniz Kandiyoti, “Introduction,” in Women, Islam, and the State, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti, Philadelphia, 
P.A.: Temple University Press, 1991, pp. 3-9, p. 8.  
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world is suffering from a severe crisis of authority.4 This crisis, he argues, was created 
by the transition from the pre-modern world to the modern nation-state in which the 
centralized state appropriated control over aspects of life that, before, were managed by 
others in society. This crisis is manifest on many levels: social, ethical, political, and 
legal. With regard to legal authority specifically, Hallaq argues that the law was once 
the province of a professional legal elite, the Muslim jurists, and that rulers generally 
considered themselves subject to that law. The modern state, however, reversed this 
principle, and assumed the responsibility to determine what the law is or is not. 
Suddenly there were two competing sources of legal authority: the state, and the 
religious legal elite, whose authority, while seriously compromised by the erosion of the 
traditional systems of religious and legal education, was still sought out by Muslims 
who resisted what they saw as the illegitimate authority of the state. Indeed, Hallaq 
points out that these two forms of authority were different in kind. Power does not equal 
authority, and Hallaq shows how the authority of the jurists was born of their erudition 
and piety, and was therefore seen as legitimate, while that of the state was merely 
backed by physical force. The modern state, therefore, suffers from a crisis of political 
legitimacy, a fact which has imbued modern calls to the return of sharīʻa with a 
distinctly political tone.  
In Bahrain, the modern state has encountered this crisis on many levels, but the 
fact that the sharīʻa courts were left alone by the state until recently saved the state from 
confronting the full extent of the crisis in the legal sphere. King Ḥamad’s announcement 
                                                
4 Wael B. Hallaq, “Juristic authority vs. state power: The legal crises of modern Islam,” Journal of Law 
and Religion, Vol. 19, no. 2 (2003-2004), pp. 243-258.  
 5 
in 2003 of his intention to enact a codified family law forced Bahrainis to measure the 
king’s authority to apply such a law versus the authority of the qāḍīs over what was, in 
theory, a religious matter. Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori suggest that in order to 
understand the way in which power works in Muslim societies, or in any society, it is 
helpful to use a geopolitical framework which may be defined as “the art and science of 
understanding and predicting spatial aspects of the shifts in political power among 
groups, particularly states.”5 While geopolitics are most often used to analyze relations 
of state power, Eickelman and Piscatori demonstrate that a consideration of various 
social actors’ spatial awareness of loyalties, opportunities, and affinities can reveal 
networks of authority and can explain those actors’ actions. For Bahrain’s Shii ʻulamā’, 
authority over the sharīʻa resides in the religious texts and those who are qualified to 
interpret them. The person most qualified to determine laws for the majority of Bahraini 
Shiis is Ayatollah ʻAlī al-Sīstānī, a senior Shii cleric who happens to reside outside of 
Bahrain. When confronted with King Ḥamad’s initiative, the Shii ʻulamā’ insisted that 
any law that would be applied to the Shii population would have to be approved by this 
supremely authoritative jurist. Shii religious networks existed long before the Bahraini 
state came into being, connecting Shii scholars in Bahrain with those in Jabal ʻᾹmil in 
south Lebanon, the shrine cities of Iraq, and the centers of learning in Iran. To demand 
that this continuity be maintained did not seem, to Shiis, unreasonable. What did seem 
out of place, on the other hand, was the fact of a Sunni and arguably secular state 
                                                
5 Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1996, p. 136, citing Demko and Wood, 1994: 3. 
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suddenly disrupting that connection and deciding for itself how the Shiis’ religious 
matters should be handled.  
Bahrain’s women activists are in a different position from the Shii clerics. They 
accept the authority of the state over family law, and in fact, invoke the state’s own 
definition of its responsibilities toward its citizens in this matter as laid out in the 
constitution. However, an analysis of the sources that the activists draw upon in their 
demands reveals that they, also, invoke networks of authority that extend beyond the 
physical borders of the Bahraini state. In addition to claiming their rights as Bahraini 
citizens, the women activists claim their rights, as humans and as women, that are 
defined and enumerated in international treaties. They also claim that Muslim women 
have rights as Muslims that derive from Islamic texts, the authority of which spans all 
space and time, according to Islamic theology. The Middle East, and especially the 
Arab world, as an area mainly comprising Muslim-majority states, has developed 
regional ideals of justice based on Islamic texts, history and culture. The activists also 
refer to these regional Islamic ideals as sources of authority. There is no doubt that the 
activists’ approach is in part based on expedience. Their primary concern is to allieviate 
the suffering of Bahraini women in crisis. However, they have also consistently 
concerned themselves with criticism of the sharīʻa courts. Their claims, that the courts 
are inefficient, incompetent, and biased toward men echo those of Westerners who have 
been exposed to the workings of Islamic law. As Hallaq has also pointed out, the term 
“law” itself is frought with Western cultural and ideological baggage that prevents it 
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from accurately representing non-Western systems of law.6 There are definitely some 
women in both of the NGOs examined here who would not object to the adoption of an 
entirely Western code of family law. However, the recurring theme of the activists’ 
statements from the early eighties and into the present is a sense of anger and having 
been betrayed that they would have to resort to Western forms of law. By studying court 
records in Ottoman Syria, Palestine, and Jordan, and the Sudan, Judith Tucker, Amira 
Sonbol, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and Abdullahi Ibrahim and others have demonstrated 
that in the pre-modern period, and in some cases the modern period, the sharīʻa courts 
were very much champions of women’s causes.7 Aware of the compassionate, just, and 
thoughtful manner in which women were treated by sharīʻa judges in the past, Bahraini 
women activists feel betrayed because contemporary Bahraini judges are not living up 
to this legacy, and the ideals that they feel Islam stands for. In a television interview 
discussed below, activist Ghāda Jamshīr nearly shouts at the host that the men who 
claim to speak for Islam have used it for their own selfish purposes, and that this is the 
image of Islam people see. “Islam is innocent of this,” she said.8  
As for the state, Bahrain’s government is authoritarian. King Ḥamad does not 
technically require the permission of either the ʻulamā’ or the women activists to enact 
any law he wishes. So, if a codified family law is what the ruler wants, and he has stated 
                                                
6 Wael B. Hallaq, Sharīʻa: Theory, Practice, Transformations, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009, pp. 1-4.  
7 See Judith Tucker, In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine,  
Berkeley, C.A.: University of California Press, 1998; Amira Sonbol, Women, the family, and divorce laws 
in Islamic history, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1996; Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Islamic law 
and society in the Sudan, London, England; Totowa, N.J.: F. Cass, 1987; Abdullahi Ibrahim, Manichaean 
Delirium: Decolonizing the Judiciaryand Islamic Renewal in Sudan, 1898-1985, Leiden; Boston: Brill, 
2008.  
8 Ghāda Jamshīr, Interview on “al-Iḍā’āt,” Al-Arabiyya, December 21, 2005. 
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that it is, what can explain the fact that it has not been achieved? Dale Eickelman writes 
that while the politics of the state inevitably involve the allocation of resources and the 
definition of physical boundaries, political struggles are not just battles over power, but 
also struggles over the meaning of symbols. Warning against viewing politics and 
religion as separate and independent categories, Eickelman demonstrates the way in 
which all societies base cooperative relations on a common set of “ideas about what is 
right, just, or religiously ordained.”9 These “background understandings” inform and 
frame all social action. For instance, if a ruler wants more than just a military state; if he 
wants legitimacy, then he must compete for control over “the interpretation of symbols 
and the control of the institutions, formal and informal, that produce and sustain 
them.”10  
Considerations of religious doctrine, which necessarily changes and evolves, are 
only one part of what contributes to the meaning of these symbols and common 
understandings. There are also competing interests, and Eickelman and Piscatori argue 
that “politics may have as much, if not more, to do with bargaining among several 
forces or contending groups as with compulsion,” that it is important also to see 
“politics as public negotiation over the rules and discourse that morally bind the 
community together.”11 In the case of Bahrain and the issue of the family law, most 
obviously, King Ḥamad is confronted with two diametrically opposed groups, the Shii 
ʻulamā’ and the women activists. There are several other forces that maintain 
                                                
9 Dale F. Eickelman, Islam and the languages of modernities, Daedalus, Vol. 129, No. 1, Multiple 
Modernities (Winter, 2000), pp. 119-135.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Eickelman and Piscatori. p. 7. 
 9 
significant interests in the outcome of the family law project. The state itself is 
comprised of various agencies that are not necessarily in agreement on the issue. The 
Parliament, the judiciary, and the Supreme Council for Women are all participants in 
the debate and have varying needs and interests. In attempting to act on his family law 
initiative, Ḥamad has had to balance the interests of these forces, along with his own, 
through negotiation and persuasion.  
In some manner, Ḥamad himself is responsible for creating a situation in which 
various social forces can exert power. The transformation to a modern society, which 
was accomplished in part by British reforms of the early twentieth century such as 
centralization, bureaucratization, and the conversion to a market economy created the 
conditions for the emergence of a public sphere in which private persons could ideally 
participate in critical debate about public issues.12 However, Bahrain’s first modern 
ruler, ʻῙsā, instituted a repressive regime in which public political opposition was met 
with harsh, and arbitrary, consequences. It was not until ʻῙsā’s successor Ḥamad granted 
the freedoms of speech, press and association that Bahraini citizens were allowed fully 
to engage in public discussions of state affairs. Once he did so, the genie was out of the 
bottle, so to speak. The expectation of democratic political participation, once created, 
could not be extinguished. The problem for Ḥamad was that, Shiis being the majority, 
an increase in political participation would give the Shiis more power than he was 
prepared to offer. When it became clear that the majority of the Shii population opposed 
the codified family law, Ḥamad found that he had a powerful political tool to use to 
                                                
12 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, trans. Thomas Burger, 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991.  
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leverage the Shiis into a position of acquiescence. When the Shiis began to agitate for 
greater political rights, Ḥamad could threaten to pass the family law.  
The special character of the family law issue has made it a lightning rod that has 
focused the country’s attention on matters that go well beyond marriage and divorce 
law. As Bahrain is one of a very few Muslim-majority countries that continues to 
maintain a sharīʻa court system, the future of family law has implications for 
perceptions of the nation’s Islamic identity, cultural authenticity, moral authority, 
and/or progressive nature in the eyes of the world. More importantly, it is in this 
moment of reform that relations of power are shifting: relations between the state and 
the religious scholars, between the state and its citizens as citizens, and relations 
between lay people and the religious scholars. By framing this study in terms of the way 
in which each actor claims authority over family law, this dissertation reveals the 
fundamental conflict between networks of religious authority and the sovereignty of the 
modern nation-state. These actors are in the process of working out the role that 
religious authority plays in a contemporary Muslim society. The attendant power 
struggles and shifts in power relations are indicative of the kinds of conflicts taking 
place throughout the Muslim world. While this study contributes a wealth of empirical 
data on a country about which very little is known, in no other Muslim-majority country 
does sect play such a significant role in the debate over family law. The effect of 
administrative centralization on Islamic religious institutions has been considered by 
many scholars. However, the present work addresses this question specifically in a dual-
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sect context in which the sects have historically maintained for the most part separate 
judicial institutions.  
 
LITERATURE 
It is likely due to its small size that there is so little scholarly literature that 
addresses Bahrain. A fair amount of archaeological research has been carried out in the 
town of Saar where there exists a field of burial mounds believed to belong to the 
ancient civilization of Dilmun. There are isolated works that look at Bahrain’s 
indigenous music, folklore, poetry, or natural attributes. Some of this work relates to the 
history of Bahrain’s pearling industry, which remained vibrant until the late nineteenth 
century. However, the bulk of twentieth century scholarship on Bahrain deals with the 
country’s relationship with the West and its strategic value as a British protectorate, its 
role as a producer of oil, the location of the base of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, or its 
role as a rising center for business and finance.  
The Bahraini state has produced several works of official history of the 
kingdom. These studies offer a version of the country’s history that presents the Ᾱl 
Khalīfa as benevolent rulers who established peace on the islands, protected its 
inhabitants from foreign threats, and brought economic success.13 Even to a casual 
observer, these accounts read as contrived and self-congratulatory. One volume even 
                                                
13 See ʻAbd Allāh ibn Khālid Ᾱl Khalīfa and ʻAbd al-Mālik Yūsuf al-Ḥamer, eds., Bahrain Through the 
Ages, Government of Bahrain, 1983; Shaykha Hayā ʻAlī Ᾱl Khalīfa and Michael Rice, eds., Bahrain 
Through the Ages, the Archaeology, London: Kegan Paul International, 1986; ʻAbd Allāh ibn Khālid Ᾱl 
Khalīfa and Michael Rice, eds., Bahrain Through the Ages, the History, London: Kegan Paul 
International, 1993; Ḥamad bin ʻῙsā Ᾱl Khalīfa, First Light: Modern Bahrain and its heritage, London; 
New York: Routledge, 1995.  
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openly states in its introduction that contributors were asked to avoid controversial 
topics and not to engage with “seriously contested views on recent political history.”14 
Madawi Al Rasheed, a historian of modern Saudi Arabia who has analyzed the 
production of official historiography in Saudi Arabia reviewed the volume, calling it, 
“an ideological product of a state and ruling elite desperate to search for historical depth 
and authenticity.”15  
 The sum of serious literature that examines Bahrain for its own sake and is 
relevant to the current project amounts to a handful of studies, one on pre-modern Shii 
legal theory, and the others on shifts in twentieth century political authority. Robert 
Gleave’s work, Inevitable Doubt, concerns the debate between what are termed the 
Usuli and Akhbari schools of Shii legal thought. In the eighteenth century, Bahrain was 
home to the prominent Akhbari scholar, Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī (d. 1186/1772). Gleave 
compares al-Baḥrānī’s legal theory to that of Muḥammad Bāqir ibn Muḥammad al-
Bihbihānī (d. 1207/1792), a scholar who many Shiis consider responsible for returning 
Usulism to prominence against the Akhbari critiques of the eighteenth century. Of 
greatest concern to Gleave is the question of the origin of the Akhbari school. While 
other scholars such as Andrew Newman see continuity between the traditionalist 
tendencies of Shii scholars in the earliest centuries of Islam, Gleave argues that one 
cannot truly speak of an Akhbari school until the time of Muḥammad Amīn al-
                                                
14 Ᾱl Khalīfa and Rice, The History, p.  
15 Madawi Al Rasheed, review of Bahrain Through the Ages, The History, by ʻAbd Allāh ibn Khālid Ᾱl 
Khalīfa and Michael Rice, eds., Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 192-193.   
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Astarābādī (d. 1033/1623).16 While the question of the origins of the Akhbaris is not 
directly germane to the present project, Bahrain’s intellectual heritage is significant in 
terms of its legacy for current modes of thinking, especially about law. There is still a 
divergence between Akhbari and Usuli thought among Bahrain’s Shii scholars. 
Although the divide is much less pronounced than it is reported to have been in the past, 
that split cleanly divides the kingdom’s Shii ʻulamā’ on the question of the family law, 
a fact of significance that is explored in Chapter Three. In addition to the work of 
Gleave and Newman that discusses the role of Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī in Shii thought, there 
are some references to Bahrain as a thriving center of Shii legal and religious 
scholarship in the pre-modern era. However, no full-length study of this aspect of the 
country’s history has been completed.17  
Studies of twentieth century Bahrain are for the most part political analyses of 
the effects of colonial intervention by the British, and the subsequent processes of state-
building carried out by the new Ᾱl Khalīfa ruling family after independence was 
declared in 1971. After a number of border disputes with other tribal powers in the 
Gulf, the modern territory of Bahrain was determined to include the main island on 
                                                
16 Robert Gleave, Inevitable doubt: two theories of Shīʻī jurisprudence, Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2000. See 
also Gleave, “The Akhbari-Usuli dispute in tabaqat literature: An analysis of the biographies of Yusuf al-
Bahrani and Muhammad Baqir al-Bihbihani,” Jusür, 10 (1994), pp. 79-109; Gleave, Scripturalist Islam: 
the history and doctrines of the Akhbārī Shii school, Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007; and Gleave, “Two Shīʻī 
Theories of Judicial Authority,” in Studies in Islamic and Middle Eastern texts and traditions in memory 
of Norman Calder, G.R. Hawting, J. A. Mojaddedi, and A. Samely, eds., Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. See also Devin J. Stewart, “Capital, Accumulation, and the Islamic Academic 
Biography,” Edebiyat: Journal of Middle Eastern Literatures, July 1997, Vol. 7, Issue 2, pp. 345-362.  
17 The most comprehensive treatment of this aspect of Bahrain’s history can be found in Chapters Three 
and Four of Juan Cole, Sacred space and holy war: The politics, culture and history of Shiʻite Islam, 
London: I.B. Tauris, 2002. References to this topic can also be found in Hossein Modarressi, An 
Introduction to Shīʻī Law: a bibliographical study, London: Ithaca Press, 1984; and Moojan Momen, An 
Introduction to Shiʻi Islam, New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1985. 
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which sits the capital of Manama, Muharraq to the northeast, the Hawar islands to the 
southeast, and the Umm al-Nasan islands to the northwest. M.G. Rumaihi offers a 
breakdown of the Bahraini population, an investigation of the shifts in the domestic 
economy from pearling and agriculture to oil and commerce, and an analysis of the role 
of the British in early twentieth century domestic affairs, especially the reforms of the 
1920’s.18 Rumaihi also looks at the development of the educational system and asserts 
that some of its social effects include new roles for women, sectarian unity, and “a 
sense of Bahraini identity that is stronger than any class feeling.” While the nationalist 
movement of the 1950’s drew together both Sunnis and Shiis, united in their opposition 
to colonial interference, the domination of the Ᾱl Khalīfa, and the high rate of 
employment of immigrants from South Asia, this unity was simultaneously undermined 
by continuous, and sometimes violent, sectarian clashes.19 Despite the strength of the 
nationalist causes, it is doubtful that a sense of national identity ever surpassed the 
deep-seated divide between the sects. Rumaihi himself points out that this divide was 
routinely exploited by the rulers, whose interests were served by ongoing sectarian 
strife. 
Mahdi Abdalla al-Tajir’s study covers the period of 1920 to 1945, and focuses 
on British imperial policy in Bahrain.20 Al-Tajir attributes the success of the 
administrative reforms of this period to the pressure exerted from below by the native 
                                                
18 M. G. Rumaihi, Bahrain: social and political change since the First World War, London; New York: 
Bowker, 1976.  
19 Fuad I. Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain: the transformation of social and political authority in an 
Arab state, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, pp. 196-198.  
20 Mahdi Abdalla al-Tajir, Bahrain, 1920-1945: Britain, the sheikh, and the administration, London; New 
York: Croom Helm, 1987.  
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Shii population. As the British records on which al-Tajir relies attest, the native Shiis 
supported British reforms because they were aimed at dismantling the feudal system 
dominated by the Sunni tribes. The Sunnis of the ruling ʻUtūb alliance, on the other 
hand, vehemently opposed these reforms. Emile Nakhleh’s work takes up where al-
Tajir’s leaves off, and focuses on the process of nation-building prior to, during, and 
immediately after independence.21 Through a close look at the history of labor unrest, 
Nakhleh demonstrates that after independence, the movement for greater political rights 
continued unresolved. The work provides the reader with thorough and valuable 
empirical data drawn from the Bahraini press and personal interviews.  
Fred Lawson’s book is a compact and nuanced analysis of the origins of the 
post-independence Bahraini political structure.22 Carefully considering the formation of 
political alliances influenced by British involvement, Lawson demonstrates the way in 
which the Ᾱl Khalīfa managed their rule by distributing favors and patronage in typical 
rentier state fashion, and achieved a delicate balance between competing domestic 
forces and various foreign interests. In the course of his analysis, Lawson also addresses 
the role of the nationalist movement of the 1950’s. In contrast to Rumaihi, Lawson 
perceives the fragmented nature of the movement, which, along with the rapid response 
of the Ᾱl Khalīfa to a perceived threat to its sovereignty, eventually leads to its failure.  
The only study to consider the role of religious authority in the events that led to 
independence and the subsequent establishment of the modern nation-state is Fuad 
                                                
21 Emile A. Nakhleh, Bahrain: political development in a modernizing society, Lexington, Mass.: 
Lexington Books, 1976.  
22 Fred H. Lawson, Bahrain: the modernization of autocracy, Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1989.  
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Khuri’s Tribe and State in Bahrain.23 Like the authors mentioned above, Khuri is 
primarily concerned with explaining how the current political system came into being. 
Unlike the other authors, however, Khuri seeks to explain the emergence of the political 
order by examining three forms of social organization: tribe, peasantry, and urban 
society. Viewing colonial rule and the development of the oil industry as the two major 
forces that have affected Bahrain’s development into a modern nation-state, Khuri 
analyzes these forces’ effects on social organization, an analysis which in turn reveals 
shifts in underlying structures of social and political authority. In comparing the 
different forms of social organization, Khuri shows how social organization affects 
ideas about religious authority. Demonstrating that the Sunni rulers belong to a tribal 
form of social organization, and that meanwhile the native Shii population is organized 
according to the village model, Khuri argues that Sunni concepts of religious authority 
are quite different from those of the Shiis. The role of the qāḍī in the Sunni community 
is compared at length to that of the qāḍī in the Shii community, with special 
consideration given to the respective qāḍīs’ access to communal resources such as 
waqf24 holdings. Because the qāḍī served dissimilar needs in each community, the effect 
of centralization on each community was also very different. Khuri shows that because 
the Sunni qāḍīs’ responsibilities were limited to fairly mundane matters, British 
attempts to define the office of the qāḍī within a bureaucratic structure changed little in 
the Sunni community. On the other hand, limiting the Shii qāḍīs’ responsibilities to 
                                                
23 Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain.  
24 A waqf is an Islamic endowment, usually denoting a building or an area of land for religious or 
charitable purposes.  
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purely judicial matters created a substantial shift in the authority structure of the Shii 
community, as the qāḍī served as a community leader, advisor, and civil administrator, 
as well as a judge. While Khuri at times overstates his case, achieving a full 
understanding contemporary attitudes toward the state of the sharīʻa courts and toward 
the possibility of codification of the family law would not be possible without this 
important study.       
Bahraini women have been active and visible in national events for half a 
century. They have participated in the nationalist movement, protests over the 
dissolution of Parliament in 1975, Shii demonstrations of the 1990’s, and the family law 
debate. However, almost nothing has been written about them by scholars in Western 
languages. Bahrain’s own Munira Fakhro is the only scholar who has completed a full-
length study of women in Bahrain. Women at work in the Gulf looks at women’s 
participation in the workforce, obstacles to that participation, and possible solutions to 
overcoming those obstacles.25 Another scholar, May Seikaly, published a small number 
of articles on women in Bahrain.26 Seikaly examines Bahraini women’s changing 
identities as a result of the steady increase in educational opportunities and women’s 
increased participation in both the workforce and political protest movements. One 
article focuses specifically on women’s involvement in the protests of the mid-1990’s 
                                                
25 Munira A. Fakhro, Women at work in the Gulf: a case study of Bahrain, London; New York: Kegan 
Paul International, 1990.   
26 May Seikaly, “Women and Religion in Bahrain: An Emerging Identity,” in Islam, Gender and Social 
Change, Yvonne Yazbeck and John L. Esposito, eds. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 
pp. 169-187; “Women and Social Change in Bahrain,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 
26, No. 3 (Aug., 1994), pp. 415-426; and “Bahraini Women in Formal and Informal Groups and the 
Politics of Identification,” in Organizing Women: Formal and informal women’s groups in the Middle 
East, Dawn Chatty and Annika Rabo, eds. Oxford; New York: Berg 1997, pp. *.  
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and explores the relationship between political radicalization and Islamic revivalism. In 
a series of personal interviews with both Sunni and Shii women Islamists of varied ages 
and socio-economic backgrounds, opposition to the West was reported most often as the 
factor which motivated their activism. Seikaly also argues that the Islamist movement 
gave women a sense of authentic identity, status, and worth as guardians of morality 
and social values.  
To supplement the meager literature that exists on Bahrain, I looked to works 
produced in several other fields. My reading was guided by a need to understand the 
roles of relevant actors in the family law debate. Those who led the vanguard of 
opposition to family law reform were the Shii ʻulamā’. The opposition of the Shii 
ʻulamā’ was based in part on the argument that a codified law would remove control 
over family law from religious scholars and place it in the hands of elected lawmakers. 
These lawmakers, the ʻulamā’ argued, have no authority over religious law since they 
have not participated in a specific tradition of education, scholarship, and the 
acquisition of piety. To analyze this part of the ʻulamā’’s argument, I have drawn upon 
the work of Marilyn Robinson Waldman and Muhammad Qasim Zaman. Waldman 
examined contemporary Muslims’ references to the past as efforts to lend authenticity 
to current projects, to legitimate themselves as authoritative figures, and as a response 
to and strategy for social change.27 The act of piecing together elements of history in 
response to current social and political needs is a creative act in which the Islamic 
narrative is constructed anew. Waldman writes that, “Traditions can be part of the 
                                                
27 Marilyn Robinson Waldman, “Tradition as a Modality of Change: Islamic Examples,” History of 
Religions, Vol. 25, No. 4, Religion and Change: ASSR Anniversary Volume (May, 1986), pp. 318-340. 
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ideology of modernity as well as of the ideology of tradition; and not all things from the 
past have to be recognized as tradition, just as not all traditions originated in the pre-
modern past. Furthermore, either ideology can support change.”28 Muhammad Qasim 
Zaman examines the role of the ʻulamā’, specifically, in the active creation of Islamic 
tradition.29 Zaman’s work, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change, 
focuses on British India and Pakistan during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; 
however, it also provides a comparative study on the role of the ʻulamā’ in the 
contemporary Muslim world. In analyzing transformations the ʻulamā’ have undergone, 
and their growing religious and political activism, Zaman specifically interrogated the 
ways in which “perceptions and imaginings of the past shape articulations of identity in 
the present.”30  
Most helpfully for the present project, Zaman considers the ʻulamā’’s 
confrontation with the emergence of the modern nation-state. One of the elements of 
modernity that has had a great effect on the role of the ʻulamā’ in society is the 
codification of law. Zaman found that there is a relationship between madhhab and the 
degree to which Western codified legal systems have been resisted by members of the 
ʻulamā’. Where legal scholars are given wide latitude in the ability to perform ijtihād,31 
codified systems are usually opposed. On the contrary, schools that require conformity 
to the existing legal tradition tend to concede rather easily to the enactment of a codified 
law. For instance, in Saudi Arabia where Hanbali scholars are free to interpret the texts 
                                                
28 Waldman, “Tradition,” p. 322.  
29 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002.  
30 Zaman, Ulama, p. 3.  
31 Ijtihād refers to the jurist’s ability to perform independent legal reasoning.  
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themselves, codification has been vehemently opposed. In contrast, the Hanafi 
ʻulamā’of Pakistan consented to codification without incident. The reason for this, 
Zaman argues, is that the act of codifying law is not dissimilar from the method of 
deriving rules used by schools such as the Hanafi. Both processes select rules from 
already extant sources. According to this premise, ʻulamā’ in Bahrain who follow 
madhhabs that allow a high degree of ijtihād (Shii Usulis) would be most likely to 
oppose codification, while those who follow madhhabs that encourage taqlīd (Shii 
Akhbaris and Sunni Malikis and Shafiʻis) would not. The relationship between ijtihād 
and taqlīd is complex and cannot be summed up by this simple equation, nevertheless, 
the equation holds for the case of Bahrain.32   
On the other side of Bahrain’s debate over family law are the women activists. 
The work of Lila Abu-Lughod addresses most fully the relationship between Muslim 
women’s activism and structures of power.33 While studies of “unlikely” forms of 
resistance, for example by women or subalterns, have provided us with valuable 
empirical material and have filled previously blank spaces in our understandings of the 
workings of society, Abu-Lughod observes that these studies can fall into the trap of 
romanticizing resistance, and seeing all of its forms as indications of the ineffectiveness 
of systems of power. It is potentially much more interesting, she argues, to look at 
various forms of resistance in terms of power relations, rather than a power binary. She 
contemplates Foucault’s phrase “where there is power, there is resistance,” and also, its 
                                                
32 See Wael B. Hallaq, Authority, continuity and change in Islamic law, Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.  
33 Lila Abu-Lughod, “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power Through Bedouin 
Women,” American Ethnologist, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 41-55.  
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inverse: “where there is resistance, there is power.” This latter phrase is especially 
illuminating as it opens up the possibility to locate specific points where power is 
applied and the methods by which this is accomplished. Bahrain’s women activists use 
many different strategies to influence the government’s actions with regard to the 
family law. They engage in public debate, they form liaisons with key political figures 
as well as respected members of the ʻulamā’. They participate in international forums 
on women’s and human rights, and report to the international community on the state of 
affairs in Bahrain, a measure that creates pressure on Bahrain’s ruler from the outside. 
In all of these actions, Bahraini women are exercising limited amounts of power. 
Additionally, the opportunities to do so are always changing. Abu-Lughod views 
women’s activism as a diagnostic of power that can also reveal the ways in which 
relations of power are historically transformed, especially, by the introduction of 
techniques and forms of power that are specific to the modern nation-state. In this way, 
one is able to get past the East/West binary by looking instead at the “ways in which 
intersecting and often conflicting structures of power work together these days in 
communities that are gradually becoming more tied to multiple and often nonlocal 
systems.”34  
 Saba Mahmood, analyzing urban women’s mosque movements in Egypt, is also 
concerned with the ways in which women’s activities affect power relations.35 
Mahmood argues that it is not only women’s overt resistance to power structures that 
                                                
34 Abu-Lughod, “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing transformations of power through Bedouin 
women,” American Ethnologist, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 41-55, p. 42.  
35 Saba Mahmood, The Politics of piety: the Islamic revival and the feminist subject, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2005.  
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can result in shifts in power relations, but also, and at times more importantly, their 
performance of “pious” activities that re-inscribe religious norms that can influence 
those relations. Mahmood’s work is an important corrective to the tendency to focus 
solely on political activities as resistance. Bahraini women activists are examined here 
for the role they play in advocating family law reform. Therefore, the types of activities 
analyzed are by definition political. However, Mahmood encourages us to consider how 
the demonstration of piety within those activities, for instance, justifying an argument 
by citing a hadith, or seeking the endorsement of a member of the ʻulamā’, also affects 
political outcomes. The result is a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which 
power and authority are applied.  
   
 
METHODS 
 In a survey on feminist research methods, Shulamit Reinharz and Lynn 
Davidman found that feminist research tended to be subject-driven rather than method-
driven, meaning that “feminist research will use any method available and any cluster of 
methods needed to answer the questions it set for itself.”36 While the current project is 
only feminist in part, it is subject-driven in that its central questions determined the 
multiple methods that were used. As I developed my research agenda, the questions that 
most immediately begged for an answer could not be categorized as addressing only 
one type of issue. Most definitely, these questions were about religion: as a newly-
                                                
36 Shulamit Reinharz with the assistance of Lynn Davidman, Feminist Methods in Social Research, New 
York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 213.  
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formed modern nation-state that defines itself as an Islamic nation, how would the 
codification of family law affect Bahrain’s status as such? After centuries of 
maintaining a traditional sharīʻa court system under the rule of several different types 
of sovereigns, what can account for the desire to change now? Sharīʻa is believed to be 
God’s law, and as such has historically been administered by religious scholars and 
officials. What factors have made it possible in contemporary Bahrain for laypeople to 
engage in debates over this topic? What does their participation in the debate say about 
the role of religion in contemporary society? What does it say about the role of women 
in Islam? 
Questions that emerged in my initial consideration of the topic also involved 
law, society, and politics. In their effort to codify the sharīʻa, how would Bahrainis 
blend these two different forms of law? How does madhhab affect legal scholars’ 
perspectives on codification and reform? What is the historical relationship between the 
madhhabs in Bahrain, and how does this relationship shape contemporary attitudes, if at 
all? And the most nagging question of all for which there did not seem to be an 
immediate or obvious answer, what is the relationship between religion and politics in 
the modern Muslim-majority nation-state? It was this question that dogged me 
throughout the research and writing period, and for which I am still not sure I have a 
satisfactory answer. The family law debate is, in the end, a debate about authority; 
namely, about who has the authority to grant or deny women’s rights; to preserve, 
amend, or discard particular rules of Islamic jurisprudence; to preserve or eschew the 
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particularities of each sect; and most broadly, the authority to determine the future of 
the role of Islam in society.  
  The only way to answer these questions and to get at the heart of an issue as 
elusive as authority was to look at several different types of sources. My research 
involved a combination of formal interviews and ethnography, textual analysis, and 
archival research. I resided in Bahrain for a total of twelve months during three separate 
visits between 2003 and 2006. During this time I conducted formal interviews with 
women activists, human rights activists, religious scholars, judges, lawyers, women 
sharīʻa court litigants, and government officials including members of Parliament, 
representatives of the Supreme Council for Women, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. In addition to formal interviews, I spent time with Bahrainis on a social basis 
and participated in various aspects of Bahraini life.  
The types of texts I analyzed were many and varied. I looked at current and past 
issues of major newspapers. From the women activists, I received copies of petitions to 
the Bahraini government as well as to the United Nations, seminar papers from 
conferences held on the topic of family law, organizational documents, personal 
statements or responses to my or other researchers’ questions, and in one case, a newly 
published book on one of the activists’ experiences. The ʻulamā’ that were most 
involved in the debate were those who are members of the Shii organization Majlis al-
Islāmī al-ʻulamā’ī (ʻUlamā’ Islamic Council, hereafter, UIC). The UIC maintains a 
website on which the khuṭab of the leading members are archived. The website also 
provides articles and statements written by members, press articles relevant to specific 
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issues, and information about the organization’s history and goals. There is a large file 
on the family law initiative including these many different types of documents as well 
as photographs of demonstrations the UIC held to oppose the family law. From sharīʻa 
court judges, I received copies of past and current procedural rules, examples of 
marriage contracts, and copies of both the Sunni and Shii family law draft proposals. 
The Supreme Council for Women (SCW) was generous with their time and materials, 
providing me with summaries of the results of their studies on divorce and the public 
opinion poll on family law; current and back issues of SCW newsletters; lists of royal 
decrees relevant to the SCW; and, most helpfully, promotional materials from the 2005 
family law campaign.  
To situate the current debate within a historical context, I spent many hours at 
Bahrain’s Historical Documents Center, searching for records relevant to the history of 
the sharīʻa courts. My search there did not meet with a great deal of success; however, I 
did obtain copies of some correspondence between the Ᾱl Khalīfa and the British 
agency on the subject of the courts. As it turned out, these same letters were transcribed 
in the records of the British India Office. Nevertheless, seeing the documents in their 
original form was exciting. The majority of my archival research was done using the 
Government of Bahrain records of Britain’s India Office, together with the memoir of 
Charles Belgrave, advisor to the ruler during the years 1926 – 1957. I also consulted the 
biographical dictionaries of Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī and ʻAlī ibn Ḥasan al-Baḥrānī, which 
describe the lives and work of major Bahraini Shii ʻulamā’ of the pre-modern period.  
******************* 
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 In order to make sense of positions held by the ʻulamā’ regarding family law 
and the sharīʻa courts, Chapter Two provides an historical sketch of Bahraini legal 
institutions. Beginning in the ninth century, the chapter demonstrates that Sunni and 
Shii legal institutions have remained, for the most part, separate. The government-
sponsored law would, for the first time, not only standardize the rules to be applied in 
the sharīʻa courts, but also give the Sunni rulers control over Shii family law. 
Contemporary attitudes of Bahrain’s Shiis toward the government’s family law are 
better understood in light of these historical patterns.  
 The response of the Shii ʻulamā’ to the government’s initiatives to enact a 
codified family law are analyzed in Chapter Three. Through examining press 
statements, Friday sermons, and political activism, the chapter demonstrates that the 
Shii ʻulamā’ claim authority over family law by referencing Islamic texts and tradition. 
They also argue that through the enactment of a codified law, the Sunni government 
would be one step closer to its alleged goal of eradicating Shiism completely. The 
chapter also addresses the religious and legal ideological divergence within the Shii 
ʻulamā’ between Usulis and Akhbaris.  
 Chapter Four examines the two women’s NGOs that have been most active in 
advocating a codified family law. These groups argue for greater rights for women 
which they believe to emanate from four sources: Islam, the Bahraini constitution, 
international human rights treaties of which Bahrain is a signatory, and regional Islamic 
and pan-Arab ideals of justice.    
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NARRATIVE 
Before analyzing each of the main actors in the debate, I would like to provide a 
basic narrative of the development of the debate within the last eight years. This can be 
used as a general reference, and will help the reader to situate points of analysis within 
the context of a timeline of events.  
Upon Bahrain’s independence in 1971, adjudication of cases involving family 
and personal status issues was left in the hands of the sharīʻa courts. These courts 
consisted of a small number of appointed qāḍīs who issued judgments based on 
independent consideration of rulings of past jurists or Islamic texts. Prior to the 
establishment of the British agency, Sunni qāḍīs were chosen by tribal leaders, and Shii 
qāḍīs emerged as authoritative figures sanctioned by the community. When the British 
agency began during the early twentieth century to take a more active role in the 
domestic affairs of the islands, qāḍīs for both communities began to be appointed by the 
Ᾱl Khalīfa. By the time of independence, qāḍīs were salaried employees of a central 
government into which the sharīʻa courts had been absorbed. The sources consulted and 
the manner in which cases were handled, however, was left to the individual discretion 
of the qaḍīs.  
In 1982, a small group of lawyers and representatives of NGOs began to discuss 
the state of the sharīʻa courts. A couple of these lawyers were women, the first women 
to argue cases before the Bahraini courts. This group, headed by Lūlwa al-ʻAwaḍī and a 
member of the royal family, Shaykha Maryam Ᾱl Khalīfa, began to speak to the press 
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about aspects of the sharīʻa courts that they considered to be flawed. Primarily, the 
women contended that the qāḍīs discriminated against women litigants, and that they 
did not follow the precepts of Islam. The small group began to petition the ruler to 
reform the courts by enacting a codified personal status law, or at the least, to address 
some of their concerns. The calls of the group that eventually took the name The 
Personal Law Committee were largely ignored by the ruling Emir, ʻῙsā ibn Salmān Ᾱl 
Khalīfa.  
    The PLC continued to work for reform. In 1987 they held a conference titled, 
“Perspective on the position of women in the issue of personal status law”. Papers were 
delivered by scholars, lawyers, and activists, covering such topics as the effects of 
social and economic changes on the family in Bahrain, divorce in Bahrain, the role of 
the women’s organizations in advancing women’s rights, and the comparison of the 
personal status laws of Arab countries Committee members formed ties with activists in 
other countries, and in 1985, some members travelled to Beijing to take part in the 
United Nations’ International Decade for Women Convention.  
Events of the 1990’s brought the PLC’s advocacy for a personal status law to a 
halt. Political repression, social and economic discrimination, and incidents of torture of 
political prisoners spurred a Shii intifāḍa (uprising). Demonstrators and government 
forces clashed frequently in the streets, and Shii community leaders were exiled.    
The crowning of Ḥamad in 1999 heralded an era of new hope for Bahrain. 
Ḥamad promised an end to the repression and violence that had wracked the country 
under his father’s rule. Within a year, Ḥamad had drafted the National Action Charter, a 
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document in which the new administration pledged reforms that would grant citizens 
the freedoms they had previously been denied. The charter mapped out a new 
government with checks and balances that would create more transparency and 
accountability to the Bahraini people. Receiving overwhelming support in a public 
referendum on the Charter in February of 2001, the new King began immediately to 
implement key reforms. Most significantly, Ḥamad abolished the State Security Law, 
the most oppressive tool in his father’s arsenal, which had allowed the government to 
arrest and imprison citizens without due course or fair trial.  
The improvement of women’s conditions was also featured prominently as a 
means to move toward a more progressive society. In 2001, Ḥamad established the 
Supreme Council for Women, a government agency charged with assessing women’s 
status and proposing actions that would lead to its elevation. The following year, the 
ruler formed a committee of legal specialists to draw up a proposal for a codified law to 
be applied in the sharīʻa courts. The committee, which included women lawyers and 
members of the Supreme Council for Women, initially began to draw up two separate 
laws: one for Sunnis and the other for Shiis. However, after realizing that there were 
only a small number of issues on which the sects differed, the committee decided to 
merge the two drafts into one, unified law that included some separate articles that 
applied only to one sect or the other. The completed draft was announced in the press in 
September of 2003, an announcement that ignited a firestorm of controversy. The 
country’s ʻulamā’ were incensed, and accused the government and the women activists 
of being influenced by the West. Members of Parliament engaged in heated debates. 
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Primarily at issue was the unified nature of the draft. Many Shiis were concerned that 
Shii legal particularities would not be preserved. Shii ʻulamā’ opposed the whole 
project of codification, arguing that what they considered to be God’s law had no place 
in Parliament.  
The issue proved so contentious that the draft was shelved. Additionally, the 
Minister of Justice was dismissed and replaced. No explanation was given for these 
moves. In the meantime, a new women’s NGO was founded. The Women’s Petition 
Committee was founded in 2002 by Ghāda Jamshīr, a member of a prominent Sunni 
family who had recently been divorced from her husband. Jamshīr began by petitioning 
the king for a codified family law, but it quickly became evident that her approach was 
to be much more aggressive than that of the PLC. Jamshīr began to organize 
demonstrations in which women who had received what they considered to be unjust 
rulings from the sharīʻa courts stood outside the court buildings. The women held signs 
on which each woman printed the name of her judge, the case number, and the ruling he 
delivered. Bahrainis reacted strongly to the unseemly nature of the demonstrations; 
however, the women’s claims struck a chord with the public. Women of both sects 
started to contact Jamshīr and to tell her their stories. Within a few years of founding 
her organization, Jamshīr had heard from hundreds of women, and had amassed stacks 
of court rulings that demonstrated the judges’ lack of training and professionalism, the 
courts’ inefficiency, inconsistency in rulings, and the existence of corruption. Jamshīr 
told the women’s stories to the press. She described instances of bribery and extortion, 
and in one case revealed a taped recording of a judge offering a woman litigant a 
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favorable verdict in exchange for sexual favors. Jamshīr also pursued reform through 
more official channels. She requested meetings with the Minister of Justice, members of 
Parliament, and members of the ʻulamā,’ in which she presented her case for Bahrain’s 
adoption of a codified family law. During these meetings, Jamshīr called for the 
dismissal of several of the sharīʻa court judges whom she felt had committed the worst 
offenses.  
Officials were reeling from the media storm Jamshīr had created. She had aired 
the country’s dirty laundry in the eyes of the region and the world, and her claims were 
difficult to deny. Jamshīr’s identity also prevented her from being silenced. She was 
well aware that not many others could get away with what she had done. She admitted, 
“You know why I can say the things I say? One, I’m rich. Two, I’m Sunni. Three, 
because of who my family is. Nobody can say the things I say.”37 The extent of 
Jamshīr’s influence became evident after she publicized the case of Badriyya Rabīʻa, a 
mother who lost custody of her children during a particularly ugly divorce. Jamshīr 
obtained the written documents relating to Rabīʻa’s case and exposed its details to the 
press. Several months later, Ḥamad dismissed six judges from the sharīʻa courts. 
Officially, the judges “retired,” however, rumors abounded that they were fired as a 
result of Jamshīr’s work. 
Despite the fact that women activists and some members of Parliament alike 
expressed anger and frustration at the king for stalling the codification project, it was 
not the case that Ḥamad had abandoned it. In 2002, he instructed the SCW to carry out a 
                                                
37 Personal conversation, March 19, 2006. 
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study of sharīʻa court cases. The study was completed by four women lawyers chosen 
for their expertise in family law. The lawyers examined 306 cases in both the Sunni and 
the Shii courts and found that much of what Jamshīr had claimed was in fact an accurate 
assessment of the state of affairs in the courts. Approaching the issue from a different 
angle, the government formulated a plan to run a national campaign that would educate 
the public about the benefits of a codified law and build popular support. In preparation 
for the campaign, the Supreme Council for Women commissioned a research firm to 
conduct an opinion poll regarding Bahraini’s knowledge of and views on the prospect 
of a codified family law. The sampling was not large (1261 individuals), and, opponents 
of the law charged, not necessarily representative of the entire public. However, the poll 
confirmed what opponents had long been arguing, that any family law that would be 
applied in Bahrain must be drawn from the sharīʻa, and not from Western law.  
As the results were being compiled, the king was at work on another front. He 
formed a second drafting committee. This time, it included only religious scholars and 
no women. The new committee also prepared entirely separate drafts each for the Sunni 
and the Shii courts. By the time the SCW campaign was launched in November of 
2005, the drafts were nearing completion. The SCW campaign was designed to have 
three stages. The first stage included a series of public information sessions, the 
delivery of public statements of support by prominent national figures, and the 
distribution of promotional materials such as flyers, pamphlets, posters, and T-shirts. 
Understanding that there were strong associations between codification and the West, 
the campaign focused on providing the public assurances that any law passed in Bahrain 
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would be drawn from Islamic texts. Members of the ʻulamā’ and judges who were 
supportive of codification spoke on behalf of the campaign, pledging that Islam is not 
incompatible with codification. The second stage was to involve the assessment of the 
results of the first stage, and the third stage would be determined thereafter.  
Unfortunately for supporters of the new law, the campaign failed. Days after the 
campaign was launched, over 100,000 Bahrainis marched on one of Manama’s main 
thoroughfares in opposition to the family law initiative. The demonstrators were mostly 
Shii, mobilized by a partnership between the ʻUlamā’ Islamic Council, the council of 
leading members of the Shii ʻulamā’, and al-Wifāq, the primary Shii political 
organization. A statement issued on the UIC website expressed the Shiis’ rejection of 
the government’s project, on the grounds that lawmakers were not religious scholars, 
and possessed no authority to handle matters of the sharīʻa. The UIC explained that it 
was not the idea of codification itself that they opposed, but the fact that the laws would 
be submitted to the Parliament for approval and that in the future, the Parliament may 
amend the laws in a way that could violate the sharīʻa. The UIC offered their support 
for codification in exchange for the satisfaction of three demands. First, that the laws, 
separate for each sect, would be drafted exclusively by sharīʻa scholars; second, that the 
constitution would be amended to guarantee that the Shii law would not be passed until 
it was approved by the Shii’s highest religious authority, the marjaʻ (who, for the 
majority of Bahraini Usuli Shiis was Ayatollah ʻAlī al-Sīstānī; and third, that the law 
could not be amended in the future without the marjaʻ’s agreement. Observers were 
exceedingly skeptical that the king would meet the UIC’s demands. It was also believed 
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that the UIC’s demands were merely a cover for their more urgent goal to acquire 
greater political rights through constitutional reform.  
In January, 2006, the SCW admitted defeat. SCW Secretary-General Lūlwa al-
ʻAwaḍī explained that the campaign failed to reach the grassroots. The reason for this, 
she claimed, was that women in some segments of society are unreachable because of 
their dependence on male religious leaders. Despite the failure of the campaign, it 
quickly became clear that the government intended to push forward anyway. In January 
the press announced that the new drafts were complete, and that the government 
intended to submit them to the Parliament for approval before the 2006 elections which 
were to take place in November. Speaking to the press, the UIC expressed surprise and 
anger that a draft had already been prepared. The Council said it had not been consulted 
on the contents of the draft and that the government had hand-picked the Shii scholars 
that composed it. Arguing that the draft did not in any way represent their views, they 
vowed to prevent it from passing in the Parliament. In the spring of 2006, president of 
the UIC ʻῙsā Qāsim invited all Shii members of Parliament to a meeting to discuss the 
family law draft. Qāsim’s goal was to encourage the lawmakers to vote against the law. 
One member of Parliament reported that Qāsim went so far as to threaten to revoke the 
Shii community’s support of any candidate who voted in favor of it. As it turned out, 
the drafts were not submitted for a vote until three years later.  
On January 3, 2009, two family law drafts were presented to the Parliament, one 
that would apply to Sunnis and the other for use in the Shii courts. Shii members of 
Parliament rejected the Shii draft, but announced that they would not stand in the way if 
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Sunnis chose to approve their own draft. On May 27th, the Sunni draft was re-submitted 
and passed by a large majority. Only three members voted against it, members of the 
minority Salafi bloc who told the press that they had consulted Salafi authorities abroad 
who had advised them to reject the law. 
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CHAPTER 2: LAW AND SECT IN BAHRAIN: A Brief History of Legal 
Institutions 
 
In considering the reactions of Bahrain’s religious scholars to the government’s 
proposed family law, one of the central questions that arises is why most Sunnis support 
it, while most Shiis do not. The fact that each sect would respond differently to this 
major change in the judicial system is not surprising when viewed from a historical 
perspective. It has only been since 1926 that the Sunni and Shii sharīʻa courts have 
existed within the same institutional framework. It is not known exactly how long 
Sunnis and Shiis have coexisted on the islands, but there is evidence suggesting that it 
has been at least as long as five centuries, dating back to the mid-fifteenth century when 
the Shii officials of the Banū Jarwān administration were replaced by the Maliki Sunnis 
of the Banū Jabr tribe of Eastern Arabia. From that time until 1923, Sunnis and Shiis in 
Bahrain developed and maintained separate legal institutions to adjudicate family 
issues. While there were periods when the entire population fell under the jurisdiction of 
a single official with respect to certain matters, such as the muḥtasib (market inspector), 
who ensured fair market prices and maintained a standard of public behavior, family 
issues such as marriage contracts, divorce settlements, and child custody arrangements 
were handled by a qāḍī of the litigant’s own sect.  
In fact, even since 1926, Bahrain’s sharīʻa courts have had separate sections for 
each sect which have preserved the legal competence of religiously-trained judges to 
administer to their respective sect’s personal status cases. The government’s law could 
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have, for the first time in Bahrain’s history, forced Sunni and Shii qāḍīs to adjudicate 
these cases by referring to the same, codified legal document, or even dispossess 
religious judges altogether of their roles, and replace them with judges trained only in 
secular law. Viewing the issue from a historical perspective demonstrates the enormous 
shift this law could produce in Bahrain’s legal and religious landscape.  
The present chapter provides a sketch of the history of Bahrain’s legal 
institutions to show that these institutions have remained for the most part separate 
according to sect. It outlines shifts in political authority and analyzes the effects of these 
shifts on legal institutions, and conversely, ways in which religious doctrine affects 
attitudes toward political and legal authority. This chapter also compares Sunni and Shii 
religious authorities and argues that not only did Sunnis and Shiis have separate 
authority structures, but that those authority structures were different in kind, a situation 
that complicated British efforts to unite both sects under one, centralized state. Sharīʻa 
in particular was positioned differently in relation to other communal forces in the 
Sunni community than it was in the Shii community. Understanding the role sharīʻa has 
played within each community historically helps to explain current Sunni and Shii 
perspectives on family law reform.  
 
   
Bahrain Before the Modern Era  
 
Shii Rule of the Ismāʻīlīs: 899 – 1460 C.E. 
 38 
 
 In early Islamic sources, the name Bahrain refers to the islands that comprise 
present-day Bahrain in addition to the regions of al-Ḥasā and Qaṭīf in eastern Arabia. 
These early references mention Bahrain as the location where the Ka’ba’s black stone 
was held for almost twenty-two years during the tenth century by Abū Saʻīd al-Ḥasan b. 
Bahrām al-Janābī (d. 301/913-914), chief of an Ismāʻīlī sect referred to as the 
Qarmaṭīs.38 Unlike Imami Shiis who believe in a line of twelve Imams extending from 
the Prophet’s nephew ʻAlī to Muhammad, son of Ḥasan al-ʻAskarī, Ismāʻīlīs hold that 
the sixth Imam, Jaʻfar al-Ṣādiq, designated his eldest son Ismāʻīl as his successor even 
though Ismail predeceased his father. While both sects are messianic in the sense that 
they believe in the existence of a savior, the Mahdī (Muhammad, son of Ḥasan al-
ʻAskarī; and Muhammad, son of Ismāʻīl, respectively), Imamis see his coming at the 
end of time, while Ismāʻīlīs saw it as imminent, and in fact, believed that the Mahdī had 
come, according to some sects, just before and in the early years of the tenth century. In 
931 C.E. the Ismāʻīlīs of Bahrain under Abū Ṭāhir Sulaymān, son of Abū Saʻīd, 
believed that the Mahdī had arrived among them in the form of a Persian slave. Since 
the Mahdī was present to decide questions of law, Islamic law was abolished. The 
Mahdī issued rules that were considered strange and even repulsive, and began to 
                                                
38 For more on the Qarmaṭīs, see Farhad Daftary, The Ismāʻīlīs: their history and doctrines, Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007; M.J. de Goeje, Mémoire sur les Carmathes du Bahran et 
les Fatimides, Leiden: Brill, 1886; Heinz Halm, Shiʻism, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004; 
Wilfred Madelung, “Fatimiden und Bahrainqarmaten,” Der Islam, Bd. 34, 1959, pp. 34-48; Moojan 
Momen, An introduction to Shiʻi Islam: the history and doctrines of Twelver Shiʻism, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985, p. 66. 
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execute Qarmaṭī notables. Abū Ṭāhir realized that the man was an imposter and had him 
killed.39  
During the following century, Ismāʻīlīs continued to rule in Bahrain, and had 
established a type of welfare state in which several members of one family ruled as a 
council. Al-Aḥsā’ in eastern Arabia was made the capital, and an army was comprised 
of Ismāʻīlīs themselves (rather than slaves or captives). It seemed that everyone 
participated in periodic attacks against non-Ismāʻīlīs, creating a sense of an egalitarian 
order. Islamic law and ritual had disappeared, and the only existing mosques were for 
visitors. In 1070 C.E., al-Aḥsā’ was conquered by the Sunni tribe of ʻAbd al-Qays and 
held for seven years, after which the Qarmaṭīs under Abū Ṭāhir were defeated.40  
The extent to which the general population adopted Ismaʻīlī beliefs is difficult to 
trace. Moojan Momen suggests that the general trend is that native Bahrainis, or as they 
are called in contemporaneous Arabic sources, the Baḥarna or the Baḥārina, adopted 
Ismāʻīlī beliefs after the arrival of the Qarmaṭīs, and then gradually embraced Imami 
Shiism. Juan Cole likewise speculates that Bahrainis were predominantly Ismāʻīlī at 
least until the fourteenth century, basing his view in part on the fact that the traveler Ibn 
Baṭṭūṭa described the inhabitants of Qaṭīf in 1331 as “extremist Shiis” (rāfiḍīyya 
ghulāt), reasoning that this is how a Sunni would describe Ismaʻīlīs.41 Cole suggests 
that there were remnants of Ismaʻīlī beliefs even into the nineteenth century.42 
                                                
39 Patricia Crone, God’s Rule: Government and Islam, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. 
325-326; and Daftary, The Ismāʻīlīs, pp. 162-163.   
40 Daftary, The Ismāʻīlīs, pp. 220-221.  
41 Juan R. I. Cole, Sacred space and holy war: the politics, culture and history of Shiʻite Islam, London, 
New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002, p. 33. 
42 Ibid., p. 55.  
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Juan Cole writes that because the Qarmaṭīs lacked their own religious and legal 
institutions, they looked to the schools of Iraq for qualified individuals to serve in 
positions such as qāḍī ‘l-quḍāt (chief judge) and the muḥtasib.43 Because the Qarmaṭīs 
of Bahrain under Abū Ṭāhir and then Saʻīd ibn Mughammis are reported to have had 
little use for law, it is likely that Cole is referring to the later Qarmaṭī tribe, the Banū 
Jarwān, which held Bahrain from 1305 – 1363. Shii biographical dictionaries testify that 
several Bahraini scholars of this period held legal posts. For instance, Shaykh Aḥmad 
ibn ʻAbdallāh Ibn al-Mutawwaj al-Baḥrānī (d. 764/1363), who is discussed below, 
served as muḥtasib. The institutionalization of these positions allowed for the spread of 
Imami beliefs in Bahrain. Given that these scholars emigrated from Iraq, they were 
most likely familiar with the ideological trends current in the Iraqi cities at that time. 
Until the Ghayba (Occultation)44 of the twelfth Imam in 874 C.E., Imamis looked to 
their Imams to answer legal questions. It was not until several decades later that, 
realizing that the Ghayba might last longer than was initially anticipated, scholars began 
establishing methods of addressing legal issues.  
The theory of the Imamate, that the Imams were the legitimate successors to the 
Prophet because they were designated as such, and because they alone were maʻṣum 
(infallible), led to a nearly exclusive focus in early Imami jurisprudence on the akhbār 
                                                
43 Cole, Sacred Space, p. 33. 
44 Twelver Shiis believe that the Mahdī, or messiah, is hiding, but will reappear at the end of time and 
institute an era of peace and justice. This period of hiding is referred to as the “Ghayba,” or Occultation, 
and has two distinct periods. The Lesser Occultation refers to the period from 874-941, during which the 
final and twelfth Imam, Muḥammad al-Mahdī led the Shii community through four deputies. In 941, the 
last deputy reported that the Mahdī would cease communication with his representatives and would not 
be seen until the end of time. Thus, 941 until the present is considered the Greater Occultation.    
 41 
(sg. khabar) or Hadith of the Imams.45 Because it was also believed that the Imams 
alone had the ability to interpret the Qur’an and the Hadith of the Prophet, the Imams’ 
akhbār often took precedence over the primary texts themselves.46 So-called 
“rationalist” methods used by Sunnis, especially qiyās, were rejected, in part because 
many akhbār exist in which the Imams denounce it. Imamis dismissed rationalist 
methods also because certainty (qaṭʻ) can only be achieved by referring to the words of 
the Imams, while the use of reason can only yield probability (ẓann).47 Hence, these 
early scholars were often referred to as “muḥaddiths” (scholars of Hadith), as opposed 
to faqīhs (jurists) or mujtahids (Muslim jurists capable of independent reasoning). The 
performance of the duties of the office of imam were also prohibited during the Ghayba 
because of the exclusive nature of the Imams’ authority, along with the fact that the 
Shia during this period lived under Sunni rule and often practiced taqiyya 
(dissimulation). Therefore, early treatises argued against holding Friday prayer, the 
collection of taxes, and the declaration of jihād. These were the views of the scholars of 
the Iraqi cities from the time of the Ghayba until approximately the mid-eleventh 
century when the work of Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), known as 
Shaykh al-Ṭāʻifa, brought rationalism to the fore.  
                                                
45 On Shii Hadith, see Robert Gleave, “Between Hadīth and Fiqh: The “Canonical” Imāmī Collections of 
Akhbār,” Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 8, No. 3, Hadith and Fiqh (2001), pp. 350-382.  
46 Andrew Joseph Newman III, The Development and political significance of the Rationalist (Uṣūlī) and 
Traditionalist (Akhbārī) Schools in Imāmī Shīʻī history from the third/ninth to the tenth/sixteenth century 
A.D., Ph.D. Dissertation, Los Angeles: University of California, 1986, p.  
47 Robert Gleave, Inevitable doubt:Two theories of Shiʻi jurisprudence, Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2000, pp. 
4-5. See also Robert Gleave, Scripturalist Islam: The History and Doctrines of the Akhbari Shiʻi School, 
Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007. 
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By al-Ṭūsī’s time, Imami scholars had begun to accept limited rationalist 
positions. It was no longer practical to continue waiting for the return of the Mahdī to 
address the growing body of legal issues for which no khabar (singular of akhbār) 
existed.48 Two scholars of the tenth century referred to as al-Qadīmayn (the Two 
Ancients), Abū Muḥammad Ḥasan ibn ʻAlī ibn Abī ʻAqīl al-ʻUmānī al-Hadhhā’ (first 
half of the 4th/10th c.) and Abū ʻAlī Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn al-Junayd al-Kātib al-
Iskāfī (middle of the 4th/10th c.) employed proto-rationalist methods that, in the case of 
the former, became a standard Shii rationalist position, but in the case of the latter, 
caused his works to be abandoned. Ibn Abī ʻAqīl rejected the khabar al-wāḥīd (tradition 
that is not widely transmitted; pl. akhbar āḥād) as invalid and gave precedence to 
Qur’anic principles over traditions that conflicted with them. While Ibn al-Junayd 
upheld the validity of akhbar āḥād, he exercised a kind of qiyās in which he interpreted 
traditions by referring to other similar traditions, and attempted to discover the rationale 
(ʻilla) behind various precepts.49  
During the following century, rationalist methods, especially the rejection of 
akhbar āḥād, gained more legitimacy through the work of al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, Abū 
ʻAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Nuʻmān al-ʻUkbarī al-Baghdādī Ibn al-
Muʻallim (d. 413/1022), and Abū al-Qāsim ʻAlī ibn Ḥusayn al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 
                                                
48 In fact, one of the techniques developed by early scholars to deal with a question that was not addressed 
by any of the akhbār was hesitation, or the delay of the decision until the return of the Mahdī. This 
position is supported by a report from the sixth Imam, Jaʻfar al-Ṣādiq, preserved in Muḥammad ibn 
Yaʻqūb al-Kulaynī’s (d. 940) al-Kafī. In the report, the Imam is asked a series of questions about how to 
resolve a dispute involving inheritance. To one of the questions, the Imam replies, “wait until you meet 
your Imam. Indeed, hesitation at points of doubt is better than leaping into destruction.” Al-Kulaynī, Al-
Furūʻ min al-Kafī, A.A. al-Ghaffārī, ed., Tehran, 1362, 1: 67-68. Also cited in Newman, Rationalist 
(Uṣūlī) and Traditionalist (Akhbārī), pp. 74-75.   
49 Hossein Modarressi Tabataba’i, An Introduction to Shiʻi Law: a bibliographical study, London: Ithaca 
Press, pp. 35-37. 
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436/1044). However, it was their student, al-Ṭūsī, who established a satisfactory middle 
ground between the traditionalists and the rationalists by justifying the use of some 
rationalist methods in order to validate akhbar āḥād. Al-Ṭūsī’s methodology and 
opinions remained the dominant Twelver doctrine for at least a century and a half.50  
Al-Ṭūsī studied and taught first in Baghdad, and later in Najaf. His work, and 
that of his students made these two cities the centers of Shii thought. After the sack of 
Baghdad and the invasion of the central Islamic lands by the Mongols in 1258, most 
Shii scholars of Baghdad and Najaf either fled or were killed. As centers of Shii 
scholarship, these cities were replaced by Ḥilla, located south of Baghdad, and Jabal 
ʻᾹmil, a mountainous region in what is present-day southern Lebanon.  
Along with Ḥilla, Bahrain and the Gulf also escaped the Mongol invasion. The 
Qarmaṭīs regained control there under Saʻīd ibn Mughammis until 1305. The Banū 
Jarwān, another Qarmaṭī tribe, captured Bahrain that year and held the islands until 
approximately 1460. During their rule, the Banū Jarwān paid tribute to the Sunni king 
of Hormuz, a kingdom founded by a confederation of Arab tribes that controlled gulf 
trade routes from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries at which point they allied with the 
Portuguese.51 The rulers of Hormuz were content to allow the existing local Shii 
administration to govern, and did not curtail the activities of the Shii ʻulamā’. 
Biographical dictionaries attest to the continued maintenance of Shii religious and 
judicial offices, and to the fact that Bahraini scholars followed ideological trends 
                                                
50 Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi writes that the work of Shaykh al-Ṭā’ifa prevailed for “more than a century 
and a half,” while Modarressi puts it at three. See Moussavi, Religious authority in Shiʻite Islam: from the 
office of Mufti to the institution of Marjaʻ, Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and 
Civilization, 1996, p. 27, and Modarressi, Shiʻi Law, pp. 44-45. 
51 Faroughy, Bahrein Islands, pp. 60-61.  
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present in the Iraqi cities and Jabal ʻᾹmil. Shaykh Aḥmad ibn ʻAbdallāh Ibn al-
Mutawwaj al-Baḥrānī (d. 764/1363) served as muḥtasib and was consulted on legal 
matters. Another Imami scholar, Shaykh Nāṣir al-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn Nizār al-Aḥsā’ī 
served as chief judge, and was a distinguished teacher.52  
Bahraini legal thinking of this period seems to reflect current trends in Ḥilla as 
well as Jabal ʻᾹmil. There was a vibrant exchange of scholars and ideas between 
Bahrain and the two cities. Many Bahraini scholars studied in one of those cities before 
taking up their posts in Bahrain. Shaykh Aḥmad had studied in Ḥilla, and was called a 
renowned mujtahid, a title he would not have been given had he been a traditionalist. 
He was referred to by one biographer as “the leader of the Imamis in his time.”53 
Alternately, it seems Bahraini scholars were sought out by those in Jabal ʻᾹmil and 
Ḥilla to enrich their own institutions. Because of his scholarly renown in theology, 
Maytham ibn ʻAlī al-Baḥrānī (d. 681/1282) traveled to Ḥilla at the request of the 
scholars there. The period of Qarmaṭī rule was one of intellectual prosperity for 
Bahrain’s Shii community. Juan Cole suggests that the Twelver community of 
fourteenth century Bahrain and eastern Arabia may have enjoyed more independence 
and institutional prominence than any other Muslim community at that time.54 
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Qum: Maktabat Ᾱyatallāh al-ʻUẓmā al-Marʻashī al-Najafī, 1407 [1986 or 1987], p. 400; Cole, Sacred 
Space, p. 34.  
53 Yūsuf ibn Aḥmad al-Baḥrānī, Lu’lu’at al-Baḥrayn fī l-ijāzāt wa tarājim rijāl al-ḥadīth, Najaf: Dār al-
Nuʻmān, 1966, pp. 177-85; ʻAlī al-Baḥrānī, Anwār, pp. 70-72; Cole, Sacred Space, p. 34.  
54 Cole, Sacred Space, p. 34. 
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Sunni Tribal and Portuguese Rule: 1460 – 1602 A.D. 
 
 In the mid-fifteeenth century, the situation changed drastically for Bahrain’s 
Shiis. The leader of the Banū Jarwān was killed, and his lands were confiscated by a 
Sunni Bedouin tribe, the Banū Jabr. The ruling family of Hormuz still claimed the 
greater Gulf region as their empire, and therefore, the Banū Jabr required a cession from 
them for Bahrain. This was granted at first, but thereafter was disputed for the better 
part of the remainder of Hormuzi rule. The Banū Jabr took an active role in asserting 
their Maliki Sunni orientation in their new territory. They replaced the Shii head of the 
market police and the qāḍī ‘l-quḍāt with Sunnis, and appointed several Maliki judges 
while forcing the conversion of some of the Twelver judges.55  
 In the meantime, the Gulf region attracted the attention of the Portuguese who 
were interested in taking over the spice trade that passed through Hormuz. Bahrain’s 
pearling industry was also an attractive prize. In 1515, they conquered Hormuz, but 
faced greater resistance from the Banū Jabr. It was not until 1521 that they were able to 
take Bahrain. Interested only in reaping economic benefits, the Portuguese ruled 
Bahrain through Hormuzi governors and did not become involved with the local 
population. With the exception of the remains of a fort outside Manama, the Portuguese 
had no lasting effect on the culture, language, or methods of government. No significant 
changes were made to the judiciary or the local administration. Sunnis continued to hold 
major offices, appointed by the Hormuzi governors, and Shiism was discouraged.  
                                                
55 Ibid.  
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Despite the Sunni tribe’s persecution of Shiis, it appears that a small number of 
Twelver ʻulamā’ continued to engage in scholarship and advise the Shii community on 
legal and theological issues. A few extant works have come down to us from the region 
in this period, although none that could rival either the works of the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries or those of later centuries when the island becomes a center of 
Akhbārī thought. In his compilation of extant Shii works on law, Modarressi lists only 
one Bahraini scholar from this period, Muḥammad ibn Ḥārith al-Manṣūrī al-Baḥrānī (d. 
after 952/1545), author of Al-Sayfiyya, on dogmatics and prayer, and Mas’ala fī ishtirāṭ 
istiqrār al-ḥayāt fī l-dhabīḥa.56 In his biographical dictionary, ʻAlī al-Baḥrānī mentions 
a Bahraini muftī: Shaykh Ḥusayn ibn Shaykh Mufliḥ (d. 933/1526) received his ijāza 
(academic degree) from the prominent Safavid scholar ʻAlī al-Karakī and composed 
fatwas on various issues, collected the fatwas of his father, and wrote many works on 
fawā’id (lessons in legal issues).57   
 During this time, major changes were taking place northeast of the Gulf. The 
Safavids defeated the Sunni Tīmūrids and took control of parts of Persia in 1501. The 
Safavid leader, Ismāʻīl, proclaimed Twelver Shiism the religion of the state and began 
taking steps to eradicate Sunnism. Because they lacked a navy and were occupied with 
defending their northwestern border against the Ottomans, the Safavids could not 
conquer the Gulf. Therefore, they allied themselves first with the Hormuzis, and later 
the Portuguese, and Bahrain remained under Sunni control for another century.   
                                                
56 Modarressi, Shiʻi Law, pp. 135 and 199; ʻAbd al-Ḥusayn al-Ḥā’irī, Fihrīst-i kitābkhāna-ʻi Majlis-i 
Shūrā-yi Millī, Tehran: Majlis, 1353-(1974- ), vol. XII, p. 38.  
57 ʻAlī al-Baḥrānī, Anwār, pp. 76-77. 
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 During the reign of the first two Safavid rulers, Ismāʻīl and Shāh Ṭahmāsp 
(1533-1576), Twelver ʻulamā’ were recruited from Jabal ʻᾹmil and the shrine cities of 
Iraq to form a religious establishment that would be fully supported by the state. A 
major figure responsible for setting the state’s new religious policy was Shaykh ʻAlī ibn 
ʻAbd al-ʻAlī al-Karakī (d. 1534). Originally from a town at the foot of Mount Lebanon, 
al-Karakī studied with prominent Shii authorities in Jabal ʻᾹmil and Najaf, and also 
studied with Sunni scholars in Damascus, Jerusalem, and Cairo. After receiving an ijāza 
from ʻAlī ibn Hilāl al-Jazā’irī, the leading Shii jurist in Najaf, he was imprisoned by the 
Tīmūrid authorities in 1508. Shāh Ismāʻīl freed him and brought him to Khurasan, 
where he joined the Safavid court and was given the authority to create a Shii religious 
establishment.58 Despite the fact that al-Karakī’s position was never formally 
institutionalized, he was granted authority over all other religious officers, as well as all 
state functionaries.59 
Al-Karakī’s initiatives affected thorough and far-reaching changes in the way in 
which Twelver Shiism was practiced. One of the first directives al-Karakī issued was 
that a prayer leader be appointed in every town and that Friday prayer be resumed. In 
the years after the Occultation of the twelfth Imam, many Shii scholars advocated the 
suspension of formal practices until his return. These practices included the collection 
and distribution of zakat and al-khums, the collection of the land tax, kharāj, and the 
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holding of Friday prayer. The prayer leaders were instructed to bless the Safavid rulers 
during the sermons. Public cursing of Abū Bakr and ʻUmar, the first two Sunni caliphs 
was also encouraged. Al-Karakī also instituted the collection of kharāj, or land tax, and 
forbade the practice of taqiyya, which is the dissimulation of Shii beliefs in order to 
protect oneself from Sunni persecution.60 Legal questions were referred to Twelver 
mujtahids who were trained in uṣūl al-fiqh and who established rationalism, or what is 
also referred to as the Uṣūlī (from uṣūl al-fiqh) school of legal thought as orthodoxy 
under the Safavids. At first, these scholars were either recruited from other Shii centers, 
or Persians were sent to those centers to study. Eventually, however, the Safavids built 
their own network of madrasas (religious colleges), and Isfahan became a prominent 
center of Shii learning. This development effected a major change in Shii religious 
education. While Sunnis had had an extensive madrasa system in place since the tenth-
eleventh centuries, Shiites transferred knowledge through master-apprentice 
arrangements in which students gathered around individual scholars. The Safavids 
established the first structural framework for Shii learning in which a formal legal 
curriculum was taught.61 The Safavid madrasa system, along with the official 
recognition of mujtahids as the predominant legal authorities, promoted the institutional 
development of the Twelver professional legal madhhab and the cultivation of a 
religious hierarchy of Shii ʻulamā’. 
 
 
                                                
60 Cole, Sacred Space, pp. 39-40. 
61 Momen, Shiʻi Islam, p. 111. 
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Safavid Rule: 1602 - 1717 
 
In 1602, the Safavids conquered Bahrain. Although a thorough study of the 
effects of the Safavid administration on Bahraini society has never been done, 
biographical dictionaries of some of Bahrain’s own ʻulamā’ provide some insight into 
developments in this period. Entries of Bahraini scholars under Safavid rule are 
numerous, and confirm that as in Persia, a complete institutional framework was set up 
that promoted Uṣūlī Twelver Shiism. The town of Bilād al-Qadīm was made the capital, 
from which affairs of the islands were managed. Appointments were made to the 
positions of shaykh al-islām (chief judge), ra’īs (chief religious dignitary), muḥtasib 
and imam (Friday prayer leaders). Often one or more of these positions were held by the 
same individual, simultaneously or consecutively. ʻUlamā’ were given full control over 
the operation of the courts and the policing of the markets. The Safavid state sent 
funding for the patronage of mosques, individual ʻulamā’, and the founding of 
madrasas. Another important source of income for the ʻulamā’ were the dividends 
earned from the management of awqāf: lands, properties, or funds endowed by private 
individuals for the benefit of either the founder’s family or for the public. Additional 
wealth came from the pearl industry. Many mujtahids engaged in pearl trading, acting 
as wholesalers, and became individually wealthy. Much of this wealth ended up helping 
to fortify the Shii establishment in the form of furthering a scholar’s own studies or 
contributing to mosque or madrasa funds.  
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Early in the 1600’s, the first Imami Shii religious office in Bahrain was 
instituted. Shaykh Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Rajab al-Baḥrānī al-Maqābī al-Rūwaysī 
(d. mid-1600’s) was appointed as imam to lead the Friday prayers, the first to do so in 
Bahrain after “its opening to the untroubled [Safavid] empire.”62 Al-Rūwaysī wrote in 
support of Friday prayer as a religious obligation, and was also an accomplished legal 
scholar and teacher. As well as being named imam, he was also appointed as the first 
shaykh al-islām.63 After al-Rūwaysī, ten additional scholars served in the position of 
shaykh al-islām during this period, ending with Aḥmad ibn ʻAbdullāh al-Bilādī (d. 
1725).64  
Even though the individual that held the position of muḥtasib received his salary 
from the ruler, those who held this office in Bahrain enjoyed a great amount of 
independence and acted as a substantial check on local government authority. Shaykh 
ʻAlī ibn Sulaymān al-Baḥrānī al-Qadamī (d. 1064/1654) was known primarily for 
spreading the study of Hadith in Bahrain, so much so that he was known as “Umm al-
Hadīth” (Source of Hadith). He assumed the position of muḥtasib, and performed it 
with excellence, restraining the power of the governor and those who were corrupt. He 
was said to “spread the carpet of justice,” and to have eradicated numerous heresies 
(bidʻa).65 Sayyid Hāshim ibn al-Marḥūm Sayyid Sulaymān ibn Sayyid Ismāʻīl (d. 
1108/1697) was also a muḥaddith (a scholar of Hadith) who took up the post of 
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muḥtasib. He was said to be of the most pious nature, and also checked the authority of 
kings and officials.66  
The Safavids’ political stability allowed for considerable mobility of scholars 
and also ideas between Persia and Bahrain. Bahraini scholars became well-known for 
the quality of their jurisprudence throughout the Shii Muslim world, and their opinions 
were sought by Persian jurists as well as the Safavid administration. The jurists of 
Isfahan sometimes submitted legal questions to the ruler, who then referred the queries 
to Bahraini jurists. Shaykh Ḥasan al-Damistānī was one such jurist who was often 
consulted.67 In another example, the decision of a local qāḍī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-
Iṣbaʻī, was questioned by Bahrain’s shaykh al-islām at the time, ʻAlī ibn Sulaymān al-
Qadamī (d. 1654). Al-Qadamī sent a query regarding the case to the jurists in Shiraz 
and Isfahan, who upheld al-Iṣbaʻi’s decision.68 Until this time, Jabal ʻᾹmil had been the 
predominant Shii center of learning. The political stability and financial prosperity 
enjoyed by Bahraini scholars under the Safavids during the seventeenth century, 
however, allowed Bahrain to rival, and perhaps even supplant Jabal ʻᾹmil as Shiism’s 
intellectual center.69 
One family in particular, the Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr, became known for their erudition. From 
the village of Dirāz, on the northeastern coast of the main island, the Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr engaged 
in pearl diving and trading, and date farming, as well as legal scholarship. The most 
prominent member of the family is Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī, who is regarded as Bahrain’s 
                                                
66 Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī, Lu’lu’at, pp. 63-66; ʻAlī al-Baḥrānī, Anwār, pp. 125-127. 
67 ʻAlī al-Baḥrānī, Anwār, pp. 217-220. 
68 Cole, Sacred Space, p. 50. 
69 Said Amir Arjomand, The shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: religion, political order, and societal 
change in Shiʻite Iran from the beginning to 1890, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 129. 
 52 
greatest legal scholar, and one of the most influential proponents of the Akhbārī school 
of the eighteenth century.70 Yūsuf was born in 1107/1696 in the village of Māḥūz, in the 
northeastern corner of the main island. His family was staying there while his father 
Aḥmad (d. 1132/1720) studied with Shaykh Sulaymān al-Māhūzī. Aḥmad was an 
accomplished scholar in his own right. He wrote several works on matters such as 
prayer formulas, marriage, divorce, and purity issues. He also collected responsa from 
various prominent shaykhs, such as ʻAbd al-Imām al-Aḥsā’ī, ʻAlī ibn Luṭf Allāh al-
Baḥrānī, Nāṣir ibn Muḥammad al-Khaṭṭī al-Jārūdā, and Sayyid Ḥusayn al-Aḥsā’ī. Many 
of his works are still extant. As well as studying with his father, Yūsuf also studied the 
Qur’an with his grandfather Ibrāhīm.  
While Yūsuf was born into a time of intellectual and financial prosperity for 
Bahrain’s Shiis, it is during his lifetime that we begin to see this idyllic era of Safavid 
Bahrain crumble. Although Safavid rulers were generous in their financial support of 
the local Bahraini institutions, they did not provide the islands with much physical 
security. They set up a nominal headquarters on the coast that was guarded by just a few 
garrisons. The Safavids were also not skilled in naval maneuvers, so when Arab tribes 
of the gulf, who were historically a seafaring people, began actively seeking a foothold 
on Bahrain, the Safavids had difficulty fighting them off. In his autobiography, Yūsuf 
writes that when he was five years old, war broke out between Persian Sunnis referred 
to as the Hawala (Persians) and the ʻUtūb, which was a confederation of Sunni Arab 
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tribes from eastern Arabia and what is today Qatar.71 The Hawala were successful in 
fighting off the ʻUtūb, but soon after that another attack came, this time from the 
southern Gulf. Yūsuf writes that the Khawārij (Arab tribes from what is present-day 
Oman who adhered to Ibāḍism, a branch of Khārijism) came three times in as many 
years, finally defeating the Hawala. It was a tragic event with a great amount of 
violence. Many of the elite fled the island to Qaṭīf, among them Yūsuf’s father and 
some other family members. Yūsuf was among those who remained in Bahrain for the 
following two years.  
Beginning with the invasion of the Khawārij, Bahrain entered a period of 
political instability that would last throughout the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth 
centuries. Yūsuf fled, though he also returned to Bahrain several times throughout his 
life, trying to maintain his family’s businesses there. Eventually he was overcome with 
debt and began a new life in a Persian village called Fasā. He fared well there. The local 
governor, Mīrzī Muḥammad ʻAlī took a liking to him and exempted him from the land 
tax (kharāj). After a time, war came to Fasā as well, causing Yūsuf to flee. He finally 
settled in Karbala, where he studied and taught, and wrote most of his several-volume 
work of uṣūl al-fiqh, Ḥadā’iq al-nāḍira fī aḥkām al-ʻitra al-ṭāhira (Gardens of splendor 
on the rules of the pure and the unpure), before passing away in 1186/1772.  
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The Shii Religious/Legal Divide: Uṣūlī vs. Akhbārī 
 
 Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī is best known for his role in spreading a school of legal 
thought, Akhbārism, that opposed the rationalism that was initiated by Muḥammad ibn 
al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), Najm al-Dīn Abu al-Qāsim Jaʻfar ibn Al-Ḥasan al-Ḥillī 
(d. 676/1277), known as al-Muḥaqqiq, and Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 
726/1325), known as al-ʻAllāmah, and institutionalized by al-Karakī and the Safavids. 
As described above, this school of thought advocated the use of reason and came to be 
called “Uṣūlism,” after the term uṣūl al-fiqh. In Uṣūlism, a religious scholar who is 
recognized by the community as having adequately studied the Qur’an, the traditions of 
the Prophet and the Twelve Imams, and the consensus of Shii jurists can act as a 
representative of the Hidden Imam. This representative, having the title mujtahid, can 
perform tasks that were only to be carried out by the Imam before the Occultation, such 
as the rendering of legal judgments, the collection and distribution of alms, the 
declaration of holy war, and leading Friday prayer. In the rendering of legal judgments 
specifically, the Uṣūlī school of thought accepted four sources of law: the Qur’an, the 
traditions, the consensus of the Shii jurists (ijmāʻ), and the mujtahid’s own use of reason 
(ʻaql). When the Safavid rulers came to power and undertook to establish the Uṣūlī 
version of Twelver Shiism as orthodoxy, they reinstituted public religious activities of 
the kind that were within a mujtahid’s competence. They also initiated the persecution 
of Sunnis.  
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 Another effect of Safavid rule that was seen as negative by some Shiites was the 
rapidly growing authority of the clergy. According to the Uṣūlī conception, the Shia 
community was divided into two parts: mujtahids, and laymen who were to follow the 
mujtahids. The mujtahids retained ultimate authority in matters of doctrine and law. 
Because the Safavid state initiated the first centralized, politically stable Imami 
government, new questions arose that the Imamis had to confront, such as the 
application of the land tax (kharāj), and the limits of the clergy’s own authority vis a vis 
the political authority of the ruler. The mujtahids were allowed a great amount of 
autonomy in responding to these concerns.72 This, combined with their close ties to 
political power, afforded the mujtahids an inviolability that Shiite clerics had rarely, if 
ever, experienced in any other period. According to one account, the head cleric was 
among the king’s closest advisors: “The king enquired about religious problems and 
scientific subtleties through him…and in assemblies and gatherings, he would sit above 
the ʻulamā’ and close to the seat of the king. He was required to be in attendance in the 
company of the victory-favored (king) in all journeys.”73 
 The Sunni backlash against Safavid policies and the growing power of the 
mujtahids engendered disapproval from traditionalist-minded Shii scholars. These 
scholars found fault with the methods of the mujtahids, which relied more and more on 
the use of their own reason and, as the conservative scholars saw it, less on authoritative 
sources. In 1622, Shii scholar Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī (d. 1033/1623 or 
1036/1627) wrote a treatise titled al-Fawā’id al-madaniyya that refuted the use of logic, 
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reason and the specific jurisprudential methods based on them, such as istiḥsān and 
istiṣḥāb. Al-Astarābādī argues for an exclusive focus on the traditions of the Imams.74 
This treatise revived a debate that had existed earlier between traditionalists and 
rationalists. At the core of the debate was a difference in concepts of religious authority. 
Traditionalists believed that after the Occultation, the only authorities on which legal or 
religious investigations could be based were the Qur’an and the traditions, the akhbār, 
of the Prophet and the Imams, thus they were sometimes called the Akhbāriyya. They 
disapproved of holding Friday prayer during the Occultation and the performance of 
other Shii religious obligations such as the collection of kharāj and khums. Devin 
Stewart argues that the Akhbārīs’ position was not just against the use of reason, but 
also against the adoption of Sunni methods. Stewart explains that because Shiis were a 
minority in most areas in the Muslim world, many of them accepted Sunni rationalist 
methods, or even joined Sunni madhhabs while practicing taqiyya. He contends that 
those who rejected these methods, the traditionalists or Akhbārīs, did so not only on 
doctrinal grounds, but also as a movement against the professionalization of the 
madhhabs and the corresponding elevation of the role of the mujtahid. In analyzing the 
early history of Shii legal thought, Stewart sees the work of the tenth and eleventh 
century Baghdadi scholars (al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, and al-Shaykh al-
Ṭūsī), and especially al-Murtaḍā’s acceptance of ijmāʻ (consensus) as a legitimate 
source of law as efforts to establish their own Shii madhhab modeled after that of the 
Sunnis. The traditionalists/akhbāriyya disapproved of this effort because the effect of 
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the madhhab is to separate the Muslim community into two halves: scholars and 
laymen, and raises the scholar to a position of authority similar to that of the Imams. 
Stewart argues that Al-Astarābādī’s work is a refutation of the Sunni system, and that 
this point is often neglected by scholars who tend to focus on Shii law as a discrete 
phenomenon, separate from the inter-sectarian context in which it developed.  
Scholars disagree about the origins of Akhbārism. Most recently (2007, 
Scripturalist Islam), Robert Gleave argued that we cannot speak of a definitive 
movement or school of “Akhbārism” until al-Astarābādī, and that Shii sources after al-
Astarābādī’s time name him specifically as the founder of the school.75 Gleave also 
argues that early traditionalist scholars that may have been referred to as “akhbāriyya” 
had concerns that were different from those of al-Astarābādī and his students. In this, 
Gleave refutes the work of scholars such as Andrew Newman, whose 1986 dissertation 
details the “development…of the Rationalist (Uṣūlī) and Traditionalist (Akhbārī) 
schools…from the Third/Ninth to the Tenth/Sixteenth century,” clearly presupposing 
the origin of Akhbārism in the ninth century.76 Newman begins by analyzing “the 
Akhbārism of the first century following the occultation,” as it is represented in the 
akhbār chosen for inclusion in two of the “Four Books” of Shii Hadith, that of 
Muḥammad ibn Yaʻqūb al-Kulaynī (d. 329/941) and Muḥammad ibn ʻAlī al-Qummī (d. 
381/991-992).77 Modarressi notes that the term “akhbāriyya,” is used as early as the 
tenth century to describe those traditionalist scholars who stressed reliance on the 
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Qur’an and the reports (akhbār) of the Prophet and the Imams as the only legitimate 
sources of doctrine and practice. Some of these traditionalists were more extreme in 
their views than others, arguing that all reports are valid, and that any attempt to 
question their authenticity entails the use of reason, which they firmly rejected. Others 
recognized the limited use of methods of Hadith criticism, but otherwise refrained from 
extrapolating from either the Qur’an or the Hadith on any given matter. All of these 
scholars were referred to at times as “akhbāriyya,” or “ahl al-ḥadīth,” or even 
“ḥashwiyya,” and contrasted with Sunni scholars who advocated rationalist methods 
such as qiyās, or Muʻtazilī theologians, whether Sunni or Shii, who used rationalist and 
philosophical methods to interpret scripture. Newman argues that the dispute involves 
not only a disagreement over sources, but also over the nature of the authority of the 
ʻulamā’ during the Occultation: whether members of the ʻulamā’ are allowed to stand in 
for the Imam in leading Friday prayer, collecting taxes, and the implementation of 
criminal punishments (al-ḥudūd). He sees a continuity between this early dynamic, and 
that which existed later. With regard to the considerable influence extended by the work 
of al-Astarābādī, those who argue for a continuous Akhbārī trend refer to al-Astarābādī 
as initiating a “Neo-Akhbārism.”  
Whether Al-Astarābādī initiated Akhbārism itself or merely a revival of an older 
debate, his ideas gained rapidly in popularity. He lived in Mecca at the time of the 
completion of al-Fawā’id, but his ideas spread quickly throughout the region, especially 
to the shrine cities of Iraq. Akhbāri thought became so dominant in this region that 
scholars writing about the arrival there of the renewer of Uṣūlism, Muḥammad Bāqir al-
 59 
Bihbihānī (d. 1205/1791), say that one could not even carry Uṣūlī books in open view: 
“Before his arrival, the land of Iraq, especially the two Holy places of martyrdom, were 
full of the sect of the Akhbārīs…so much so that if one of them wished to carry a book 
[written by] our fuqahā’…he carried it in a handkerchief.”78 Akhbārī ideas also found 
fertile ground in the Gulf. Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī credits Shaykh ʻAlī ibn Sulaymān (d. 1653-
4) as being “the first to spread ʻilm al-ḥadīth [the science of Hadith] in Bahrain.”79 
Akhbārism would take hold in Bahrain and remain dominant there until well into the 
twentienth century. However, when Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī was born, Uṣūlism still prevailed. 
Yūsuf’s father and grandfather were Uṣūlis, and schooled him in classical works on 
grammar and morphology. His other teachers in Bahrain included Aḥmad ibn ʻAbdallāh 
al-Bilādī (d. 1137/1725) and ʻAbdallāh ibn ʻAlī (d. 1148/1735).80 In Qaṭīf he studied 
with Shaykh Ḥusayn al-Māḥūzī (d. 1181/1767), who was also from Yūsuf’s village, but 
lived most of his life in Qaṭīf. After Bahrain had been laid waste by the Omani tribes 
and Yūsuf’s family’s businesses had been destroyed, he migrated to Persia where he 
taught in a madrasa and became a Friday prayer leader. It was there that he wrote his 
risāla.81 However, he was again pursued by war, and spent several years roaming before 
finally settling in Karbala. In Persia and Iraq Yūsuf would have found himself 
surrounded by Akhbārī thought. In his initial works, he advocated a strict Akhbārism, 
but gradually established a moderate view such that Uṣūlī biographers claimed him as 
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one of their own, calling him an ex-Akhbārī, and citing arguments in Yūsuf’s works in 
which he challenges Akhbārī views.82 In Ḥadā’iq al-nāḍira, although he rejects the use 
of ijmāʻ, ijtihād and ʻaql, he accepts some Uṣūlī positions, such as the permissibility of 
Friday prayer, and advocates lay persons’ reference to the ʻulamā’.83  
Although Yūsuf lived out the entirety of his professional life abroad, he 
remained in close touch with his relatives who had stayed in Bahrain. He mentored and 
taught two of his nephews and judging them worthy, issued each an ijāza: Khalaf, son 
of his brother ʻAbd ʻAlī, and Ḥusayn, son of his brother Muḥammad.84 Ḥusayn 
remained in Dirāz and produced such highly regarded scholarship that prominent 
members of the ʻulamā’ praised his excellence and diligence in teaching, writing, and 
studying, and considered him a “renewer” (mujaddid) of his age.85 Through his teaching 
and influence, Dirāz became a well-known center of Akhbārī thought. Ḥusayn regularly 
debated the scholars of the city of Bilād, who continued for a time to ascribe to 
Uṣūlism.86  
The revival of the Uṣūlī-Akhbārī debate coincided with the start of the 
weakening of Safavid rule. The later Safavid rulers became immersed in the enjoyment 
of their wealth and had less interest in the running of the state than earlier leaders had. 
The Afghans were encroaching from the north, and the ʻIbāḍis of Oman were gathering 
strength to the south. The Omanis, together with some Sunni tribes in the region, 
invaded Bahrain in 1717. In 1722 the Safavids fell to the Afghans. The arrival of the 
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Omanis signaled the end of the extensive Shii legal establishment and period of 
freedom of religious and legal thought. The Omanis immediately began applying heavy 
taxes on the Shii population and replacing Shii officials.87 Not only did these forces 
curb Shii intellectual freedoms, they also hurt local Bahraini commerce, in which the 
ʻulamā’ were actively engaged. This drove some Bahraini ʻulamā’ to emigrate to Persia 
or the shrine cities of Iraq. The Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr’s businesses, for example, were bankrupted 
by the effects of the invasion.  
Despite the political turmoil of the eighteenth century, some Shii scholars stayed 
in Bahrain and continued to produce works on theology and jurisprudence. Akhbārī 
thought became predominant for a time in all the Shii centers of learning as well as in 
Bahrain, although it was never exclusive. There was still a measure of intellectual 
diversity on the islands, with some families remaining Uṣūlī, traces of Ismāʻīlī beliefs, 
and some interest in the esoteric ideas of Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Zayn al-Dīn al-Aḥsā’ī. 
Juan Cole suggests three reasons for Akhbārism’s rise to prominence in Bahrain. 
Politically, Akhbārī beliefs accommodated non-Shii governance better than Uṣūlism 
did. Denying the validity of public Shii religious obligations, and reserving religious 
authority to the sacred texts (and not an active clergy), Akhbārīs could exist 
comfortably under non-Shii rule. Geographically, Akhbārism became tied to certain 
Bahraini towns, such as the Ᾱl ʻAṣfūrs’ hometown of Dirāz. Cole also argues that there 
is a generational aspect to Bahrain’s move toward Akhbārism. The sons of Safavid-
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appointed Uṣūlī officials were disappointed by the failure of the Safavids, and thus 
rejected the ideology of their fathers.88  
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Uṣūlī thought enjoyed a reawakening 
with the work of al-Bihbahānī (d. 1791). Akhbārism died out throughout most of the 
Shii world except for Bahrain. The Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr family remained proponents of this 
school. The work of Shaykh Ḥusayn Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr (d. 1802) became well-known. His thesis 
in jurisprudence, Sadād al-ʻibād wa rashād al-ʻubbād (The propriety and integrity of 
the pious) is still used by Bahraini jurists today.89 Shaykh Khalaf Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr served as 
the Shii community’s chief judge for almost half a century, from the mid-nineteenth to 
the early twentieth centuries. Shaykh Khalaf’s grandson, Shaykh Muḥsin, served as a 
judge in the senior sharīʻa court for ten years and continues today to produce works on 
jurisprudence.  
 
 
The Arrival of the Sunni ʻUtūb Tribes and the Beginning of British Involvement:  
1783 - 1869 
 
 The period  between Safavid rule and the establishment of the rule of King ʻῙsā 
in 1869 was one of political turmoil for Bahrain. Aware of the islands’ strategic position 
on various trade routes, as well as the potential wealth to be gained from its pearling 
industry, Persian, European and Arab tribal powers vied for control. The Omani Arabs 
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had developed a strong navy modeled after that of the Portuguese and became a 
significant force in the Gulf. They captured Bahrain from the Safavids in 1717 and a 
number of other islands to the east of Bahrain. After Nādir Shāh established a new 
government in Iran in 1737, his forces recaptured Bahrain and held it as a province 
maintained by local Arab governors.90 Although Nādir Shāh’s government was Shii, it 
pursued a policy of ecumenism by appointing both Sunnis and Shiis to office, and 
promoting friendly relations between the sects. This was not an easy task after the 
Sunnis suffered the discriminatory policies of the Safavids and while the Sunni 
Wahhābī movement was emerging on the Arabian peninsula pursuing the violent 
suppression of Shiis. Ultimately, Nādir Shāh’s policies were unsuccessful and his 
administration was defeated by Karīm Khān Zand in 1750. Bahrain remained under 
Persian control, again governed by local members of the Ᾱl Madhkūr tribe, a Sunni 
tribe of Omani origin, until the arrival of the ʻUtūb tribes in 1783.91  
 After the defeat of the Portuguese in the mid-seventeenth century, the Dutch had 
taken over the spice trade in the Gulf. This was short-lived, however, as the British East 
India Company arrived and quickly gained strength. Because all commercial activity in 
the Gulf at the time was carried out via seafaring operations, the British saw any other 
powers with capable navies as competition, such as the Omanis and the Arab tribes. 
They therefore allied themselves with Iran, which had no navy. This arrangement was 
successful for a time, but as the British exerted more control over the Gulf, they met 
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with increasing resistance from Arab tribal forces. A period began in which tribes 
fought each other for territory, “pirates” pillaged freely throughout the Gulf, and the 
British made various attempts to secure their hold on trade and commerce by forging 
various alliances with particular tribes.  
 The ʻUtūb was a federation of Sunni tribes indigenous to eastern Arabia and 
what is now Qatar. Having long been involved in seafaring activity, the ʻUtūb were in 
an excellent position to compete for control over trade and pearling in the Gulf. In the 
early eighteenth century two of the ʻUtūb tribes, the Ᾱl Jalāhima and the Ᾱl Khalīfa, 
established themselves in Kuwait under the rule of the Ᾱl Ṣabāḥ tribe. From there, they 
began to send pearling vessels into the waters around Bahrain. Sometime around 1760, 
they were forced out of Kuwait and resettled in Zubāra on the northwestern coast of 
Qatar.92 By the late eighteenth century, a rivalry had developed between the tribes of the 
ʻUtūb. Not long after settling in Zubāra, the Ᾱl Khalīfa built up successful trade and 
pearling businesses such that Zubāra became a prominent commercial center. This drew 
the resentment of other ʻUtūb tribes who expected to share in the profits of these new 
enterprises. When the Ᾱl Jalāhima seceded and began to build a navy of their own, the 
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Ᾱl Khalīfa attacked them and killed their chief, a move that made the Ᾱl Khalīfa 
undisputed leaders of the ʻUtūb.93 
The Ᾱl Khalīfa also had to contend with the Omani tribes. In 1782, Oman 
launched an attack on Zubāra. The Ᾱl Khalīfa were successful in repelling this attack. A 
Kuwaiti fleet had been on its way to assist the Ᾱl Khalīfa when news of the Omanis’ 
defeat reached them. The fleet then changed course and sailed to Bahrain and captured 
the fort at Manama. The Ᾱl Khalīfa and its allies then claimed Bahrain and Zubāra for 
themselves. Early in 1783, Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Khalīfa94 became the first member of the 
family to rule Bahrain.95 
Shaykh Aḥmad spent most of the year in Zubāra and ruled Bahrain through 
agents. It was a prosperous time for the Ᾱl Khalīfa. Most of the Indian trade between 
southern Iraq and Oman passed through Bahraini ports. Very little is known about the 
details of Aḥmad’s rule, but Khuri ventures that he managed it as an occupied territory 
in much the same way as the Persians did before him, collecting taxes and demanding 
that the local population pay tribute. He most likely did not become directly involved 
with Bahraini society. The Ᾱl Khalīfa, along with the other tribes that were part of the 
ʻUtūb confederation followed their own system of government which consisted of tribal 
councils that decided the political, economic, and social concerns of the tribe based on 
customary rules.96  
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The Ᾱl Khalīfa’s success attracted once again the attention of the Omanis and a 
new force in the Gulf, the Wahhābīs. In 1795, the Wahhābīs attacked Zubāra and the Ᾱl 
Khalīfa were forced to retreat to Bahrain the following year, the year that Shaykh 
Aḥmad died. He was succeeded by his two sons, Sulaymān and ʻAbdullāh, who took 
charge of Manama and Muharraq respectively. Khuri writes that the fall of Zubāra 
initiated a new era in Bahrain, one in which the Ᾱl Khalīfa began to exert direct control 
over the islands.97 This did not result in good fortune for either the local population or 
successful trade endeavors for the Ᾱl Khalīfa. The two branches of the family 
represented by Shaykh Aḥmad’s sons competed for wealth and power and the support 
of the other ʻUtūb tribes, and appeared more interested in this power struggle than in the 
success of their new territory. Even after the deaths of Sulaymān (1825) and his son 
Khalīfa (1834), Khalīfa’s son Muḥammad continued the feud with his great uncle 
ʻAbdullāh. To fund their activities, the Ᾱl Khalīfa levied heavy taxes on local farmers 
and merchants, and even resorted to extortion and confiscation of property. The 
situation continued to grow worse as Muḥammad came to gain greater support from the 
other tribal chiefs as well as from Wahhābī tribes in Arabia. In 1834, he attacked 
ʻAbdullāh and forced his retreat to the Eastern coast of Arabia. Thereafter, he began to 
indulge in excessive practices of oppression and violence. A British agent of the 
government of India who was charged with monitoring affairs in Bahrain described the 
situation there as follows: “Piratical outrages were frequent; the Resident’s advice was 
asked only to be disregarded; agreements were broken as soon as made; trade 
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languished; the common people were oppressed, and took every opportunity that 
presented itself of flying from the hands of the oppressors.”98 By 1843, trade had 
declined to half of what it had been during Aḥmad’s rule.99  
In the meantime, Britain was becoming a military as well as a commercial force 
in the Gulf. Their trade operations and those of their allies were continually being 
interrupted by piracy carried out mainly by the Ᾱl Qawāsim, a tribe that controlled the 
Straight of Hormuz and exacted tolls from all passing ships. The British refused to pay 
the tolls, and instead sent a military force to attack the Ᾱl Qawāsim and the coast of 
Oman, which they referred to as the “Pirate Coast.” After soundly defeating the Ᾱl 
Qawāsim and subduing the Pirate Coast, the British imposed the General Treaty of 
Peace on several ruling shaykhs in the Gulf. Signatories agreed to refrain from acts of 
piracy and intertribal warfare in exchange for British protection.100 The 1820 treaty 
recognized the Ᾱl Khalīfa as rulers of Bahrain and began a relationship in which Britain 
gradually came to exercise more and more control over Bahrain’s affairs. The Political 
Residency at Bushire sent one of its Indian assistants to Manama to open and maintain 
an office in 1829.101 Britain helped to protect Bahrain from external threats, yet the 
feuding between the two branches of the Ᾱl Khalīfa continued unabated. As was 
described above, any agreements made between the Ᾱl Khalīfa and the British were 
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largely ignored, and ʻUtūb tribes continued to engage in piracy, which disrupted British 
trade operations. In an effort to control the situation, in 1861 the British navy seized two 
of Muḥammad’s war vessels and encouraged him to sign a treaty that declared all 
previous agreements in force.102 In it, Muḥammad also agreed to refrain from piracy, 
acts of war, and slavery in exchange for British protection from external threats.103 
Although Muḥammad did sign the treaty, he did nothing to alter his activities. He 
continued to engage in acts of piracy and violence, most notably the murder of his 
brother ʻAlī, who had begun working with the British toward Muḥammad’s 
overthrow.104 
Finally in 1869, a British task force again seized Muḥammad’s war vessels, fort, 
and weaponry, and publicly burnt the vessels. After interviewing local merchants and 
some of the minor tribes’ chiefs, finding that they would agree to be ruled by a member 
of ʻAlī’s branch of the Ᾱl Khalīfa, the British sought out Shaykh ʻῙsā ibn ʻAlī who was 
responsible for the Ᾱl Khalīfa territory in Qatar. They invited him to accept the position 
of sole ruler of Bahrain under their protection, and he accepted. On the second of 
December, 1869, ʻῙsā took up residence in Bahrain and began the period of active Ᾱl 
Khalīfa rule. In treaties concluded in 1880 and 1892, Shaykh ʻῙsā promised to consult 
the British authorities before entering into negotiations with any other state or 
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government, and that he would not sell, cede, or mortgage any part of his territory to 
any but the British government.105 
 We know little about how the local population fared during this period. We do 
know from Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī’s Lu’lu’at al-Baḥrayn that from the time of the Omani 
invasion in 1717, many Shii businesses suffered first from heavy taxation by the 
Omanis, and that many Shiis left Bahrain for this reason. Later on, British records 
repeatedly refer to oppression of the local population by the ʻUtūb tribes in the form of 
extortion, confiscation of property, and piracy. The pearling industry, which was run by 
Shii ʻulamā’ during the Safavid period, was gradually taken over by members of the 
ʻUtūb tribes. These developments had a negative effect on the Shii religious 
establishment of madrasas and centers of legal education. We do have the sources of 
some of the Shii ʻulamā’ who remained in Bahrain during this period and continued to 
produce works of jurisprudence, such as Ḥusayn Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr (d. 1802) and ʻAbdullāh al-
Sitrī (d. 1864). However, there is a clear decline in, at the least, the quantity of Shii 
scholarship coming from Bahrain, if not also the quality. 
 While indigenous Shiis remained the majority of the population, there was an 
increase in migration of traders, merchants, and workers from India, Iran, Iraq and other 
areas to Bahrain during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. This 
demographic change resulted in a diversity of religious beliefs as well as religious 
practices, including in the realm of religious law. Fuad Khuri writes that by the end of 
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the nineteenth century, four major Islamic legal schools were represented. Along with 
the indigenous Shia whose origins are unclear but thought to be Safavid, Arab Shiis 
came to Bahrain from Eastern Arabia, especially the town of al-Ḥasā. All of these Shiis 
followed the Jaʻfarī school of law. The Ᾱl Khalīfa and the other tribes of the ʻUtūb 
alliance followed the Mālikī maddhab. Other Sunnis from Arabia also began to arrive at 
this time from the area of the Najd, but these Sunnis were urban and non-tribal, and they 
followed the Ḥanbalī school of law. A Sunni group of Persian descent called the 
Hawala came to Bahrain when trade routes shifted from the eastern to the western coast 
of the Gulf, and also to work in the pearling and later the oil industry. Many Hawalas 
consider themselves to be descended from Arabian tribes, yet their family names and 
linguistic history are Persian. Hawala Sunnis are also distinguished from the Arabian 
Sunni tribes because they follow the Shāfiʻī madhhab.106 Non-Muslim immigrants also 
comprise part of the population, therefore small communities of Hindus, Jews, and 
Christians begin to form during this period. Because there was a lack of political 
stability and centralization of rule, members of both the Muslim and the non-Muslim 
communities followed the dictates of their own religious traditions in matters of law.107  
 As Muḥammad Ᾱl Khalīfa’s behavior became more erratic and oppressive 
throughout the 1860’s, British authorities became concerned for the welfare of their 
Indian subjects who had migrated there. As part of the “Friendly Convention” of 1861 
mentioned above, Muḥammad was deprived of judicial competence over British 
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subjects living in Bahrain. Any disputes involving British subjects of a civil, criminal, 
or commercial nature would now be handled by the Political Resident.108 This 
agreement was the start of British involvement in Bahrain’s judicial affairs.  
 
 
The Modern Period 
 
Ᾱl-Khalīfa Rule and Bahrain as a British Quasi-Protectorate:  
The Rule of Shaykh ʻῙsā 1869 - 1923 
 
 The rule of Shaykh ʻῙsā lasted from 1869 until 1923. By making Bahrain a 
signatory to the treaties of 1820, 1880, and 1892, Britain legitimized Ᾱl Khalīfa rule 
and established physical boundaries to the territory controlled by the ruling family. 
Foreign companies were granted concessions to operate in Bahrain in exchange for 
rents paid to the Ᾱl Khalīfa. This influx of foreign wealth provided the ruling family 
with resources independent of local markets, thus abrogating the need to cooperate with 
Bahraini merchants.109 The Ᾱl Khalīfa operated a feudal-type estate system in which 
prominent members of the family were given a specific section of palm groves to 
manage. The head of each estate had his own staff consisting of a tax collector, guards, 
and an on-site manager who dealt directly with the laborers who were mostly Shii 
peasants. There was no central oversight or standardization by the ruler, so each Shaykh 
                                                
108 “Friendly Convention,” as cited above, f.n. 60. 
109 Khuri, Tribe, p.  
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levied taxes and rents as he saw fit, which were enforced by physical coercion. The 
cities of Manama and Muharraq were each ruled by an amīr and a group of fidāwīs,110 
which were similar to a police force that executed the will of the ruler and/or the Sunni 
qāḍī.111 
 For the Sunnis, justice was administered in most cases by tribal chiefs or by the 
ruler himself as a function of regularly held councils, majālis (sg. majlis). The councils 
discussed and issued decisions on many different kinds of matters – trade, prices, 
wages, treaties with foreign powers, marriages of political significance, as well as legal 
issues involving contracts, disputes, and criminal offenses. The ruler’s council was the 
highest authority in the country and issued decisions on matters of national political or 
economic importance, such as the management of the ports, the distribution of palm 
groves, pearl diving rights, and the recruitment of forced labor. It also acted as an 
appellate court when local councils could not resolve a particular conflict. There was no 
hierarchy among the local councils. Each managed the affairs of its respective tribe or 
branch of a tribe.112  
 When a dispute occurred involving a foreigner and a Bahraini, an informal joint 
court was held in which the British agent and Shaykh ʻῙsā or his representative together 
                                                
110 The term fidāwī is thought to derive from fidā’i, which refers to members of the Nizārī Ismāʻīlīs who 
were sent to assassinate enemies of the sect. See Huart, Cl. “Fidāʻī.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second 
Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs. Brill, 
2010. Brill Online. UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA. 02 January 2010 
<http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:3678/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-2355> 
111 IOR: R/15/2/83 or IOR: L/P&S/10/1039, Correspondence No. 304-S of 1922, From Lieutenant 
Colonel A.P. Trevor, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to D. de S. Bray, C.S.I., C.I.E., 
C.B.E., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, 14 April 1922, enclosing letter from C.F. Daly, 
Major I.A., Political Agent, Bahrain, 11 April 1922, Records of Bahrain: Primary Documents, 1820-
1960, Vol. 3: 1892-1923, Archive Editions, 1993, pp. 709-714.  
112 Khuri, Tribe, pp. 35-36. 
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decided the case. The British agent could also refer civil disputes between foreigners 
and Bahrainis to an arbitrator.113 Other courts that operated at this time were the Majlis 
al-ʻUrf and the Salifat al-Ghawṣ. The Majlis al-ʻUrf, also called Majlis al-Tijāra, was a 
type of trade council that was comprised of three or four prominent merchants that met 
upon request to rule on cases involving foreign trade. 114 Khuri writes that the council’s 
decisions were based on a set of Kuwaiti laws called qanūn al-safar that was published 
around the turn of the nineteenth century. The Salifat al-Ghawṣ dealt with loan 
payments, debts, and disputes involving the pearling industry. It was established by the 
Ᾱl Khalīfa, who appointed the judge of the court in agreement with the chiefs of the 
pearling tribes. Whereas cases involving debt were usually referred to qāḍīs to be dealt 
with under sharīʻa, which had developed extensive rules regarding this issue, the judges 
appointed by the Ᾱl Khalīfa for this court reportedly had no background in Islamic law, 
and based their decisions simply on “conventional wisdom, political instincts, and 
personal whims, generally taking the side of the powerful to avoid conflict.”115  
 The last type of court existing at this time is the sharīʻa court. There are no 
known court records and little written material concerning the operations of the sharīʻa 
courts during the period preceding the rule of Shaykh ʻῙsā.116 Most likely, the followers 
of each school of law referred their legal concerns to a local qāḍī. It was only during the 
rule of Shaykh ʻῙsā that formal appointments begin to be made. For Sunnis, two qāḍīs 
                                                
113 IOR: L/P&S/10/28 & 82, No. 188 of 1907, From Foreign Department, Government of India, to John 
Morley, O.M., Secretary of State for India, 14 November 1907, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 3, p. 419.  
114 IOR: L/P&S/10/248 and R/15/1/299, The Bahrain Order in Council, India Office to Governor General 
in Council, 12 August 1913, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 3, pp. 446-469. 
115 Khuri, Tribe, p. 65. 
116 John Gordon Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, ’Oman, and Central Arabia; Vol. I, Westmead, 
Eng., Gregg, 1970, p. 387.  
 74 
were appointed, one for Muharraq and one for Manama, although the Manama judge 
seems to have been in a primary role. Both qāḍīs were of the Mālikī school. ʻAbd al-
Raḥmān ibn Shaykh ʻAbd al-Latīf (b. 1837), originally from al-Ḥasā, served as 
Muharraq’s qāḍī, while Jasīm al-Mihza (d. 1927)117 was appointed as the Manama 
judge. British sources also mention the latter’s brother, Aḥmad, as a Manama qāḍī who 
worked together with Shaykh Jasīm. The qāḍīs held court in their own homes and dealt 
with cases of family law and sometimes petty crimes. Cases involving both a Sunni and 
a Shii were referred to the Sunni judges.118 Their decisions were ostensibly based on 
sharīʻa, although Khuri writes that the Sunni qāḍīs conceded to tribal law when 
possible. Their rulings on minor cases were final, but major cases could be appealed to 
the ruler. In fact, Khuri argues that the Sunni qāḍīs, and especially Jasīm al-Mihza, 
ruled in conjunction with the ruler, and calls their role “an accessory function” of tribal 
government.119 British sources attest to the close relationship Shaykh Jasīm held with 
members of the Ᾱl Khalīfa and repeatedly call his integrity into question.120 The qāḍīs 
worked closely with the ruler, and their decisions were enforced by the ruler’s fidāwīs. 
There was no such relationship between the ruler and the Shii qāḍīs.121 
                                                
117 This qāḍī’s name appears as “Jāsim” in some English sources and “Qāsim” in others. This can be 
explained by regional variations in the pronunciation of the Arabic letter qāf.  
118 IOR: R/15/186, Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Ross, Report, 1882, as referenced in Radhi, Judiciary, pp. 15-
16. 
119 Khuri, Tribe, p. 68-69.  
120 IOR: L/P&S/10/81, Correspondence No. 421 From Major P.Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political 
Resident in the Persian Gulf, to The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, 17 
December 1904; and Enclosure No. 5: No. 272, dated 19 November 1904, From Captain F.B. Prideaux, 
Assistant Political Agent, Bahrein, to Major P.Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian 
Gulf, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 3, pp. 198-205. 
121 Khuri, Tribe, pp. 68-69. 
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 The sources are unclear about the state of the sharīʻa courts and the qāḍīs for the 
Shia during this period. Hassan Radhi notes that two qāḍīs were appointed by Shaykh 
ʻῙsā for the Shia: Muḥammad ʻAlī ibn Shaykh ʻAbdullāh (b. 1826) and Aḥmad ibn 
Shaykh Salmān (b. 1841).122 However, Khuri writes that there were many Shii qāḍīs, 
nearly one for every village or neighborhood. Unlike the Sunni qāḍīs, the Shii qāḍīs’ 
rulings were not enforced by the ruler’s fidāwīs, but rather by the consensus of the 
community. Their decisions were reportedly based entirely on sharīʻa, and were final 
for all cases, with no appeal process linked with the ruler.123  
Khuri contrasts the type of authority held by the Sunni qāḍīs with that held by 
the Shiis. Whereas the Sunni qāḍīs derived their authority from their appointment by the 
ruler, the Shii qāḍīs derived theirs from the community. While the ruler did reportedly 
appoint two Shii qāḍīs, it is to the local qāḍīs who emerged spontaneously from the 
community that people actually turned to have their issues resolved.124 In addition to the 
local village qāḍīs, multiple sources attest that one Shii qāḍī rose to prominence above 
the others, and was regarded by Shiis as the highest religious authority on the islands.125 
This was none other than a member of the Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr family, Shaykh Khalaf Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr. 
Shaykh Khalaf’s authority had not been sanctioned by the Ᾱl Khalīfa. It was not until 
the British became involved in Bahrain’s domestic affairs that he was recognized as the 
“head qāḍī,” and formally appointed. When Charles Belgrave arrived in 1926 to take up 
                                                
122 Radhi, Judiciary, p. 16. 
123 Khuri, Tribe, p.  
124 Khuri, Tribe, pp. * 
125 Khuri, Tribe, p. 84; Charles Belgrave, Personal Column, London: Hutchinson of London, p. 27; 
Rahdi, Judiciary, p. 54-56; IOR: R/15/2/112 5/22, Shaikh Khalaf ibn Ahmad al-Usfur, Shiite Qadi: Career 
and dismissal, 22 August 1928- 31 December 1931; Interview with Shaykh Muḥsin Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr, 9 March 
2006.  
 76 
the position of legal adviser to the ruler, he was struck by the reverence with which 
Shiis held Shayhk Khalaf: “He had a tremendous reputation among the village people. 
They used to fall on their knees and kiss the hem of his robe, and when he visited the 
villages they brought out the best of everything for his delectation.”126  
There was a significant difference in the area over which the Sunni qāḍīs had 
control versus that of the Shii qāḍīs. The Sunni qāḍīs handled basic personal status 
issues such as marriage contracts, divorce settlements, and child custody agreements, 
while the tribal chief was the dominant authority figure who was consulted on nearly all 
issues. Even when the case was handled by the qāḍī, the final authority rested with the 
head tribal chief, the ruler. The ruler and the other tribal chiefs managed the economic 
resources held by the tribe, and their leadership arose from the consensus of the tribe. 
For Shiis, the qāḍīs played this role. They handled all manner of disputes, they 
controlled the economic resources of the Shii community in the form of waqf estates, 
and they advised the community on trade, commerce, and even political affairs.127  
This arrangement necessarily determined the sources used in the adjudication of 
cases. Scholars have documented the fact that sharīʻa has never been the exclusive 
source of law used by Islamic societies. Adjudication of legal issues has always been a 
process of negotiation between local customary laws, tribal rules, ruler’s edicts, 
                                                
126 Charles Belgrave, Personal Column, London: Hutchinson of London, p. 27. 
127 Khuri, Tribe, pp. 82-84. In summarizing Khuri’s work on the role of the Shīʻī qāḍī in Bahrain, Mahdi 
Abdalla al-Tajir notes that while Khuri correctly demonstrates that Shīʻī qāḍīs played a more active role 
in the community than did their Sunnī counterparts, not all Baḥārnah (native Shīʻite) leaders were qāḍīs 
or jurists. Al-Tajir specifically refers to Shīʻī community leaders during the years 1920-1945 who were 
pearl merchants, landowners and others. Although the present discussion covers the period immediately 
prior to that to which al-Tajir refers, his point is worthy of consideration. See Mahdi Abdalla al-
Tajir,Bahrain 1920-1945: Britain, the Shaikh, and the Administration, London, New York, Sydney: 
Croom Helm, p. 16.  
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Qur’anic principles, substantive laws recorded in fiqh manuals, and in the modern 
period, Western, secular codes.128 The degree to which various sources are used is 
constantly in flux and changes with political and historical circumstances. Because 
court records are largely inaccessible in Bahrain up to the present day, it is nearly 
impossible to determine what the specific formula was for either of the sects in any 
specific time period. Khuri’s work, which was completed from 1974-1975 and covers 
the period from 1869 to roughly Bahrain’s independence in 1971, gives us the only 
detailed study on the sources of law used in any period of Bahraini legal history.129  
His work reveals that for Bahrain during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries there was a significant difference in the degree to which the Sunni community 
referred to sharīʻa versus the Shii community. At least until the British reforms of the 
1920’s, tribal or customary law appears to be the primary source of legal decisions for 
the Sunni community. The tribal chief, who was generally not a religious scholar, was 
the central figure who held wide jurisdiction over the tribe’s affairs. Decisions in his 
council were made according to custom or tribal law: “rarely if ever did religious law 
take precedence over tribal dictates” for the Sunnis.130 For issues involving trade or 
commerce, Sunnis were referred to the Majlis al-ʻUrf, and for disputes involving 
pearling, to the Salifat al-Ghawṣ. In neither case were those settling the disputes 
schooled in sharīʻa. Pearling cases often also involved Shii petitioners, as nearly all 
                                                
128 See Joseph Schacht, An introduction to Islamic law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964; Noel J. Coulson, 
A history of Islamic law, Edinburgh: University Press, 1964; Wael B. Hallaq, ed., The formation of 
Islamic law, Aldershots, Hants, Great Britain; Burlington, VT: Ashgate/Variorum, 2004.   
129 To the author’s knowledge, two collections of court records exist in personal libraries in Bahrain. One 
is thought be dated from the early twentieth century, and the other collection holds relatively recent 
judgments, probably from the last twenty years. Neither of these collections have been studied. 
130 Khuri, Tribe, p. 8. 
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pearl divers were Shii, while most boat owners were Sunnis. Shii petitions to the British 
agency attest to the fact that these cases were not settled according to Islamic law: 
Much oppression is done in the diving question in this  
town of Bahrain. Such proceedings are contrary to the  
Mohammedan Law. Although we are Shiah but we are  
in concurrence with all the Islamic religions agree to  
the decision of Sunni judges in this matter. When one  
of the divers complains to the Government and demands  
his dues from the Nakhoda [boat owner] they refer him  
to the diving Salifah Court, that is two wicked Arabs who  
do not distinguish right from wrong. Anyhow, they decide  
the case in favor of the oppressors – the diving Nakhodas –  
and by these reasons they damage the rights (of the divers).131   
 
For the Shii community, the person who held a central position similar to that of 
the Sunni’s tribal chief was the head qāḍī. For the period in question, this person was 
Shaykh Khalaf. Shaykh Khalaf, who was a religious scholar, acted as an appeals judge 
for local qāḍīs dealing with personal status issues as well as handling the other areas 
that for the Sunni community were handled by the tribal chief. Reportedly, all of these 
issues were dealt with according to sharīʻa in the Shii community.  
 
 
1904 Incidents – Dispute Over Jurisdiction 
 
Britain’s interest in Bahrain until this point had remained mostly commercial. 
The port at Manama was a thriving stop on Gulf trade routes, although not run as 
                                                
131 IOR: L/P&S/10/1039 and R/15/1/338, Translation of petition from 7 representatives of the Baharnah, 
handed to the Political Resident on 26th October 1923, Records of Bahrain: Primary Documents 1820-
1960, Vol. 4, 1923-1932, p. 166.  
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efficiently as the British would have liked. The pearling industry was also seeing a 
successful return. The British had offered protection against foreign invaders, but 
pursued a policy of the least intervention necessary in domestic affairs.132 Regarding 
judicial matters, the local British agent had jurisdiction over British subjects living in 
Bahrain and European foreigners as per the “Friendly Convention” of 1861. An 
informal joint court was convened to handle cases between British and Bahraini 
subjects. In the fall of 1904, two incidents occurred that both caused the British to 
reconsider the extent of their jurisdiction and raised the issue of religion in the 
determination of judicial competence. The incidents both involved clashes between 
Sunnis who were Bahraini subjects and Shiis who were Qajar subjects. Although these 
Shiis were technically “foreigners,” the Bahraini ruler claimed them as belonging to his 
jurisdiction by reason of their being Muslim. These incidents forced a redefinition of the 
relative spheres of judicial authority between Britain and Bahrain, and between 
Muslims and non-Muslims.  
On September 29, 1904, a fight took place between the employees of a German 
trading firm and a number of fidāwīs in the employ of a member of the Ᾱl Khalīfa 
family, Shaykh ʻῙsā’s nephew ʻAlī.133 The Ᾱl Khalīfa at this time regularly engaged in 
                                                
132 IOR: L/P&S/7/138 & 164, Correspondence No. 85 of 1904, from the Foreign Department, 
Government of India, to the Hon. St. John Brodrick, Secretary of State for India, 21 April 1904, Records 
of Bahrain, Vol. 3, pp. 168-170. 
133 This description of the September 1904 incident is taken from the following correspondences, all 
found in IOR: L/P&S/10/81: No. 225 of 1904 from J.C. Gaskin, Esq., Assistant Political Agent, Bahrein, 
to Major P.Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 1 October 1904; From Herr 
Robert Wonckhaus to J.C. Gaskin, Esq., Assistant Political Agent, Bahrein, 29 September 1904; From 
Sheikh Isa ibn Ali Al Khalifa, Chief of Bahrein, to Major P.Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident 
in the Persian Gulf, 20 Rajab 1322/1 October 1904; From Sheikh Ali ibn Ahmed Al Khalifa to Sheikh Isa 
ibn Ali Al Khalifa, Chief of Bahrein; No. 252 From Captain F.B. Prideaux, Assistant Political Agent, 
Bahrein, to Major P.Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 31 October 1904; 
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the forced labor of Bahrain natives and/or migrant workers from India, Africa, or other 
parts of the Gulf. At first a privilege of the ruler and tribal chiefs, as the Ᾱl Khalīfa’s 
power became more secure with British support, numerous members of the family 
began to engage in this practice. Whenever labor was needed for the completion of any 
project or task, members of the Ᾱl Khalīfa would simply gather the required number of 
laborers and force them to do the work free of charge for whatever length of time was 
necessary. Shaykh ʻῙsā’s nephew ʻAlī was known for his abuses of this system, as well 
as for practicing other forms of oppression of the native Shii population in particular. 
The September incident reportedly occurred when some of ʻAlī’s fidāwīs entered the 
German firm and attempted to commandeer some of the firm’s own workers as forced 
labor. A Shii employee of the firm attempted to turn them away, explaining that the 
servants were already otherwise engaged. Fighting then broke out between the fidāwīs 
and the firm’s employees. Hearing loud voices, a German employee who was working 
on the second floor came downstairs, and after attempting to break up the fight was 
severely beaten by the fidāwīs.  
Immediately afterward, the incident was reported to the British Political 
Resident, Major Cox. Cox contacted Shaykh ʻῙsā, and it was agreed that because the 
incident involved both Bahrainis and British-protected citizens, a decision would have 
to be arrived at jointly. After completing an investigation, Cox proposed that a fair 
settlement would entail the flogging and imprisonment of the fidāwīs, a sum of 
                                                                                                                                          
No. 248 From Captain F.B. Prideaux, Assistant Political Agent, Bahrein, to Herr Robert Wonckhaus, 28 
October 1904; From Herr Robert Wonckhaus to Captain F.B. Prideaux, Assistant Political Agent, 
Bahrein, 30 October 1904, Records of Bahrain: Primary Documents, 1820-1960, Vol. 3: 1892-1923, 
Archive Editions, 1993, pp. 182-190. 
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compensation paid by ʻAlī to the German firm, and in consideration of the additional 
offenses reportedly committed by ʻAlī, his expulsion from Bahrain for a period of four 
years. Shaykh ʻῙsā agreed to the monetary part of the settlement, and promptly 
forwarded the compensation to the German firm. However, he resisted both the arrest of 
the fidāwīs and the expulsion of his nephew. When the fidāwīs were finally brought in, 
Shaykh ʻῙsā refused to allow any of his staff to administer the flogging, and a British 
subject was eventually instructed to do so. Understanding that the expulsion of a 
member of the ruling family was a sensitive matter, Cox engaged in a lengthy process 
of negotiation with Shaykh ʻῙsā over ʻAlī’s fate. 
Shortly thereafter, another incident involving ʻAlī occurred on November 14.134 
A clash between Arab Sunnis, and Shii Qajar subjects and native Shiis broke out in the 
Manama bazaar. It was never determined decisively who threw the first blow, but the 
skirmish began when the servant of a Qajar trader passed one of ʻAlī’s fidāwīs in an 
alleyway. The two began fighting, and others quickly joined in. The end result was that 
two members of the Qajar trader’s family were beaten nearly to death, and seven other 
Shiis were badly injured. The case was reported to Cox and to Shaykh ʻῙsā. Cox 
immediately began interviewing witnesses and arranging for testimony to be given by 
those injured and the doctor who attended them. Within a few days, Shaykh ʻῙsā 
                                                
134 The following description of the November 1904 incident was taken from the following 
correspondences all found in IOR: L/P&S/10/81. Quotations will be cited individually, and with specific 
pages numbers. From Herr Robert Wonckhaus to Captain F.B. Prideaux, Assistant Political Agent, 
Bahrein, 5 November 1904; No. 259, From Captain F.B. Prideaux, Assistant Political Agent, Bahrein, to 
Sheikh Isa ibn Ali Al Khalifah, 7 November 1904; From Sheikh Isa ibn Ali Al Khalifah to Captain F.B. 
Prideaux, Assistant Political Agent, Bahrein, 10 November 1904; No. 260, From Captain F.B. Prideaux, 
Assistant Political Agent, Bahrein, to Herr Robert Wonckhaus, 10 November 1904; No. 421, From Major 
P.Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the Secretary to the Government of 
India in the Foreign Department, 17 December 1904, with enclosures, Records of Bahrain: Primary 
Documents, 1820-1960, Vol. 2: 1868-1892, Archive Editions, 1993, pp. 190-202. 
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submitted to Cox an istishhād, or written testimony, from Sunni witnesses and ʻAlī’s 
fidāwīs drawn up by the Sunnī qāḍī Shaykh Jāsim al-Mihza. The istishhād affirmed that 
the witnesses had seen the Qajar subjects attacking and beating Sunni Bahrainis. Cox 
replied that if the istishhād was to be admissible, the witnesses must also appear in court 
to be cross-examined. Shaykh ʻῙsā at first refused to call the witnesses, saying that the 
Sunnis would not appear in the presence of Shiis. Cox persisted, indicating to ʻῙsā that 
the istishhād held even less weight in this case because some of the Shii witnesses had 
reported seeing Shaykh Jāsim himself urging Sunni worshippers to leave his mosque 
and to “Kill, kill the moguls135!!”136 ʻῙsā relented and sent the Sunnis to Cox for cross-
examination. Cox’s determination was that the Sunnis had been primed on what to say 
and that the Shiis were in the right. The neighborhood in which the clash took place was 
a Sunni neighborhood in which the Qajar Shiis were considerably outnumbered. The 
family that was attacked maintained a well-known and successful cargo-landing 
business, while ʻAlī and his fidāwīs were already notorious for their repeated acts of 
oppression and violence. The injuries of nine Shiis had either been witnessed by Cox 
himself or attested to by the physician, while ʻῙsā could not produce one Sunni who 
suffered any wounds. Cox told ʻῙsā that despite his own religious biases, he must see 
justice done for the Shiis. ʻῙsā responded that he would agree to send the case to the 
sharīʻa court to settle.  
                                                
135 Shaykh Jāsim’s alleged use of the term “moguls” to refer to Shiis reflects a Sunni belief prevalent in 
the Gulf that Shiis were responsible for the sack of Baghdad in 1258.   
136 IOR: L/P&S/10/81, No. 270 From Captain F.B. Prideaux, Assistant Political Agent, Bahrein, to Major 
P.Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 17 November 1904, Enclosure No. 1 
of No. 421, From Major P.Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the 
Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, 17 December 1904, with enclosures, 
Records of Bahrain, Vol. 2, p. 202. 
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The Qajar subjects were then ordered to appear before the Sunni sharīʻa court – 
presided over by Shaykh Jāsim himself. They refused, arguing that since the qāḍī 
himself was involved in instigating the violence against them, it was a foregone 
conclusion that they would be found guilty and sentenced to flogging or imprisonment. 
Being Qajar subjects, they also contacted their government in Tehran seeking 
assistance. Tehran contacted the British agent in Bahrain and requested that justice be 
done for their subjects. Cox again met with Shaykh ʻῙsā and explained that sending the 
case to the sharīʻa court was not a workable solution. The Qajar Shiis could not expect 
to receive justice from a Sunni qāḍī, especially Shaykh Jāsim. Furthermore, the British 
agent pointed out, no Muslim can be compelled to attend a sharīʻa court if he did not 
wish to, and the Qajar Shiis absolutely refused. In a communication to Cox, the 
Assistant Political Agent Captain Prideaux wrote:  
Sheikh Isa, I think, should be told emphatically that 
no disputes between Shiahs and Sunnis are henceforth  
to be referred to the Shara Court, any more than disputes  
between Hindus and Mahommedans are. The Shiahs, who  
are mostly Persians,137 in the absence of the Shah’s Consular 
representatives naturally look to us for protection, and as  
the British Government are interested in the welfare of all  
classes in Bahrein, they cannot view with equanimity the  
injustice even of making Bahrein Shiahs (who are all Persian  
by origin) submit to the jurisdiction of a religious Court  
other than their own. All such cases should be adjudicated  
upon by the Chief himself [Shaykh ‘Isa] or by an impartial  
Mejlis.138  
 
                                                
137 Prideaux refers to Shii Qajar subjects as “Persians.”  
138 IOR: L/P&S/10/81, Correspondence No. 270, from Captain F.B. Prideaux, Assistant Political Agent, 
Bahrein to Major P.Z. Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 17 November 1904, Records of 
Bahrain, Vol. 2, p. 204. 
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Ironically, it is the British who remind the Muslim ruler about the voluntary nature of 
Muslims’ appearance in sharīʻa court. ʻῙsā remained obdurate, and told Cox that even if 
the British government seized Bahrain, which he knew they were capable of doing, he 
would not consent to the trial of the Qajar Shiis except in his own courts. In the 
meantime, ʻῙsā’s nephew ʻAlī remained in Bahrain and continued to evade punishment 
for the incident at the German firm as well.  
A discussion then ensued between Cox and the Foreign Office in India about 
how to resolve the deadlock. The British State Department advised the continued use of 
diplomacy. However, Cox reported that every tack had been tried, and ʻῙsā would not 
budge. Meanwhile, Tehran continued to apply pressure on the British to see justice 
done. Finally a decision was reached by the British to present ʻῙsā with an ultimatum: 
either he would punish the Sunni offenders as well as his nephew ʻAlī, or British 
warships would take military action. The ultimatum was delivered on February 25, 
1905, together with a show of naval force at the Manama port.  
 
Bahrain Order-In-Council 1913/1919 
 
 The British response to the incidents of 1904 initiated a new phase in Bahraini-
British relations in which Britain took an active role in managing Bahrain’s domestic 
affairs. The use of the threat of force demonstrated to the Ᾱl Khalīfa that Britain meant 
to direct the course of the country’s future. During negotiations over the punishment of 
ʻAlī and his fidāwīs, Shaykh ʻῙsā had been reminded by Cox that it was the British who 
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sought him out to rule, and that without their support he would not be in a position of 
leadership. Somewhat cowed after these events, ʻῙsā for a time became more tractable to 
British “advice.”139  
 Because the number of British subjects and other foreigners in Bahrain was 
steadily increasing, and in light of the difficulty of resolving the 1904 cases, the British 
saw the need to define more clearly their judicial authority. In 1907 the Foreign Office 
began to recommend the establishment of an Order-In-Council that would not only 
outline Britain’s jurisdiction over its own subjects, but would also determine procedure 
in Bahraini courts whenever a British subject or a foreigner was involved. Britain was 
still concerned to maintain an image to the international community of minimal 
involvement in Bahrain’s internal administration and therefore they did not want to 
appear to issue the Bahrain-Order-In-Council (hereafter, BOIC) unilaterally.140 In 1909, 
the Foreign Office instructed the agent in Bahrain to acquire an official statement from 
Shaykh ʻῙsā asking the British to assume jurisdiction of foreigners. ʻῙsā wrote the 
statement, but after asking the British to exercise authority in all cases in which 
foreigners only are concerned, he added, “but not in other cases; and in cases that occur 
between foreigners and my subjects, it is necessary that you and I settle them jointly.”141 
In these last phrases, ʻῙsā wanted to maintain some control over cases such as those in 
                                                
139 IOR: L/P&S/10/81, Memorandum of demands made by the Officiating Political Resident in the 
Persian Gulf upon Sheikh Isa ibn Ali, Chief of Bahrein, by order of the Government of India, Enclosure 
No. 1 of No. 119, From Major P.Z. Cox, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to The 
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, 4 March 1905, Records of 
Bahrain, Vol. 2, p. 239. 
140 IOR: L/P&S/10/28 & 82, No. 188 of 1907, From Foreign Department, Government of India, to John 
Morley, O.M., Secretary of State for India, 14 November 1907, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 3, pp. 419-421. 
141 IOR: L/P&S/10/28 & 82, Correspondence from Sheikh Esa ibn Ali Al Khalifa to Captain C.F. 
Mackenzie, Political Agent, Bahrein, 16 July 1909, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 3, p. 431. 
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1904 in the context of the Joint Court. Thus, a dual-authority system was established in 
which the British agency and the Bahraini ruler shared authority. 
The letter was considered sufficient to meet the need for which it was requested. 
However, the Foreign Office expressed concern that the term “foreigner” needed to be 
defined in the final draft of the BOIC.142 ʻῙsā would not likely take issue with Britain 
handling cases of Europeans or subjects of Christian powers, but there was some 
ambiguity in the case of subjects of Muslim rulers such as those of the Qajar Shah or of 
Turkey, and especially in the case of subjects of other Arab rulers in the Gulf such as 
those of Oman, Kuwait, Qatar and Arabia. Britain considered itself responsible for the 
well-being of subjects of any country that it had friendly relations with while they were 
in areas under British protection. Because these subjects were Muslim and Arab, ʻῙsā 
believed he could claim jurisdiction over them in his own courts. Not only was it a 
political matter, it was also financial. Traditionally, a court fee (khidma) of 
approximately 10% of the amount involved was charged for each case. ʻῙsā claimed a 
right to these fees, and went so far as to convince King ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz ibn Saʻūd to grant 
him jurisdiction over the subjects of the Najd and al-Ḥasā during their stay in 
Bahrain.143 The lack of a clear definition of who falls under the term “foreigner” also 
allowed for this system to be abused by Bahraini subjects who could claim to be 
subjects of other rulers because of their heritage. Before the BOIC was completed in 
1913, many Bahrainis did in fact take advantage of this situation. The British agent 
                                                
142 IOR: L/P&S/10/28 & 82, No. 3134 of 1910, From Major P.Z. Cox, Officiating Political Resident in 
the Persian Gulf, to The Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, 27 November 1910, Enclosure 
No. 4 of No. 67 of 1911, From Foreign Department, Government of India, to The Earl of Crewe, K.G., 
Secretary of State for India, 8 June 1911, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 3, pp. 435-437. 
143 Radhi, Judiciary, p. 29. 
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freed slaves, protected women who had been accused by their families of committing 
“honor crimes,” and excused merchants who had committed acts that violated tribal 
custom, but did not violate Indian codes followed by the British.144  
In the final draft of the BOIC, “foreigner” was defined as “any person not a 
British or Bahrein subject,” a definition which gave the British the widest possible 
jurisdiction over merchants, migrant workers, and arguably recent immigrants.145 
Although it was completed in 1913, World War I prevented the British from putting the 
required time and resources into enforcing the BOIC. It was not until 1919 and 1920 
that the new courts outlined in the document were established.146  
In cases that involved only British subjects and foreigners, the British Political 
Resident acted as a High Court Judge and the Political Agent as the Sessions Judge as if 
they were operating in a full British protectorate. Appeals in some cases could be made 
to the Governor General of the Foreign Department in India. If both the individuals 
were Muslim, the case could be referred to the Bahrain sharīʻa courts. However, the 
BOIC specifies that in such cases, a representative of the Political Agent must be 
present at the hearing to record the proceedings, the qāḍī’s decision must be ratified by 
the Political Agent, and final appeal rests with the Political Agent. The Order designates 
any insult to religion a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine. This 
article offered additional protection to Qajar and Arab Shiis from religious persecution 
by the Sunni tribes.  
                                                
144 India Library Office, Bahrain Administration Report of 1907, p. 100; 1908, p. 92; 1911, p. 100.; India 
Library Office, Bahrain Administration Report of 1906, p. 67, See also IOR R/15/2/K/17; India Library 
Office, Bahrain Administration Report of 1910, p. 83; as referenced by Khuri, Tribe, p. 87. 
145 IOR: L/P&S/10/248 & R/15/1/299, BOIC, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 3, p. 446-469. 
146 Al-Tajir, Bahrain 1920-1945, p. 22. 
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Cases involving a British subject or a foreigner and a Bahraini subject were 
referred first to the Joint Court which consisted of the Political Agent and Shaykh ʻῙsā. 
Cases concerning questions of local custom could be referred to the Majlis al-ʻUrf, 
while pearling disputes could be sent to the Sālifa Court. Civil cases could be referred to 
an arbitrator, or if they involved questions of inheritance, wills, or points of Islamic law, 
they could be referred to the sharīʻa court (under the supervision of a representative of 
the Political Agent). Any Muslim witness could be sent to the sharīʻa court for the 
administration of an oath. Appeals in cases that were sent to the Majlis al-ʻUrf or an 
arbitrator could be made to the Political Agent, while appeals from the Sālifa court 
could be made to the Joint Court.147  
The content of these reforms did not meet with the favor of the Ᾱl Khalīfa or 
their tribal allies. One of Shaykh ʻῙsā’s sons, ʻAbdullāh, became a voice of protest 
against the reforms. ʻAbdullāh had been gaining prominence by working closely with 
his father to gain administrative experience. He earned the support of the tribal leaders, 
and at the same time he worked with the British agency to assist them on various 
projects. While Ḥamad had been named heir apparent in 1898, ʻAbdullāh desired to 
supplant his brother in that position. The British agency considered supporting him in 
this and even invited him for a visit to London in 1919 during which he was given an 
audience with the King. However, it became evident that ʻAbdullāh’s interests did not 
match up with those of the British. ʻAbdullāh had developed very close ties with the 
Sunni tribal leaders, and wished to maintain the system that ensured their – and the Ᾱl 
                                                
147 IOR: L/P&S/10/248 & R/15/1/299, BOIC, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 3, p. 446-469.  
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Khalīfa’s – dominance.148 During his meeting in London, he made a series of requests 
on behalf of his father that included the return of jurisdiction over non-Bahraini Arabs, 
and the ability to choose the Bahraini members of the Majlis al-ʻUrf without 
interference from the Political Agent. The latter request was prompted by a 
disagreement over some actions ʻῙsā had taken earlier in the year when he appointed 
new members to the Majlis without consulting the British agency.  He signed the 
request: “ʻAbdullāh ibn ʻῙsā Ᾱl Khalīfa, The Successor.”149 All of the requests were 
denied. The first was denied because the British had concluded agreements with the 
other Arab rulers of the Gulf which granted them the right to protect Arab subjects 
while in Bahrain. The second was denied because it contradicted the rulings of the 
BOIC.150    
 
 
Administrative Reforms of the 1920’s 
 
Municipal Councils 
 
                                                
148 IOR: R/15/2/83 & L/P&S/10/1039, “Note on the Political Situation in Bahrain, November 1921,” 
Major C.K. Daly, I.A., Political Agent, Bahrain, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 3, pp. 668-675; No. 24-S of 
1922, From Lieutenant-Colonel A.P. Trevor, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to D. de 
S. Bray, C.I.E., C.B.E., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, 6 January 1922, Records of 
Bahrain, Vol. 3, pp. 675-677. 
149 IOR: R/15/2/26, Correspondence from Shaikh Abdullah ibn Isa to Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Records of 
Bahrain, Vol. 3, p. 591.  
150 IOR: R/15/2/26, No. 246-S of 1919, From Deputy Political Resident, Persian Gulf, to Civil 
Commissioner and Political Resident, Persian Gulf, 28 December 1919, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 3, pp. 
600-602.  
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While the institution of new laws regarding jurisdiction over foreigners, 
however defined, limited the Ᾱl Khalīfa’s sovereignty, these changes were insignificant 
compared to those that occurred beginning in 1920. By this time, Shaykh ʻῙsā had 
become no more than a figurehead while Ḥamad had assumed the responsibilities of 
ruler. Despite the continued resistance of ʻῙsā and ʻAbdullah, Ḥamad was crowned by 
the British in 1923 in front of an assembly of tribal leaders, prominent merchants, and 
religious officials.  
In 1920, the British brought an end to the amīr-fidāwī system and replaced it 
with municipal councils which managed major towns and cities. The head council, that 
of Manama, was made up of eight members – four appointed by Shaykh ʻῙsā and four 
by the Political Agent, and a president nominated by Shaykh ʻῙsā. The municipality 
structure was vastly different than the previous system under the amīrs in which the 
amīrs were appointed by Shaykh ʻῙsā, hired their own fidāwīs, taxed at will, and were 
responsible to no one for their expenditure. The amīrs were exclusively chosen from 
either the Ᾱl Khalīfa family or the Sunni tribes. The appointment to these positions, 
which were recognized by the British as well, served only to institutionalize the 
limitless authority the ʻUtūb enjoyed over the native population since the time of their 
invasion in 1783. As such, the weight of taxation fell heavily on the native population 
and hardly at all on the tribes. The new system was modeled exactly on the British 
structure in which each municipality was a self-contained financial entity. The revenue 
required to maintain the town was collected in the form of taxes from residents. All 
residents were taxed equally, and every resident had a voice in determining how the 
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taxes were spent as well as the right to demand to examine the municipality’s accounts 
at any time.151 This system drastically altered the position of the native Bahrainis vis a 
vis the ruling authority. Instead of being subjects of a feudal and largely arbitrary 
power, residents now became something more like citizens, to whom some rights were 
granted. Native Shiis were now placed on par with the Sunni tribes. All would be taxed 
equally and would be equally subject to the now bi-national courts of justice.  
 
Domestic Courts 
 
British reforms of Bahrain’s domestic courts also shifted relations toward more 
equality between the Sunni tribes, native Bahrainis, and foreigners. The Majlis al-ʻUrf 
was restructured to include an equal number of Bahraini and foreigners – five of each. 
The Political Agent chose the foreigners, and while ʻῙsā chose the Bahraini members, 
his choices had to be approved by the Political Agent. The Sālifa Court was left under 
the charge of ʻῙsā until 1923 when it was abolished. The Majlis al-ʻUrf was enlarged to 
eleven, and then to twenty-two members in order to take over the pearling cases.152 The 
result was a dual-authority system in which neither the Ᾱl-Khalīfa nor the British had 
full control, but all major decisions were made jointly, and power was constantly being 
negotiated.  
                                                
151 IOR: L/P&S/10/249, Rules and Regulations under Article 70 of Bahrain Order in Council, Municipal, 
Municipal Bye-Laws, and Municipalities, No. 1 of 1921, Lieutenant-Colonel A.P. Trevor, Political 
Resident, Persian Gulf, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 3, pp. 648-658.  
152 IOR: R/15/1/343, No. 1822/9A of 1357 (1938), From C. Dalrymple Belgrave, Adviser to the 
Government of Bahrain, Bahrain, to Political Agent, Bahrain, 9 December 1938, Records of Bahrain: 
Primary Documents 1820-1960, Vol. 5, 1932-1942, 1932-1942, pp. 629-636. 
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 Regarding the sharīʻa courts, the Sunni courts were not greatly affected. British 
agents at times offered suggestions regarding the appointment of specific qāḍīs.153 
However, the Ᾱl Khalīfa still had ultimate control over the appointments, which is as it 
had been before the British were involved. The Sunni qāḍīs began to receive “official” 
salaries from the government, but this also was not a significant departure from their 
pre-British position in which their well-being resulted from their close ties with the Ᾱl 
Khalīfa. Either way, their loyalties lay with the rulers.  
 The Shii sharīʻa courts, on the other hand, were considerably affected. As 
oppressive as the ʻUtūb tribes had been when they first conquered Bahrain, they did not 
interfere with the native Shii community’s ability to choose and maintain their own 
local qāḍīs (except, of course, that they taxed Shii landowners and businesses so heavily 
that the flow of income to the madrasas, mosques, and religious scholars from these 
sources was nearly cut off). When the British began to advise Bahrain’s rulers on 
domestic affairs, for the first time in Bahrain’s recent history, or perhaps ever, the Sunni 
authorities, together with the British, took control over the appointment of Shii qāḍīs.  
A report filed by British Lieutenant Colonel E. L. Ross in 1882 described the 
state of the sharīʻa courts at that time.154 The ruler had appointed two Sunni qāḍīs, one 
for Manama and one for Muharraq. The Manama judge was Shaykh Qāsim Ᾱl Mihza, 
born in 1849, whom we met above in reference to the 1904 incident. Shaykh Qāsim 
adjudicated cases according to the Mālikī madhhab, which is the madhhab of the Ᾱl 
                                                
153 IOR: R/15/1/343, No. 1438/26 of 1937, From C. Dalrymple Belgrave, Adviser to the Government of 
Bahrain, Bahrain, to Political Agent, Bahrain, 1 December 1937, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 5, pp. 625-
626. 
154 IOR R/15/186 Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Ross, Report, 1882, as referenced in Radhi, Judiciary, pp. 15-
16. 
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Khalīfa. The Muharraq judge was Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf, 
born in 1837 in al-Ḥasā, from which he fled to Bahrain. He also followed the Mālikī 
madhhab. The Sunni qāḍīs’ decisions on minor cases were final. On major cases, 
however, their decisions were appealable to the ruler. For Shiis, Lt. Colonel Ross writes 
that two qāḍīs were appointed by the rulers: Shaykh Muḥammad ʻAlī ibn Shaykh 
ʻAbdullāh, born in 1826 in Jidd ʻAlī, and Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Shaykh Salmān, born in 
1841. Although the two qāḍīs are said to have been appointed by the rulers, the report 
states that they did not receive salaries, but relied solely upon gifts and donations from 
Shii petitioners. Although the British understood this monetary compensation to be 
informal, the Shii petitioners as well as the qādīs most likely considered it as al-khums, 
a Shii institution according to which a percentage of one’s income is paid as a tax to 
religious scholars who will spend it on behalf of God. Also, there was no appeals 
process for the Shiis. All decisions by the Shii qāḍīs were final.  
Whether or not the two Shii qāḍīs mentioned in Ross’s report actually carried 
authority within the Shii community is not clear. Other sources refer repeatedly to 
Shaykh Khalaf Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr’s prominence during this period, and his very high standing 
among Shiis. A rivalry apparently developed between the Shii qāḍī and Shaykh Ḥamad 
Ᾱl Khalīfa. The “bad relations” between the two were described in a letter from 
Lieutenant-Colonel L.B.E. Haworth, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the 
British Foreign Secretary, dated March 1927. Haworth writes that Ḥamad met with him, 
requesting the removal of Shaykh Khalaf from the island. Ḥamad swore that he himself 
had no problem with Shaykh Khalaf, but that the Shii community did. He produced a 
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petition which had apparently been signed by hundreds, in which the Shii community 
protested the injustice of Shaykh Khalaf’s activities, and requested that cases be 
referred to a different qāḍī, whom they named (Sayyid ʻAdnān al-Musāwī). Haworth 
then called Shaykh Khalaf in for a meeting. Rather than exile the qāḍī, he recommended 
that the qāḍī go on an extended pilgrimage. Shaykh Khalaf agreed, and Haworth 
instructed Ḥamad to treat him with honor and friendship until his departure. The qāḍī 
that had been named in the petition then assumed Shaykh Khalaf’s position. Haworth 
admits that he himself has doubts about the new Shii qāḍī, “as I have yet to meet an 
honest [Shii cleric],” but writes that, “He is at any rate the choice of his sect.”155 It is 
difficult to determine whether the “hundreds” of Shiis who signed the petition were 
truly representative of the entire Shii community, given that they numbered almost 
100,000 at the time.156 That Ḥamad endorsed the new qāḍī is also no indication that the 
Shii population agreed. Evidence that mitigates against Ḥamad’s claim is first, that the 
new qāḍī died unexpectedly in January of 1928, shortly after his appointment,157 and 
second, in May of 1929 Shiis lodged another petition with the British agency, this time 
protesting the exile of Shaykh Khalaf.158 Whether the new qāḍī was or was not indeed 
the Shiis’ choice, what is clear is that the community now required the sanction of the 
Sunni-British government to “elect” their judges. Indeed, the qāḍīs were warned at the 
                                                
155 IOR: R/15/2/127 & L/P&S/10/1043, No. 86-S of 1927, From Lieutenant-Colonel L.B.H. Haworth, 
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, 27 March 
1927, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 4, pp. 378-379. 
156 IOR: R/15/1/343, No. 1438/26 of 1937, From C. Dalrymple Belgrave, Adviser to the Government of 
Bahrain, Bahrain, to Political Agent, Bahrain, 1 December 1937, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 5, p. 626. 
157 IOR: R/15/2/129, R/15/1/350 & L/P&S/10/1044, Notes on Expenditure 1347, Records of Bahrain, 
Vol. 4, p. 460. 
158 IOR: R/15/2/296 as referenced by Radhi, Judiciary, p. 53. 
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gathering during which British Political Resident Lieutenant-Colonel S.G. Knox 
announced Shaykh ʻῙsā’s abdication and Ḥamad’s crowning that he who interferes with 
the maintenance of justice will be dismissed from his appointment. Knox also warned 
against the constitution of spontaneous authority: “Attempts by unauthorized persons to 
usurp executive or judicial authority will be resented and punished, particularly attempts 
by persons who constitute themselves leaders of any community as has been done in the 
past.”159  
 The result of these changes was that religious legal authority became subsumed 
under the authority of the state, and hence, Sunni and Shii religious legal authority 
became politicized in a way that it had not been in the past. The role of the qāḍī was no 
longer limited to local communities, but was now a function of the centralized state. 
The relationship between the Shii layperson and his/her qāḍī was no longer a direct one, 
in which the qāḍī was chosen by the community, and the petitioner paid the qāḍī 
directly for his services. In the new configuration, the primary relationship is between 
the litigant, who was now a citizen, and the state. The qāḍī had become a representative 
of the state, speaking and acting on its behalf. If an individual wanted to register a 
marriage, the only choice open to him was to go to the state’s qāḍī. And of course, the 
qāḍī receives his salary from the state, not from the petitioner.  
 
 
                                                
159 IOR: L/P&S/10/1039, R/15/1/336 and R/15/2/73, Speech made by Lieutenant-Colonel S.G. Knox, 
C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, at the majlis convened in Bahrain on the 26th May 
1923, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 4, p. 11.  
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Waqf 
 
 As the British agency set out on its course of pursuing domestic reforms, local 
agents examined Bahrain’s infrastructure and public works. They ascertained that the 
country was in great need of a number of improvements in the way of, for example, 
schools, roads, bridges, hospitals. Having analyzed ʻῙsā’s management of funds and 
discovering that not only had he been “squandering” it on “unnecessary luxuries” as 
well as giving handouts to Ᾱl Khalīfa family members and Bedouins, but that his wife 
had also been literally burying a percentage of the ruler’s revenue in the ground for 
several years, the agency determined that a thorough overhaul of the country’s finances 
was in order.160 One area that was considered a potential source of funding for public 
works was that of waqf endowments. The waqf endowment is the formal 
immobilization of property from a donor and the assignment of its dividends to specific 
purposes. Two main types of waqf distinguish between those that benefit the Muslim 
community in general or groups of an indeterminate number and continue perpetually, 
such as in the form of mosque construction (waqf ʻāmm); and those which are 
designated for specific, named individuals such as family members, who will eventually 
pass away (waqf khāṣṣ or waqf ahlī).161 Waqf endowments in Bahrain, as in most 
                                                
160 IOR: R/15/1/331, 336 & 338, R/15/2/127-28, L/P&S/10/1039, No. 250 of 1923, From Lieutenant-
Colonel S.G. Knox, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to D. de S. Bray, Esq., C.S.I., 
C.I.E., C.B.E., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, 31 May 1923, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 4, 
pp. 25-40. 
161 Astrid Meier, “Waḳf,” Encyclopedia of Islam, Brill Online; and Said Amir Arjomand, “Philanthropy, 
the Law, and Public Policy in the Islamic World before the Modern Era,” Philanthropy in the World’s 
Traditions, ed. Warren F. Ilchman, Stanley N. Katz, and Edward L. Queen II, Indiana University Press: 
Bloomington, 1998.  
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Muslim societies, were traditionally managed by the qāḍīs and were administered 
according to sharīʻa. During the 1920’s and 1930’s, the British completed a cadastral 
survey which showed that of the three major types of agricultural land holdings, Shii 
waqf held 33.6%, 17.9%, and 19.2%, while Sunni waqf held .7%, .7%, and 2.2%, 
respectively.162  
There is no formal documentation of how waqf revenues were used by the qāḍīs, 
but the expenses they submitted to the British agency included maintenance of mosques 
and their grounds, salaries of muezzins, and salaries of property administrators. Arguing 
that this revenue could, first, be better managed by an executive committee, and second, 
be better spent on what the British considered to be “public works” (as opposed to 
“religious uses”), in 1925 Political Agent Major Daly attempted to remove waqf 
endowments from the control of the qāḍīs and subsume them under the central authority 
of the government.163 This idea was completely antithetical to the system under which 
Bahrainis had been operating for centuries. The idea that the Bahrain government, 
which in the 1920’s was not just a Muslim government, but a government ruled jointly 
by the Sunni Ᾱl Khalīfa and a foreign, non-Muslim power, would assume control over 
what many saw as a religious right aroused furious opposition from the population.  
Daly decided not to press on with this particular reform, at least not for the 
moment. Waqf endowments continued to be administered by the qāḍīs. For the Sunnis, 
this was Shaykh Jāsim, and then in 1926, “the three ʻAbd al-Latīfs.” For the Shia, it was 
                                                
162 Khuri, Tribe, pp. 41-42. 
163 IOR: R/15/2/129, R/15/1/350 & L/P&S/10/1044, Notes on Expenditure 1347, Records of Bahrain, 
Vol. 4, p. 461. 
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Shaykh Khalaf until he was replaced by Sayyid ʻAdnān, again, in 1926. After Sayyid 
ʻAdnān died in 1928, no Shii qāḍī was appointed for some months, and the waqfs were 
temporarily entrusted to his executor, Shaykh Muḥammad ʻAlī al-Madānī. Finally, it 
seems al-Madānī himself was appointed as the qāḍī for the villages, and Shaykh 
ʻAbdullāh ibn Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ was appointed for Manama. Shaykh ʻAlī, as al-Madānī 
was called, specified that as qāḍī, he wanted nothing to do with the waqfs. Shaykh 
ʻAbdullāh on the other hand asked to be put in charge of them. British Adviser Charles 
Belgrave persuaded Shaykh ʻAbdullāh to settle for being named president of a 
committee that would administer the waqfs. He agreed to this, but the “country people” 
apparently objected to his presidency. Finally, British sources say that “government 
decided” that neither qāḍī would control the waqfs, but that a committee of six villagers 
and four Manama residents would take charge,164 although the qāḍīs were given the 
authority to appoint these members. A Waqf Department was also created to oversee 
both Sunni and Shii waqfs, which was headed by the ruler’s brother, Shaykh 
ʻAbdullāh.165 British sources praise Belgrave’s actions in transferring the Shii waqfs to 
a government committee and write that great progress was made thereafter: “the new 
arrangement has proved so satisfactory that there is little doubt that the Sunnis will soon 
bestir themselves and take over their Waqfs from the three Qadhis. When this is done it 
should be possible to open many primary schools all over the island at no extra cost to 
                                                
164 IOR: R/15/2/129, R/15/1/350 & L/P&S/10/1044, Notes on Expenditure 1347, Records of Bahrain, 
Vol. 4, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 4, pp. 460-461.  
165 IOR: R/15/2/130, p. 88 as referenced by Radhi, Judiciary, p. 51. 
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the State.”166 Despite the fact that the Shii community had so strenuously objected to 
the removal of the waqfs from the qāḍīs, British sources record that there were repeated 
accusations against the qāḍīs of misappropriation of waqf property. By 1930, sources 
say the Shii community came to accept the fact of the new committee overseeing the 
waqfs because they could now see the efficiency and impartiality with which it handled 
the resources.167  
 The bureaucracy that was planned by the British agents and the Ᾱl Khalīfa was 
built slowly due to continuing local political struggles. Sectarian clashes continued 
intermittently throughout the twentieth century. For a time, the spread of Arab 
nationalism gave village Shiis and Sunni anti-imperialists groups a common cause. 
Especially in the 1950’s, Sunni groups and Shiis stood together against British 
occupation and the tribal rule of the Ᾱl Khalīfa. However, the groups that constituted 
the opposition lacked formal organization and internal cohesion. Ultimately, they were 
not successful in attaining any significant political authority for themselves, and the Ᾱl 
Khalīfa maintained its rule.  
As for the sharīʻa courts, they remained under the control of the qāḍīs. Britain 
appointed Charles Belgrave in 1926 to be the ruler’s political advisor. Among 
Belgrave’s many tasks was the management of the country’s courts. Belgrave focused 
on continuing the reforms of the criminal, commercial, and diving courts, while 
allowing the sharīʻa courts to continue much in the same manner as before. In his 
                                                
166 IOR: R/15/2/129, R/15/1/350 & L/P&S/10/1044, Correspondence No. 93-C of 1929, Capt. C.G. Prior, 
I.A. Political Agent to Secretary to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, 20 July 1929, 
Records of Bahrain, Vol. 4, p. 478.  
167 Khuri, Tribe, pp. 112-113, 
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memoir, Belgrave writes that the ruler left the matter of appointing qāḍīs almost entirely 
in his [Belgrave’s] hands, and that the ruler’s policy was to “conform as much as 
possible to the wishes of the people.”168 Periodically, Belgrave and the ruler instituted 
certain regulations for the qadis to follow, such as the number of days per week they 
must hear cases, and the hiring of clerks.169 The actual process of deciding cases, 
however, was left to the discretion of the judges. In this way, the Shii community 
retained autonomy over some of their own affairs.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The character of political rule in Bahrain did not remain constant throughout the 
islands’ history. Power was held variously by Shii and Sunni sovereigns. The Banū 
Jarwān set up Shii institutions which they staffed with Imamis from the shrine cities of 
Iraq. When control of the Gulf was seized by the Sunni Hormuz, Shii officials in 
Bahrain retained their positions because the Hormuz were content to have the local 
governors pay tribute. This situation changed, however, when the Sunni tribe of the 
Banū Jabr captured Bahrain. The Banū Jabr dismissed Shii officials and replaced them 
with Mālikī Sunnis. Shiism was discouraged, and many Shiis fled Bahrain. Meanwhile, 
                                                
168 Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 55.  
169 IOR: R/15/1/343, No. 26/1357 Adviser to the Government, Government of Bahrain. Notice. Shia 
Kadhis, 4th Ramadhan 1357/27th October 1938. Records of Bahrain, Vol. 5, pp. 627-628.    
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the Safavids came to power and eventually captured Bahrain in 1602. This initiated an 
era of great intellectual and financial prosperity for the Shiis of Bahrain during which 
the Ᾱl ʻAsfūr family produced one of the greatest Shii legal scholars the region has 
known. In 1783, this idyllic time ended when the ʻUtūb federation of Arabian Sunni 
tribes invaded and conquered Bahrain. Not only were Shii legal and religious 
institutions dismantled, but heavy taxes and extortion destroyed Shii businesses and 
commerce, and the local pearl trade which had been built and maintained by native Shii 
merchants and scholars was taken over by the Sunni tribal chiefs. However, despite 
these unfortunate events, Shiis remained somewhat autonomous with regard to their 
legal and religious life. While a Shii no longer served in the positions of muḥtasib and 
shaykh al-Islām, Shiis could still choose their own qāḍīs. They could still pay him a 
tithe for concluding a contract or settling a dispute. Shii qāḍīs still controlled endowed 
properties (those that were not confiscated). Throughout this period, Sunnis and Shiis in 
Bahrain retained separate institutions to deal with communal legal and religious issues. 
The islands existed under one or another patrimonial state in which sectarian communal 
prerogatives remained discrete. 
The changes that took place leading up to and during the 1920’s effected a 
transition of Bahrain from a pre-modern, patrimonial state to a modern nation-state. For 
family law, this meant different things for the Sunnis than for Shiis. With the exception 
of the removal of waqf endowment from their control, Sunni qāḍīs operated in much the 
same manner after the reforms as they had before: their jurisdiction did not change 
significantly and their role vis a vis the ruler remained the same. The role of the Shii 
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qāḍī on the other hand underwent a total transformation. Before the reforms, the Shii 
qāḍī served not only as judge and religious expert, but also as municipal administrator, 
business consultant, political advisor, and general community leader. His jurisdiction 
included everything but foreign affairs. After the reforms, qāḍīs were appointed by the 
Sunni-British state rather than being chosen by the Shii community, they were paid 
salaries by the state instead of receiving tithes from the Shii petitioners, their 
jurisdiction was reduced to a fraction of what it had been, and their control over waqf 
endowments was stripped. Unlike the Sunni waqf which retained a negligible amount of 
land holdings, the Shii waqf holdings were significant. The qāḍī managed these, and 
therefore controlled the maintenance of mosques, wells, and other public works that 
were enjoyed by the Shii community. The role of the qāḍī, and thus the structure of the 
Shii community was drastically altered such that by the time the reforms were complete, 
the only thing Shiis still had agency over was family law. Given this state of affairs, it is 
not surprising that today they would so stridently resist the removal of this last 
communal prerogative. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE SHII ʻULAMᾹ’ 
 
Since the government’s first attempt at establishing a codified family law (for all 
citizens) in 2003, Bahrain’s Shii ʻulamā’ have opposed the government having any 
hand in the drafting of rules governing the family. Like ʻulamā’ in many other Muslim-
majority states, Bahrain’s clerics argue that the state has no authority over matters that 
are, they argue, the province of God. However, unlike ʻulamā’ in other countries, 
Bahrain’s Shii ʻulamā’ are also arguing against having their family law determined by 
government officials who are of a different sect. The ʻulamā’ have declared that the 
only way they would accept a government-sponsored family law is if an amendment 
was made to the constitution prohibiting anyone but the highest Shii religious authority, 
the marjaʻ, the right to approve and subsequently amend that law. The marjaʻ currently 
followed by the majority of Bahraini Shiis is Ayatollah ʻAlī al-Sīstānī, who resides in 
Iraq. Therefore, the ʻulamā’ are not only claiming religious authority over family law, 
but they are looking to a secular authority, the constitution, to safeguard it. In addition, 
while the Bahraini constitution defines political authority that is limited to a specific 
territory, the religious authority the ʻulamā’ would like it to protect extends beyond 
those borders. So far, this demand has not been met. 
 Adding to the complexity of the issues surrounding Bahrain’s family law is the 
fact that not all Shii ʻulamā’ reject the government’s proposed law. The islands’ Shiis 
adhere to two different schools of legal Shii thought; Usuli and Akhbari. Usulis are the 
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majority, and reject the law, while the minority Akhbaris actually support the law. One 
possible explanation for Akhbaris’ support of the law is their close political relationship 
to the ruling family. However, another explanation is that Akhbaris and Usulis each 
have sound doctrinal reasons for taking the positions they have. Akhbaris have 
traditionally argued for the exclusive authority of the religious texts and for strict 
reliance on the reports (akhbār) of the Prophet and the Imams. Usulis, on the other 
hand, insist on the need to refer to a qualified legal scholar (mujtahid or marjaʻ). It is 
crucial, Usulis argue, that this scholar be living. Given these doctrinal positions, the 
Bahraini Usulis’ insistence on preserving the control of the marjaʻ over family law 
seems to be rooted in their concept of religious-legal authority. Until now, the Shii 
ʻulamā’ have enjoyed nearly exclusive control over the sharīʻa courts. It has only been 
in the last six years that the possibility that this prerogative will be removed from them 
has become real. Therefore, it is only recently that they have had to legitimate their 
authority over this area. By examining khuṭab (Friday sermons), written statements in 
the press, and on-line publications, the following chapter looks at the ways in which the 
Shii ʻulamā’ define religious-legal authority. It also demonstrates that through their 
insistence on a constitutional guarantee, the ʻulamā’ are constructing an authority that is 
a hybrid between secular political and religious authority.  
   
 
AUTHORITY BASED ON TRADITION 
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Throughout the eight years during which the Bahraini government endeavored 
to pass a codified family law, the majority of the country’s Shii Usuli ʻulamā’ 
consistently opposed this move. Primarily, members of the ʻulamā’ object to individuals 
who are not religious specialists having a role in drafting and maintaining the law. Part 
of the argument of Bahrain’s Shii Usuli ʻulamā’ is similar to that of ʻulamā’ elsewhere 
in that they claim legal authority based on their participation in an Islamic tradition that 
includes the adherence to a particular course of study, method of legal reasoning, and 
acquisition of certain personal characteristics that specifically link ʻulamā’ in the 
present with authoritative figures of the past. While this conscious linking with the past 
has at times been understood as a move that is in opposition to modernity, scholars have 
pointed out that, on the contrary, tradition often serves as a modality of change.170 
Faced with the possibility of losing control over family law issues, Bahrain’s Shii 
ʻulamā’ are struggling to define their role against that of the state in a way that situates 
them squarely within a religious framework that legitimates that role and grants it 
authority. In his study on contemporary ʻulamā’, Muhammad Qasim Zaman writes that 
this process of definition is on-going: “The ʻulamā’’s tradition is not a mere inheritance 
from the past, even though they often argue that that is precisely what it is. It is a 
tradition that has had to be constantly imagined, reconstructed, argued over, defended, 
and modified.”171 In the written statements analyzed below, Bahrain’s Shii ʻulamā’ 
                                                
170 Marilyn Robinson Waldman, “Tradition as a Modality of Change: Islamic Examples,” History of 
Religions, Vol. 25, No. 4, Religion and Change: ASSR Anniversary Volume (May, 1986), pp. 318-340. 
171 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 10-11. 
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review and reassert their place within the Islamic legal tradition in order to justify their 
exclusive control over family law. 
In response to the formation of the 2003 drafting committee, which consisted of 
the Minister of Justice, the head of the Legislative Committee, and three women 
lawyers, as well as judges of the sharīʻa courts (three Sunni and three Shii), ʻAbdullah 
al-Ghurayfī, a prominent religious scholar and imam of the Masjid al-Imām al-Ṣādiq in 
Manama, published an essay rejecting the law in the May 23rd issue of his weekly 
newsletter. Speaking on behalf of other leading Shii ʻulamā’, al-Ghurayfī rejected the 
transfer of jurisdiction over matters of personal status from the sharīʻa judges to the 
Parliament. Although the law was drafted in part by religious scholars, it would be 
ratified and enacted by the legislature. It would also then be subject to amendment by 
the same body. Members of Parliament, al-Ghurayfī said, do not possess the necessary 
qualifications to give an opinion on matters fiqh and sharīʻa that are the province of the 
fuqahā’ (jurists) and the mujtahids (jurists qualified to exercise independent reasoning): 
 
  It would be Parliament who would decide for us the  
legality of rules in our marriages, divorces, and our  
personal status matters. And they would decide for us  
the ḥalāl and ḥarām, what is permitted and what is  
forbidden, what to accept and what to reject. They  
would be the ones to apply one fiqh opinion and reject  
others, and to give weight to one judgment of ijtihād  
and dismiss others. They…do not possess the competence  
to do so: “Say: Was it God who gave you permission, or  
do you invent falsehoods About God?” [10 (Yūnus):59].172 
 
                                                
172 ʻAbdullah al-Ghurayfī, Ḥadīth al-Jumʻa (May 23, 2003), p. 1.  
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Even if Parliament passes a law that is consistent with sharīʻa today, he argues, they 
will have the ability to amend it in the future so that it may someday contradict sharīʻa. 
While the Shii ʻulamā’ had made clear their position on the family law, the 
government sought the opinion of the general public prior to its 2005 initiative. In 2004, 
the SCW commissioned a study to be done on the public’s knowledge of and position 
on the family law debate. Of the 1300 respondents, 73.7% said that a codified family 
law is needed in Bahrain. However, a full 98% believed that such a law should be 
drawn from sharīʻa.173 In responding to the poll results, as well as to the Shii clerics’ 
arguments, the ruler staffed the 2005 drafting committee exclusively with religious 
scholars, however, as mentioned above, he did not consult with the ʻUlamā’ Council. 
The exclusion of the UIC from the drafting process, as well as the fact that the SCW 
campaign assumed the responsibility to teach the public about family law angered Shii 
authorities.   
In a lengthy interview with al-Mīthāq, a Bahraini weekly, Shaykh ʻĪsā Qāsim, 
the head of the UIC, attacked the campaign. He said that while SCW officials assured 
the public that the proposed family law would be derived from sharīʻa and that its 
statutes (aḥkām) would be based on sharīʻa principles (mabādi’), they are using these 
technical legal terms as if they understand them, but they do not have a grasp of these 
terms. He explained that:  
 
There is a considerable difference between basing  
                                                
173“Istiṭlāʻ li-l-ra’y hawl taqnīn aḥkām al-usra fī Mamlakat al-Baḥrayn,” Markaz al-Baḥrayn li-l-dirāsāt 
wa-l-buḥūth for The Supreme Council for Women (2005), pp. 46-47.  
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a law on mabādi’ and basing it on aḥkām. Aḥkām are  
a type of detailed explanation (tafṣīl) that is based  
on the foundation of mabādi’. Mabādi’ are groupings  
broader than the matter of aḥkām found in a particular  
topic (bāb). Mabādi’ al-Sharīʻa are principles that govern  
every chapter of fiqh, and every chapter of fiqh is a  
secondary grouping that is based on the foundation  
of the mabādi’ of Islam. This confusion of terms greatly  
obscures the truth.174   
 
Qāsim said that it is not from general principles such as justice, charity, and honor (to 
which the SCW seem to be referring when they say the law will be based on mabādi’) 
that specific rulings (aḥkām) are derived. It is through the process of ijtihād, which can 
only be carried out by those who are authorized and upon whom it is incumbent (al-
mukallafīn), that rulings are deduced. 
The UIC also published a lengthy statement on their website penned by a 
leading member of the council, Shaykh Muḥammad Ṣunqūr on January 26, 2006 that 
offered religious and legal justifications for the UIC’s opposition to the new law. 
Ṣunqūr writes that Islam has already detailed rules for every legal exigency that could 
befall a person. It has covered marriage, divorce, spousal support, child custody, child 
support, paternity, inheritance, and many other issues. He refers to the sixth Shii Imam 
and putative founder of the Imami school of law, Jaʻfar al-Ṣādiq, saying that there is no 
matter that has not been addressed: 
 
 Islam encompasses all of life, the great and the small,  
and offers a judgment for every occurrence: {Nothing  
have we omitted from the book} [6 (al-Anʻām):38], and  
                                                
174 “al-Shaykh ʻῙsā Qāsim: Maʻik, maʻik yā Islām,” Al-Mīthāq, (October 22, 2005). 
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}We have sent down to you the book explaining all things{  
[16 (al-Naḥl):89]. Thus Islam has rules related to the  
administration of justice, for instance it has rules related  
to markets and human relations, rules for war and peace,  
personal relationships, society, and nation. It has rules  
for al-ḥudūd (capital crimes), al-qiṣāṣ (retaliation), al-diyya  
(indemnity for bodily injury), and “even the penalty for  
a scratch,” as Imam al-Ṣādiq taught.175  
  
 Considering all of this, Ṣunqūr argues, it would seem superfluous to import and 
apply a completely different system of law, especially a system that was neither 
developed by Muslims nor based in religious belief of any kind. Furthermore, this 
proposed Western code does not even remain faithful to its own society’s beliefs, but 
rather it responds to politics and short-term interests. This kind of law does not have any 
relation to Islam, which is not just a system of law, or a set of beliefs, but an entire way 
of life. Ṣunqūr admits that Bahrain has already adopted some civil laws, such as penal 
and commercial law, for instance, but that this is no justification for accepting yet 
another civil law. This is especially true when, “this law would consider Islam [the 
sharīʻa] only one source of legislation among many, because  God is the only reality, 
and because whatever else they invoke besides Him is falsehood  [31 (Luqmān):30]. 
Thus, we do not accept that there are tributaries of legislation in Bahrain that are a 
mixture of truth and falsehood under any guise.”176 Ṣunqūr stresses that this is not just a 
matter of choosing one law over another. God revealed His law, and it is not for humans 
to pick and choose which parts suit him and which do not, as is expressed in the 
                                                
175 Shaykh Muḥammad Ṣunqūr, “Ru’iyatnā hawl qānūn aḥkām al-usra,” www.olamaa.net (26 January 
2006). 
176 Ibid. 
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following Qur’an verse:  Then is it only a part of the book that you believe in, and you 
reject the rest? But what is the reward for those among you who behave like this? And 
on the Day of Judgment those of you who act thus will be rewarded with disgrace in 
this life and with grievous punishment on the Day of Resurrection  [2 (al-Baqara):85]. 
“Thus as Muslims,” Ṣunqūr writes, “we cannot hold any view except that which enjoins 
adherence to what is set forth in the sharīʻa.”  
 Not only is it essential to limit the law to what is found in the sharīʻa, but it is 
also crucial that a qualified individual interpret the religious texts. Ṣunqūr argues that 
the texts’ meanings are not clear, and that only a person with extraordinary mental, 
spiritual, and moral capabilities can comprehend them. That individual is the mujtahid. 
A mujtahid must be knowledgeable about the Arabic literary sciences such as naḥw 
(grammar); ʻilm al-ṣarf (morphology); ʻilm al-bayan (rhetorical language), ʻilm al-
maʻanī (semantics), ʻilm al-badiʻ (figures of speech, rhetoric, and the art of style); and 
logic; in addition to the sciences of the Qur’an, tafsīr, and the study of uṣūl al-fiqh 
(legal theory) and the manner of textual authentication. The mujtahid must also follow a 
specific process of deduction. His examination must be limited to sharīʻa sources:  
 
It is not for him to derive judgments from himself.  
No judgment possesses the character of religious  
legitimacy unless it is based on the Qur’an and Sunna,  
and provided that this is done by means of the methods  
and tools that establish definitive proofs on the condition  
that the methods are connected with the Qur’an and Sunna. 
Unless he has attained that level of aptitude, and unless he  
is, in addition to all of that, at the highest level of piety,  
devotion, and fear of Allah, only then is there a guarantee  
that he will not issue fatwās by following whims or under  
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some other pressure or by using some other evidence.  
Unless he possesses all of that, he is not competent to  
deduce sharīʻa judgments from its sources.177  
 
In this way, Ṣunqūr illustrates the contrast between the qualified legal scholar 
carefully deducing judgments, and the elected (or appointed) politician who assures the 
public in a cavalier manner that the codified law will be consistent with sharīʻa. To the 
government’s pledge that the legislative council will only ratify the law if the ʻulamā’ 
approve, Ṣunqūr responds, “God’s law does not require anyone’s approval.” In the 
legislative council, God’s law would also be subject to revisions, additions, and 
deletions. Although the council will supposedly be assisted by religious scholars, after 
the council members have heard what the scholars have to say, they can still choose, 
using whatever background they want, whether or not to follow the scholars’ advice. 
“And then what happens if the members of the council disagree on what to choose?” 
Ṣunqūr asks, “Will they subject the laws of God to a majority vote?” It is not the 
specialization of politicians to deal with religious law. It is foolishness for anyone other 
than the physician to attempt to cure the illness. Implying that the council’s real 
intention is to contravene sharīʻa, Ṣunqūr writes, “Ijtihād is the use of methods of 
definitive proofs with the intention of understanding the divine text, not opposing it.”178
   
 
 
                                                
177 Ṣunqūr, Ru’iyatna. 
178 Ibid.  
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AUTHORITY BASED ON SECT 
 
 When Bahrain’s Shii ʻulamā’ argue that they are the rightful possessors of 
authority over family law because of their participation in the Islamic legal and 
religious tradition, implied in this argument is the corollary that if authority derives 
from knowledge of and expertise with a certain set of texts and methodologies, then not 
only are laypersons excluded from that authority, but so are those who engage with a 
different set of texts and methodologies. By this, of course, is meant Sunnis. Bahrain’s 
native population has historically been predominantly Shii. The current ruling family, 
the Ᾱl Khalīfa, only arrived in Bahrain in 1783. Together with other Sunni tribal allies 
from central and eastern Arabia, the Ᾱl Khalīfa conquered Bahrain by force. The 
British, arriving in 1829, took the Ᾱl Khalīfa for the rightful rulers of the islands, and as 
such concluded their treaties with and gave their political and military support to the 
heads of the Sunni family. More than two centuries later, the Ᾱl Khalīfa still rule 
Bahrain, despite the fact that the Shiis remain a majority of the population. The manner 
in which the Ᾱl Khalīfa have dealt with the Shii population and the issue of sect is and 
has been the major political concern for Bahrain’s Shiis for over a century.  
In the January 26, 2006 statement, the ʻulamā’ make clear that not only is the 
survival of the sharīʻa court at stake, but so is the very preservation of their sect. As 
well as taking the side of those who advocate secularism, the government is also 
threatening to impose Sunni laws on the country’s Shiis:  “Just as the Sunnis would not 
accept the Shiis to impose the specific rules of their sect upon them, we will not accept 
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the government or the Sunnis to impose on Shiis the particular laws of their madhhab 
through this Parliament.”179 This is the true goal of those who support the government’s 
law, to eliminate Shii law altogether: 
 
 These people made clear their ambition to work  
towards a secular law, or one that is a mixture of  
secular and religious teachings. They expressed 
 this goal at the beginning of their movement, and  
called for a unified law that covers both Shiis and  
Sunnis. This means the promotion of one sect at  
the expense of the other. Sunnis and Shiis differ  
in some provisions concerning marriage, divorce,  
custody, living expenses and others. Thus, we refuse  
to stand by and keep silent. Our faith is more valuable  
to us than our blood.180  
 
In an earlier version of the same document, the UIC addressed an argument that 
supporters of the law had made, that Iran, a Shii-majority country had a codified family 
law. The UIC responded that there are great differences between Iran and Bahrain. First, 
the Parliament:  
 
Iran has a completely elected Parliament that represents  
the people. Here, half of the assembly is appointed by the  
ruler and passes whatever laws it wishes. As for the other  
                                                
179 “Al-Bayān al-Khatāmī li-l-masīrat al-Jamāhīriyya,” al-Majlis al-Islāmī al-ʻUlamā’ī, 
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half, called the Majlis al-Nuwwāb, it does not reflect the  
reality of the will of the people. The electoral districts are  
sectarian in that they make one thousand people in some  
neighborhoods equal to thirty-three thousand in others. 
 
Second, the constitutional court: “There is a council [in Iran] called the Council for the 
Protection of the Constitution that has the power to repeal any law that was passed by 
Parliament that contradicts sharīʻa. Here, there is nothing which guarantees the Islamic 
nature of the laws, and the evidence testifies to this;” and third, the source of law: “In 
Iran, the Islamic sharīʻa is the only source of legislation. Here, it is only one of the 
primary sources besides other sources. Because of this, many laws are contrary to 
sharīʻa and they are unjust.” 181 To develop a codified law under such circumstances, 
namely circumstances in which those who are developing the law both represent the 
will of the people, and are legally obligated to derive that law exclusively from the 
sharīʻa, means that the resulting law would not likely compromise either Islam in 
general, or inappropriately blur sectarian distinctions.  
 
 
Substantive Differences 
 
 Beyond the threat of the loss of general autonomy Shii judges currently hold 
over sharīʻa court proceedings is the issue of the specific rules themselves, as well as 
the methodology used to develop them. Ṣunqūr explains that there are significant 
                                                
181 Ibid. 
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differences between the types of sources that are used to derive law in the Sunni schools 
and the Jaʻfarī school. Although both sects agree that the primary sources of law are the 
Qur’an and the Sunna, they differ with regard to other sources that can be used. In cases 
in which no text exists that addresses the case at hand, the Sunni schools accept reliance 
on qiyās (analogical reasoning), as well as al-istiḥsān (juristic preference) and al-
maṣlaḥa (ruling in the interest of the public good), and other methods that use 
subjective reasoning. Ṣunqūr says that the Shiis have rejected these methods 
categorically. More than five hundred accounts exist from Imām al-Ṣādiq and others 
that refute these bases. The extent of the divergence in actual rulings that is produced by 
these differences in methodology cannot be underestimated.  
 Even though the Sunni and the Shii schools agree that the Qur’an and Sunna are 
the two primary sources of law, their theories on what counts as authoritative reports 
making up the Sunna conflict. When determining the soundness or weakness of a 
particular report, one of the main criteria is the legitimacy of the transmitter. In this, the 
Sunnis do not accept those considered authoritative by Shiis, and vice versa. These 
reports are often the bases for deriving sharīʻa rulings and fatāwā, therefore generating 
greatly diverging results between the sects: “Shiis use the sayings of the twelve imams 
as proofs because these sayings are immune to error (maʻṣūma), and they are the most 
important means of learning the noble path and its meaning…This basis is not accepted 
by the Ahl al-Sunnā.” After discussing these differences in legal theory, Ṣunqūr gives 
several examples of the discrepancies in rulings that are produced by these differences. 
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He compares the views of the Sunnis schools to that of the Jaʻfarī, and then discusses 
what is found in the new family law draft.  
 
Guardianship (Wilāya) 
 
Regarding the subject of guardianship (wilāya), Ṣunqūr explains that the Sunni 
schools of Imām Shāfiʻī and Imām Mālik (the two schools followed by most Bahraini 
Sunnis) grant guardianship to the father of the bride, then to the paternal grandfather, 
then to the full brother, then to the brother’s son, and on to the son (of the bride). This is 
different from the Jaʻfarī school, he says, in which the father and the paternal 
grandfather are the only acceptable guardians. The Jaʻfarī also distinguish between a 
virgin and a woman who has previously been married (thayyib). Guardianship only 
holds for the virgin. For the woman previously married, she is the guardian of herself 
and requires no one’s permission, and no one can interfere in her contract. In the draft 
of the family law, Ṣunqūr points out that Article 16 stipulates that the consent of a 
guardian is not necessary. Then he says that in Article 11, the guardian is specified as 
the father, then the paternal grandfather, then the full brother. Neither article, he says, 
specifies the difference between a virgin and a thayyib. Ṣunqūr only notes these 
discrepancies, and does not comment on them. However, as he offers them as examples 
of irreconcilable differences, we have to assume that they are significant enough to 
stand as proof that the Sunni and the Jaʻfarī schools require completely separate laws to 
address their adherents’ personal status issues.  
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Child Custody (Ḥiḍāna) 
 
 Ṣunqūr says that for the majority of Sunnis, after a divorce, custody of the young 
child goes to the mother. They disagree as to what happens when the child reaches the 
age of majority. As for the Jaʻfarī school : “According to the Imāmiyya, the most 
accepted view is that the mother has the right of custody of the children, male or female, 
in the interim [during the waiting period], and after that the mother has the right of 
custody of the girl up to the age of seven, unless she marries again. As for the boy, the 
father gets custody after the interim.” Ṣunqūr again does not emphasize or analyze what 
the exact differences between the schools are that are of concern.182 Even when he 
addresses the draft law, he does not express why the law is inappropriate. In discussing 
the opinions of the Sunni and Jaʻfarī schools, he talks about the right of custody before 
and after the age of majority. In the following in which he looks at the draft law, he only 
mentions the right of custody before the child reaches the age of majority (in which 
there is little dispute that it goes to the mother). This section of the draft law only 
addressed what happens if the mother is not available: 
 
  It is stated in Article 119 of the draft of the family law:  
                                                
182 The Sunni schools vary widely on rules regarding child custody. For instance, the Hanbalis do not 
distinguish between girls and boys. They give custody to the mother until the child turns seven, at which 
point the child chooses the parent he or she wishes to stay with. The Malikis, on the other hand, rule that 
the mother has custody of boys until puberty, and girls until marriage. For a discussion of the rules of all 
Sunni schools, as well as specific applications of these rules in the personal status laws of Muslim-
majority countries, see Jamal J. Nasir, The Islamic Law of Personal Status, London; Boston: Graham & 
Trotman, 1990, pp. 158-172.  
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“In the case of separation custody goes to the mother,  
then to the maternal grandmother, then to the paternal  
grandmother, then to the father.” The appearance is  
that this arrangement is based on [the assumption that]  
it [custody] does not revert to the second arrangement  
[to the grandmother] except if the first is not possible  
[for example, if the mother is dead] or if she does not  
have legal capacity. Otherwise, according to the  
continuance of the stipulation, the right of custody  
is fixed to the first arrangement.183 
 
The mention of the grandmothers in the draft law could be what Ṣanqūr finds unsuitable 
because according to majority Jaʻfarī opinion, custody goes to the father if the mother 
dies, remarries, or is legally incompetent. If the father dies or becomes incompetent, it 
then goes back to the remarried mother, and then to the paternal grandfather. The 
grandmothers are only then reached.184  
 
Divorce (Ṭalāq) 
 
 Ṣunqūr points out that while Jaʻfarī law stipulates that a divorce cannot occur 
while the wife is menstruating, for Sunnis, divorce can occur whether or not the wife is 
menstruating. As for the divorce pronouncements, Jaʻfarī law requires that the words 
“She is divorced” be pronounced three times, and that the husband may not return to the 
wife in between the pronouncement of these sentences. Saying the words “She is 
irrevocably divorced” is not sufficient to effect the divorce. Regarding the Sunni 
schools, Ṣunqūr simply states, “The majority of the Egyptian fuqahā’ of the Sunnis hold 
                                                
183 Ṣunqūr, “Ru’iyatna.” 
184 Nasir, Islamic Law, p. 162.  
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the view that the divorce by the three pronouncements effect a definitive divorce.” He 
does not explain whether this means that for Sunnis, the statement “She is irrevocably 
divorced” is effective or not, or whether Sunnis hold that the husband can return to the 
wife in between the three statements or not.185 Ṣunqūr does not address the family law 
draft on this matter.  
 
Inheritance (Turāth) 
 
 A critical difference between Sunni and Shii law involves inheritance due to the 
children of the deceased, especially to daughters when there are no sons. Ṣunqūr 
explains that in this situation, Sunni law prescribes that the brothers of the deceased 
inherit along with the daughters. For instance, if there is one daughter, she will receive 
half, and her uncle will receive half. If there are two daughters, they will each receive 
one third, and their uncle will receive one third, and so on.186 This differs greatly from 
Shii law which does not recognize the right of the ʻaṣaba, or the closest male blood 
relative to the deceased, to inherit along with the children of the deceased. In the above 
example, Ṣunqūr writes, “the single daughter will receive half as her lawful share, and 
the second half by return (bi-al-radd).” This discrepancy regarding the rights of the 
ʻaṣaba originates in the respective schools’ approach to the interpretation of the Qur’an 
                                                
185 Sunni rules allow the husband who has not yet pronounced the third statement to return to his wife and 
resume the marriage if he so choose. However, once the third statement has been pronounced, the divorce 
is irrevocable. If the two choose to remarry, they may do so only after the wife marries and divorces 
another man. For a full discussion, see Tucker, Women, Family, and Gender, pp. 86-92.  
186 The existence of a son or sons would then cut the daughter(s)’ share again, as girls receive a half share 
to that of boys. This is why the Sunni system is particularly hard on daughters. 
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verses that address inheritance. The rules of succession existing prior to Islam 
privileged the ʻaṣaba over the immediate family and direct descendents of the deceased. 
The Sunni schools held that the Qur’an verses were revealed in order to mitigate this 
system by allocating definite shares to the spouse and children (often termed the 
“Qur’anic heirs”), but not to fundamentally change it. Shii scholars, on the other hand, 
did conclude that these verses constituted the establishment of a new system that 
favored close relatives (and women) over the extended family. Noel Coulson argued 
that the Shii view “reflects a fundamentally different idea of family ties and 
responsibilities,” 187 and Joseph Schacht saw in the Shii interpretation “the 
consequences of their dogmatic-political doctrines.”188 By this is meant the ideology of 
succession that initially and essentially set Shiis apart from Sunnis, that the succession 
of leadership of the Muslim community should devolve based on bloodlines rather than 
community consensus. The practical effect of this divergence can be as radical as one 
group of relatives inheriting the whole of the estate, while others get nothing at all.189 
For this reason, Bahraini Sunnis have been known to convert to Shiism toward the end 
of their lives, particularly those having only daughters.190 
                                                
187 Noel Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 
125.  
188 Joseph Schacht, “Mirāth,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, vol. 7, 110.  
189 Lucy Carroll analyzes such a case in nineteenth century South Asia in which the deceased left a 
brother, a sister, and two sons of a predeceased daughter. The deceased’s siblings claimed that he was 
Sunni, therefore they should receive the entire estate. The husband of the predeceased daughter argued 
that his sons should receive the estate because the deceased was Shii. The court ruled on behalf of the 
siblings, thus the grandsons got nothing. See “Application of the Islamic Law of Succession: Was the 
Propositus a Sunni or a Shiʻi?” Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1995), 25.  
190 Interviews with Hadiyya Fatḥallāh, Political Specialist, US Embassy, Manama (20 April 2005), and 
Attorney Ḥasan ʻAlī Rāḍī, Manama, (12 February 2006).  
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 These few examples of disparities between Sunni and Shii law, Ṣunqūr writes, 
“are only the tip of the iceberg. The differences between the madhhabs on personal 
status are many and significant. No one among the Ahl al-Sunn (Sunnis) accepts 
obligations that their madhhab rejects, just as the Shiis would not accept this.”191 
Therefore, a unified law would necessarily deny one sect’s rights to live according to its 
principles.  
 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE 
 
 A UIC statement published on November 9, 2005, the day of the Seef highway 
demonstration, clarified that codification of the law, per se, is not what the ʻulamā’ 
oppose. Rather, it is that the process of codification will be carried out by individuals 
who have not attained the level of piety and legal-religious education required to deal 
with these sensitive and complex issues. Even if the draft committee is comprised of 
religious scholars, the law will thereafter be subject to amendment, revision, and/or 
eradication by Parliament. In addition, the UIC argues that simply enacting a codified 
law will not solve all the difficulties plaguing the sharīʻa courts. Egypt and Lebanon 
have codified law, but they still have many problems, among them high divorce rates.  
 The UIC offered the government a solution to the problem of codification. They 
agreed to support the new law as long as, first, it is drawn exclusively from sharīʻa, and 
                                                
191 Ṣunqūr, “Ru’iyatna.” 
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second, an article is added to the constitution stipulating that the enactment of the law, 
as well as any future changes to the law, must first be approved by the Shiis’ highest 
religious authority, the marjaʻ. The UIC suggested the following wording for the article: 
“He who has the right to enact and amend articles of the law is the marjaʻ.”192 For 
members of the UIC, that authority is Ᾱyatollāh ʻAlī al-Sīstānī who resides in Iraq. If 
enacted, the constitutional guarantee would radically change Shii legal authority in 
Bahrain. As the system exists today, the Ᾱl Khalīfa appoint the judges to the sharīʻa 
court who then make rulings according their own personal examination of sharīʻa 
sources. Although the judges are Shii, they are individuals who have a positive 
relationship with the Sunni rulers. The UIC has made no formal demand regarding the 
process of the appointment of judges (although they have certainly criticized it). 
However, if the constitutional guarantee were to be enacted, those judges would be 
constrained by Bahraini law to apply only those statutes that have been approved by 
Ᾱyatollāh ʻAlī al-Sīstānī, an Iraqi national.  
 Some observers have stated that the constitutional amendment is an 
impossibility. MP ʻAbd al-Nabī Salmān described the ruler’s unwillingness even to 
discuss the constitution: “This by-law [the UIC’s proposed constitutional guarantee] 
cannot be changed by Parliament, or even the king. This won’t happen. It is a sensitive 
issue. Once we start talking about changing the constitution, the king closes his ears.”193 
Salmān and others have suggested that the UIC is using the amendment regarding the 
family law as a pretext to open up the constitution for further reform. “What they really 
                                                
192 “al-Ghurayfī: Ḥamlāt al-ʻAlā li-l-mar’a’ tadlīl li-l-ra’i al-ʻumūm,” al-Mīthāq (October 27, 2005).  
193 Interview with MP ʻAbd al-Nabī Salmān, Manama (30 March 2006). 
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want is to affect constitutional law,” stated Sunni sharīʻa scholar Niẓām Yaʻqūbī who 
served on the 2005 draft committee and helped to write the Sunni component of the 
family law.194 The UIC has discovered an issue that strongly resonates with the Shii 
population; one with which they have been able to mobilize that population against the 
Ᾱl Khalīfa in a manner that not even the repression of the 1990’s did. There can be no 
doubt that the UIC, as well as most Bahraini Shiis, would like to see the reinstatement 
of the 1973 Constitution, or at least some readjustment of the current document.  
Despite the great amount of support the UIC enjoys, not all Bahraini Shiis are in 
agreement. Some Shiis such as Shaykh Muḥsin Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr support the family law, and 
do not back the UIC’s demand for the constitutional guarantee. The next section 
explores possible explanations for this divergence.   
 
THE USULI-AKHBARI DIVIDE 
 
 Within Imami Shiism, two schools195 of legal thought have historically 
competed for dominance. One of the key disagreements between them concerns the 
                                                
194 Interview with Shaykh Niẓām Yaʻqūbī, Manama (5 April 2006).  
195 Whether or not Akhbarism can be called a school in the sense of the formal madhhab has been 
debated. Robert Gleave notes that scholars have been reluctant to name it as such, and instead have 
referred to it by terms such as “movement” (Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi, Religious authority in Shi`ite 
Islam: from the office of Mufti to the institution of Marjaʻ, Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of 
Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1996, 92) and “trend” (Devin Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: 
Twelver Shiite Responses to the Sunni Legal System, Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 1998, 
92). Stewart argues that those Shii jurists who accepted and developed the use of reason modeled Sunni 
methods with the aim of creating a Shii madhhab that could rival those of the Sunnis. The Akhbaris, on 
the other hand, Stewart sees as having opposed this movement, specifically because the madhhab was a 
Sunni institution based upon a concept of authority they saw as thoroughly incompatible with Shii 
principles, namely that jurists could provide religious guidance as proxies of the Imam. Robert Gleave, 
Inevitable doubt:Two theories of Shiʻi jurisprudence (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2000), 5-6. 
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proper sources of law. Both agree that the primary sources are the Qur’an, and the 
hadith, or akhbār. For Imami Shiis, the hadith includes not only the reports of the 
Prophet Muhammad, but also those of the twelve Imams. For scholars referred to as 
Akbaris, these are the only valid sources of law. Akhbaris do not accept ijmaʻ, or the 
consensus of legal scholars. They also reject the use of reason in deducing rules, such as 
qiyās (analogical reasoning), istiṣlāḥ (reasoning dictated by consideration of public 
interest), and istiḥsān (juristic preference based on practical considerations). One or 
more methods of legal deduction in which the jurist uses reason have been referred to 
by Muslim scholars, as well as non-Muslim scholars of Islam, broadly as ijtihād, 
although the term has become imprecise and requires some qualification. Akhbaris 
generally reject all methods of ijtihād, and therefore also reject the role of the jurist who 
performs these actions, the mujtahid. The other group of scholars, referred to as Usulis 
(taken from the phrase “uṣūl al-fiqh,” or legal theory), do accept some methods of legal 
reasoning as well as the consensus of legal scholars as legitimate sources of law. Usulis 
not only accept the role of the mujtahid, but have institutionalized the process of 
referring to the mujtahid for all legal questions. This process is called taqlīd, and 
dictates that every lay person must seek the opinion of a qualified mujtahid in all legal 
matters. A mujtahid who has attained a superior status then acquires the title of marjaʻ. 
Members of the laity can decide which marjaʻ to follow, or can follow more than 
one.196  
                                                
196 For a thorough treatment of the development of the Marjaʻiyya, see The Most Learned of the Shiʻa: 
The Institution of the Marjaʻ Taqlīd, Linda S. Walbridge, ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001). 
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 Currently, most Bahraini Shiis are Usuli. The members of the UIC are Usuli and 
follow the preeminent marjaʻ of Najaf, Iraq at this time, Ᾱyatollāh ʻAlī al-Sīstānī. But 
not all Bahraini Shiis are Usuli. In fact, from the eighteenth century until very recently 
(the 1980’s), Bahrainis have been predominantly Akhbari.197 The country has produced 
some of the most well-known Akhbari scholars such as Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī (d. 
1186/1772), and has been considered an Akhbari stronghold by scholars of Islamic 
law.198 Bahraini sources interviewed for this project attributed the upsurge in Usuli 
thought during the 1980’s to the 1979 Iranian revolution which inspired many Bahraini 
Shiis.  
 Scholars of Islamic legal reform in the Middle East and South Asia have noted 
that there is a relationship between the school of legal thought, or madhhab, and the 
degree to which Western codified legal systems have been resisted by members of the 
ʻulamā’.199 Where legal scholars are given wide latitude in the ability to perform ijtihād, 
codified systems are strongly opposed. On the contrary, schools that require conformity 
to the existing legal tradition tend to concede rather easily to the imposition of a 
                                                
197 In practice, Akhbaris did and do practice ijtihād. The terminology can be somewhat confusing and/or 
misleading. Bahraini Akhbaris themselves and others refer to Akhbari scholars as mujtahids, and even 
marjʻas. Similarly, Bahraini Usulis have differentiated themselves from the Sunnis by arguing that they, 
Shiis, use the Qur’an and the Sunna as their two basic sources, while the Sunnis rely on various 
subjective methods such as qiyās, al-istiḥsān, and al-istiṣlāḥ. This argument obfuscates the Usulis’ 
reliance on the use of reason, although there are several techniques that use reason that tend to be 
subsumed under the heading of ijtihād. It is true that qiyās, analogical reasoning, is strenuously objected 
to in the Imams’ reports. For more on these distinctions, see Robert Gleave, Inevitable Doubt: Two 
Theories of Shiʻi Jurisprudence (Leiden: Brill, 2000). The crossing over of terminology between Usulis 
and Akhbaris in Bahrain underscores the presumption that the distinction between them has become less 
significant in recent years. During the course of the research period, neither the term “Usuli” nor the term 
“Akhbari” were used by any of the informants unless they were specifically prompted to do so.   
198 See Moojan Momen, An introduction to Shiʻi Islam: the history and doctrines of Twelver Shiʻism 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 118, 127, 225. 
199 See Sherman A. Jackson, Islamic Law and State: the constitutional jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-
Qarāfī (Leiden: New York: E.J. Brill, 1996); Vogel, Islamic Law and legal system: studies of Saudi 
Arabia (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2000); and Zaman, Ulama.  
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codified law. For instance, in Saudi Arabia where Hanbali scholars are at liberty to 
interpret the texts freely to derive rulings, codification has been vehemently opposed. In 
contrast, the Hanafi ʻulamā’ of Pakistan accepted codification without incident. The 
reason for this, it has been argued, is that the act of codifying law is not terribly 
dissimilar from the method of deriving rules used by schools such as the Hanafi. Both 
processes select rules from already extant sources. Muhammad Qasim Zaman, whose 
work centers on Pakistan remarks: “Modern initiatives toward codification, then, can be 
thought of as continuing the already well-established practice of adhering to the texts 
and doctrines recognized as authoritative in one’s school of law.”200  
 According to this theory, the Akhbaris’ emphasis on the texts of the akhbār and 
their rejection of ijtiihād would make them more amenable to codification. As long as 
the rules being chosen for codification are derived from established texts that have been 
inspired by the Imams, the authority of those texts, and therefore the Imams, is not 
threatened. For the Usulis’, however, authority rests with the mujtahid and especially, 
the marjaʻ who is believed to represent the Twelfth Imam. The practice of taqlīd 
dictates reference to these experts in any religious or legal matter (it is crucial that they 
be living experts). Codification would therefore involve the transfer of the authority 
enjoyed by the experts to the text. Usulis, then, have a strong doctrinal basis for 
rejecting efforts at codification.  
These assumptions are borne out in the respective Usuli and Akhbari positions 
on the family law.  Discussed at length above were the Usulis’ objections to the law and 
                                                
200 Zaman, Ulama, 97. 
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their efforts to protect the authority of the marjaʻ. When asked about the UIC’s demand 
for the constitutional mandate for Sīstānī’s approval, Shaykh Muḥsin Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr of a 
prominent Akhbari family replied, “Why should we look to Najaf (Iraq)? We have two 
hundred years of experts here in Bahrain that are of a higher standard than those from 
Najaf.”201 Shaykh Muḥsin described the quality of the scholarship of those in his 
family, including Shaykh Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī, mentioned above, and Shaykh Ḥusayn Ᾱl 
ʻAṣfūr (d. 1216/1801). Shaykh Muḥsin said that over half the Shiis in Bahrain use the 
works of Yūsuf and Ḥusayn. Two theses in particular are used regularly: Ḥadā’iq al-
nāḍira fī aḥkām al-ʻitrah al-ṭāhira written by al-Baḥrānī, and Sadād al-ʻibād wa rashād 
al-ʻubbād written by Ḥusayn Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr.  “Even the Usulis use Shaykh Yūsuf and 
Shaykh Ḥusayn,” Shaykh Muḥsin said. His comments are corroborated by Attorney 
Ḥasan ʻAlī Raḍī in his study of the judiciary in Bahrain. He cites the same two works of 
the Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr along with a third, Muʻtamad al-sā’il by ʻAbd Allāh al-Sitrī, and writes, 
“The Shia in Bahrain still rely on the remaining books of their jurists, particularly the 
books of the above mentioned three jurists.”202 Shaykh Muḥsin himself has compiled a 
collection of rulings on family law using the authoritative Akhbari sources, and 
especially those of his family members. He offered this collection to the government to 
use in the Shii sharīʻa court, but they have not expressed an interest in doing so. Still, 
Shaykh Muḥsin supports the family law initiative.  
                                                
201 Interview with Shaykh Muḥsin Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr, Manama (9 March 2006).  
202 Hassan Ali Radhi, Judiciary and Arbitration in Bahrain (London: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 7, 
also f.n. 21, 8. 
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Apart from these ideological bases for Akhbari support for codification, there 
are political motives as well. The Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr family has had a close and agreeable 
relationship with the Sunni ruling family. The benefits of this relationship have been 
mutual. Members of the Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr have received prestigious and lucrative 
appointments, while the Ᾱl Khalīfa have been guaranteed a government-friendly Shii 
sharīʻa court, and token Shii support for its initiatives. This situation has begun to 
unravel of late due to the work of the women activists described below in the following 
chapter.     
   
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Bahrainis have been debating the enactment of a codified family law since the 
early 1980’s. Currently, there are two divisions in the nation’s courts: a civil court that 
takes criminal, commercial, and civil cases, and a sharīʻa court that handles cases 
related to the family and personal status. The sharīʻa court is further divided into Sunni 
and Shii sections, treating the kingdom’s two major sects separately, as each sect 
follows its own school of legal thought. Activists have charged that both sharīʻa 
sections are in need of reform; that the courts are inefficient, inconsistent in their 
rulings, that judges are not properly trained and that some are corrupt. Bahrain’s 
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previous king, ʻῙsā b. Salmān Ᾱl Khalīfa, disregarded these charges, and was reluctant 
to change the system. It has only been since his son, Ḥamad, was crowned in 1999, that 
the rulers have taken serious steps toward the implementation of such a law. Although 
the government is an authoritarian regime, Ḥamad has twice suspended his plans to 
promulgate a new law, once in 2003 and again in 2006. From all accounts, it was 
because of the opposition generated by the Shii ʻulamā’ that the government halted its 
plans. 
As members of the UIC, Shii clerics argued that the state does not have the 
authority to oversee family law. If the state were to issue a codified law, this law would 
be drafted and promulgated by men who are not trained in Islamic jurisprudence; 
legislators and government officials. Even if the government allowed religious scholars 
to draft the law, it would still have to be promulgated, and could be amended in the 
future, by these secular authorities. These are “God’s laws,” they argue, and not to be 
tampered with by those who are not “men of religion.” A second, not insignificant issue 
is that Bahrain’s ruling family is Sunni, and has demonstrated an interest in furthering 
Sunni (minority) domination over the kingdom’s majority Shii population. Sunni and 
Shii family laws have many elements in common. However, Shii ʻulamā’ are concerned 
that the government would not preserve those elements that are specific to Shii law, 
since government representatives have expressed approval for a unified law which 
would be used for all Bahrainis irrespective of sect.  
In public statements, the ʻulamā’ clarify that it is not codification itself that they 
oppose, but only the involvement of secular authorities in the codification of the 
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sharīʻa. They offer that they would accept a codified law under three specific 
conditions: first, that the law would be drafted exclusively by religious scholars; second, 
that it would be submitted to the Shiis’ highest religious authority, the marjaʻ, before 
promulgation, namely Ᾱyatollāh ʻAlī al-Sīstānī, who resides in Najaf, Iraq; and third, 
that the Bahraini constitution be amended to include a guarantee that the law could not 
be altered in any way without prior approval of the marjaʻ. Thus, at the same time they 
are claiming the superiority of the religious authority of the marjaʻ over the secular 
authority of the state, the ʻulamā’ are looking to that same secular authority to safeguard 
the authority of the marjaʻ. By issuing these demands, the ʻulamā’ claim the 
predominance of religious authority over that of the state and at the same time seek to 
safeguard that authority by enshrining it in the very (secular) authority it claims to 
supersede. In addition, they ask that the state’s authority, one that is limited to its 
geographic and political borders, be used to sanction a religious authority that extends 
beyond those borders, in this case to Iraq. Through the debate over the new law, the Shii 
ʻulamā’ are redefining the meaning and scope of religious authority by proposing an 
extra-territorial jurisdiction that is challenging the sovereignty of the Bahraini state.  
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CHAPTER 4: Women Activists Claiming Women’s Rights 
 
 Bahrain’s Shii ʻulamā’ have claimed that they have authority over the sharīʻa 
court and, specifically, over the family law. They base this claim on their participation 
in an Islamic tradition of a particular course of study and the cultivation of a prescribed 
type of piety. They also argue that the authority of their highest Shii religious official, 
the marjaʻ, supersedes that of the state in matters of Islamic law. Therefore, the Shii 
ʻulamā’ oppose the state-sponsored law. They prefer instead either the maintenance of 
the current system in which sharīʻa judges have exclusive authority to issue rulings 
based on individual consideration of Islamic jurisprudence, or the establishment of a 
codified law that is drafted, maintained, and amended solely by Shii religious 
authorities.  
Standing opposed to the Shii ʻulamā’ are Muslim women activists. The activists 
contend that the sharīʻa courts are not giving Bahraini women their legitimate rights 
under the sharīʻa in matters of marriage (nikah), divorce (ṭalāq), child custody (ḥaḍāna) 
and maintenance (nafaqa). They believe that the government’s codified law, while 
admittedly not perfect, would give women the best chance of receiving some, if not all 
of these rights. Although the administration of Islamic law has been almost exclusively 
conducted by men, contemporary Bahraini women activists claim authority to play a 
part in determining the future of the sharīʻa court. The grounds upon which they do so 
differ from those of the ʻulama’. As Muslims, they claim rights that are granted to them 
in the sacred Islamic texts, the Qur’an and hadith. By engaging with the texts 
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themselves, the activists show that the sharīʻa courts have been denying women their 
legitimate Islamic rights. As citizens, they claim rights found in the Bahraini 
constitution, which declares all citizens equal in regard to legal rights and protections. 
As members of a global Muslim community, they draw upon contemporary global, as 
well as local or regional (Arab) Islamic ideals of justice. As humans, the activists assert 
that the denial of their rights in the aforementioned areas constitutes a human rights 
violation, citing international human rights documents such as the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).  
The strategies by which Bahraini Women activists pursue their goal of attaining 
women’s rights are similar to those of the ʻulamā’: they engage in public debate, give 
press interviews, hold discussion sessions in the salons (majālis) of prominent members 
of society, organize and submit petitions to the government, hold conferences and 
seminars, lobby the government, hold public demonstrations, and engage in other forms 
of political activism. Through analyzing the strategies of two women’s NGOs, Lajnat 
al-Aḥwāl al-Shakhṣīyya, The Personal Law Committee (hereafter PLC), and Lajnat al-
‘Arīḍa al-Nisā’iyya, The Women’s Petition Committee (hereafter WPC), this chapter 
examines the ways in which Bahraini women are challenging the authority of the male 
religious elite as well as that of the state. In answering the central question of the 
dissertation, namely, how is religious authority determined in contemporary Bahraini 
society, the chapter assumes a Foucauldian view of power in which power is relational 
rather than exerted exclusively from above. Drawing on the work of Leila Abu-Lughod, 
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this chapter considers the activity of the two NGOs as a “diagnostic of power;” as 
activity that reveals shifts in relations of power.203 The Bahraini NGOs’ activity reveals, 
first, increased involvement of lay people in a discourse, that of Islamic law, once 
restricted to religious specialists. This was made possible in part by the opening not 
only of a public sphere in which ordinary individuals participate in debate about public 
issues,204 but also of a “religious public sphere” in which those individuals participate in 
religious discourse.205 
Second, the NGOs’ activities demonstrate Muslim women’s agency in a male-
dominated arena. While contemporary Bahraini women are by no means the first 
Muslim women to seek their legitimate rights in the sharīʻa court, the activists 
examined here are the first in the modern history of Bahrain to engage in the process of 
legal reform in an organized manner. Their activities have yielded demonstrable effects 
on policy-making with regard to the judiciary and legal procedure. Lastly, as a result of 
specific demands made by the NGOs, the state has begun to provide wives with certain 
rights that Islamic jurisprudence dictates are the responsibility of the husband, such as 
proper nafaqa and sakan. In this, the activists have caused the state to play a more 
significant role in the “Islamic” family.  
 In the course of striving toward their goal of a codified family law, Bahraini 
women activists pursue strategies of political activism: calling for their rights as 
                                                
203 Lila Abu-Lughod, “The Romance of resistance: Tracing transformations of power through Bedouin 
women,” American Ethnologist, 17 (1), pp. 41-55.  
204 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Berger, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991.  
205 Fariba Adelkhah, Being Modern in Iran, trans., Jonathan Derrick, London: Hurst & Company, 1999, 
pp. 105-138.  
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citizens, petitioning and lobbying the government, etc. In analyzing the relationship 
between Islam and politics, Dale Eickelman points out that political struggles are not 
just struggles over power. They are also struggles over the meaning of symbols.206 The 
sharīʻa court has become an iconic symbol of Islamic authenticity, therefore those who 
determine the role that court plays also help to determine the meaning of Islam in 
society. Also, as Saba Mahmood has demonstrated, it is not just women’s overt 
resistance to existing power structures that results in the shifting of power relations. 
Women’s performance of piety in activities that serve to re-inscribe religious norms can 
be just as transformative as performing those activities which are deliberately political, 
and at times even more so.207 As much as the ʻulamā’ may accuse them of being so, 
most Bahraini women activists are not secularists seeking to imitate the West by 
throwing out religion. They are committed Muslims who believe that the solution to the 
problems in the sharīʻa courts exists not in eliminating religion, but rather in enforcing 
it.    
 
 
 
Claiming rights as Muslims 
 
“Islam gave us and preserved for us all of our rights. All of our rights are found in the 
Holy Qur’an”208 
 
                                                
206 Dale F. Eickelman, “Islam and the Languages of Modernity,” Daedalus, Vol. 129, No. 1, Multiple 
Modernities (Winter, 2000), pp. 122-123.  
207 Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005, pp. 34-35.  
208 Ghāda Jamshīr, Interview on “al-Iḍā’āt,” Al-Arabiyya, December 21, 2005.  
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 In a speech delivered to the members of the Executive Women’s Society in 
April of 1986, lawyer and member of the PLC, Lūlwa al-ʻAwaḍī explained that the 
growing crisis in the country’s sharīʻa courts was caused predominantly by one thing: 
the religious courts’ failure to follow the rules of religion. The rules of sharīʻa allow a 
woman to divorce her husband on several grounds including his failure to support her, 
and his mistreatment of her.209 Despite these rules, which al-ʻAwaḍī claimed are 
accepted as majority opinions in all schools of Islamic law, Bahraini judges force 
women to pay their husbands in order to acquire the divorce, as if they are at fault (i.e., 
to avail themselves of a khulʻ210 divorce): “Regarding our Sharia courts, we have never 
seen any judgment which has adopted any of these reasons as a cause for divorce.”211 
Regarding the wife’s maintenance after divorce, al-ʻAwaḍī said that the courts generally 
award women too small an amount, a practice that she said violates the principles of 
Islam.  
 Al-ʻAwaḍī and the other committee members studied hundreds of sharīʻa court 
decisions.212 The committee analyzed decisions in cases relating to twelve specific 
issues: 
                                                
209 The schools vary on the specific grounds upon which wives can be awarded a divorce. For instance, 
the four major Sunni schools as well as the Jaʻfari school all consider desertion grounds for a woman to 
divorce her husband. However, Malikis first require that the husband be missing for a period of four 
years; the Hanbali and Jaʻfari schools require four years, four months, and ten days; while the Hanafi 
school considered the wife married to her husband until she received confirmation of his death, or until 
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years, or until all male members of his peer group are deceased. For a summary of the major schools’ 
positions on this issue, see Judith E. Tucker, Women, Family, and Gender in Islamic Law, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 92-95.  
210 Details of the khulʻ divorce will be discussed below.  
211 Belinda Seward, “Change divorce laws – women’s campaigner,” Gulf Daily News, April 23, 1986.  
212 PLC, “Dirāsat ḥawl qānūn al-aḥwāl al-shakhṣīat li-l-usra, (Study on the laws of Personal Status for 
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1) al-wilāya fi ʻaqd al-zawāj (guardianship in the contracting of 
marriages) 
2) taʻaddud al-zawjāt (polygamy) 
3) nafaqat al-zawja (wife’s maintenance) 
4) al-ṭāʻa (wife’s obedience of the husband) 
5) sinn al-zawāj (minimum age of marriage) 
6) ṭalāq al-mukrah wa al-hāzil wa al-sakrān (divorce [initiated by the 
husband] under compulsion, in jest, and while drunk) 
7) al-ṭalāq al-thulāthī bi-lafẓ wāḥid (triple divorce in one 
pronouncement) 
8) al-ṭalāq bi-l-ḥukm al-qaḍā’ī (judicial divorce) 
9) mutʻat al-zawja al-muṭlaqa (temporary marriage of the divorced 
woman) 
10) khulʻ (divorce at the insistence of the wife in which she pays 
compensation) 
11) ḥiḍānat al-awlād (child custody) 
12) nafaqat al-awlād (child maintenance)213 
 
The rulings were examined according to two basic criteria: whether they agreed with 
Qur’anic injunctions and/or majority fiqh opinions, and whether they were similar to 
rulings of the courts of other Muslim countries. The committee summarized their results 
and submitted their findings to the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs along with a 
set of specific recommendations for reform. They argued that despite the fact that there 
are many valid interpretations (al-ijtihādāt) to choose from, judges in Bahrain’s courts 
generally choose the ruling that is hardest on women.214 One example is the unusually 
frequent use of the khulʻ divorce by Bahraini judges. The report references Qur’an 
2:229 which reads: “It is not lawful for you to take back any of your gifts [from your 
wives] except when both parties fear that they would be unable to keep the limits 
prescribed by God. There is no blame on either of them if she give [him] something for 
                                                
213 PLC, “Dirāsat,” pp. 1-2.  
214 Kokila Jacob, “Family Law Plea Rejected,” Gulf Daily News, November 30, 1987. 
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her freedom.”215 The report then explains that a majority of jurists have found it 
permissible to grant women a divorce in cases in which she simply does not love her 
husband, and prefers to pay him in exchange for her freedom, either by returning the 
marriage gift (mahr) or by offering him a specified sum of money. In support of the 
widespread contemporary agreement on the matter, the report cites laws of other 
countries that allowed the khulʻ divorce: Iraqi Article 46, Article 102 of the Jordanian 
law, Articles 95 to 103 of the Syrian law, Laws 61 to 65 of Morocco. The committee 
then explains that in the case of Bahrain, the khulʻ divorce appeared to be used in most 
cases in which the wife initiated the divorce, even when her grounds included being 
beaten by her husband or his mistreatment of her, and criticizes this practice: “This is 
not legal. It contradicts the most widely accepted rules of sharīʻa.”216 The committee 
reported that out of 360 total divorce cases examined from the year 1982, 139 of them 
were khulʻ, an unusually high number.217     
                                                
215 PLC, “Dirāsat,” p. 13.  
216 Ibid. Studies of the use of khulʻ in practice have found significant differences between the sharʻī 
version prescribed by jurists and that which is implemented by judges. Aharon Layish found that khulʻ 
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qāḍīs approved what was clearly a contradiction as legitimate because it was usually proven that both 
parties entered into it willingly. In studying the court records of Eygpt and Jordan, Amira El-Azhary 
Sonbol found a discrepancy between the way in which khulʻ was applied in the pre-reform Ottoman 
period, and the post-independence nation-states. The key issue she encountered was that Ottoman judges 
tended to grant wives the khulʻ regardless of whether they had legitimate grounds, and regardless of 
whether the husbands agreed or not, while modern courts require the husband’s consent. See Layish, 
“Customary “Khulʻ” as Reflected in the “Sijill” of the Libyan “Sharīʻa” Courts,” Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 51, No. 3 (1988), pp. 428-439 and Sonbol, 
“Ṭāʻa and Modern Legal Reform: a rereading,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 9, No. 3, 
1998, pp. 285-294.  
217 Ibid. It is interesting to note that while Bahraini women activists revealed the negative impact of the 
overuse of the khulʻ divorce in their country, activists in Egypt lobbied for the enactment of a law 
allowing women to divorce by khulʻ. Until the spring of 2000 when the khulʻ law was passed, Egypt’s 
laws did not provide women any legal avenue for divorcing their husbands without specific grounds such 
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The PLC therefore advocated a unified law that would standardize which 
interpretations would be used and that could be applied in both the Sunni and the Shii 
sharīʻa court. Undersecretary of the ministry Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman ibn Rashīd Ᾱl 
Khalīfa rejected the committee’s recommendations, and denied the claim that women 
are dealt with in an unjust manner: “Judges presently apply Sharia rules which make no 
distinction between men and women and do not discriminate in favor of the former.”218 
Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman instead accused the activists of misunderstanding the sharīʻa, 
or of trying to introduce legislation that contradicts Islam. He maintained that the judges 
are strictly bound by the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the interpretations of the Imams,219 and 
that the fact of differing interpretations is the logical result of such a process: “The 
words of the Qur’an and the teachings of the Sunna are clear and without contradiction, 
and any differences that may exist between the interpretations of the Imams are natural 
and such as exist in all authoritative and vital legal traditions.”220  
 Despite the fact that the PLC continued to base their recommendations on the 
Islamic texts, their support for a single law that would apply to both sects aroused the 
opposition of the Shii ʻulamā’. In 2003, after Ḥamad announced the formation of a 
family law drafting committee, the fear that this law would be the destruction of the 
madhhabs became a familiar refrain. Members of the Shii ʻulamā’ accused the 
government and the women activists alike not only of importing secular codes from the 
                                                                                                                                          
as abuse or abandonment. See Leila Al-Atraqchi, “The Women’s Movement and the Mobilization for 
Legal Change in Egypt: A Century of Personal Status Law Reform,” dissertation, Concordia University, 
March 2003.   
218 Jacob, “Plea rejected.” 
219 It is my belief that here, Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥmān is referring to both the group of twelve Shii Imams 
as well as the four putative founders of the Sunni madhhabs (Imam Mālik, Imam Shāfiʻī, etc.).  
220 Jacob, “Plea rejected.” 
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West, but also of seeking to eradicate differences between the madhhabs. As was 
discussed in Chapter 1, the king’s 2003 decree came shortly after the wave of sectarian 
violence of the 1990’s. Sectarian tensions were thus especially pronounced at this time. 
In addition, the government agency charged with Bahraini women’s affairs, the 
Supreme Council for Women, announced their support for a unified law.  
Although the government eventually conceded to the ʻulamā’ on the point of 
keeping Sunni and Shii law separate, the PLC maintains that a unified law for both sects 
would not only ease the suffering of Bahraini families better than separate laws could 
do, but that a unified law would also reduce sectarian tension, and be fully Islamic at the 
same time. When asked what the PLC’s position is on how interpretations should be 
chosen for such a unified law, a PLC representative issued the following statement: 
 
 It is necessary in my opinion to choose for the personal  
status law the most lenient [rulings] that the madhhabs  
arrived at, because the foundation of the sharīʻa is the  
easing [of burdens], not the amplification of them. The  
[rulings] arrived at by the master mujtahids of the madhhabs  
were derived in consideration of the time and place in  
which they lived. If they had lived in our time, they would  
have arrived at [rulings] that befit our time and circumstances.  
For there is no text but the Qur’an, and ijtihād does not lend  
power to it [my italics].221  
   
The members of the PLC speak with authority and confidence about their understanding 
of the way in which Islamic texts are to be used. Their perspective is modernist in that 
they consider past rulings and jurisprudence inappropriate for specifically modern social 
and historical circumstances, viewing them as inapplicable to their own context. They 
                                                
221 Personal Law Committee statement, correspondence from member Nādia al-Maskatī, March 18, 2006.  
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argue that applying a centuries-old ruling to a modern case which involves completely 
changed social conditions is not only inappropriate and a cause of unnecessary 
suffering, but also contrary to the intention of the Qur’an. They urge an unyielding 
focus on the Qur’an, its purpose, and its principles, and continuous reappraisals of such 
in light of ever-changing social, economic and political conditions. As the word of God, 
the Qur’an is the only enduring authority needed to pursue a way of life that accords 
with God’s will. In the last line of the above statement, the PLC is implying that by 
placing such a high value on past fiqh rulings, which are human interpretations (as well 
as male human interpretations), the ʻulamā’ are revering human scholars above God.   
  
*************** 
 
 Family law activist and founder of the Women’s Petition Committee Ghāda 
Jamshīr also shares a modernist approach to the question of the sources of Islamic law. 
In December of 2005, Jamshīr appeared on the talk show “al-Iḍā’āt,” which airs on the 
Dubai-based network al-Arabiyya, to discuss the work of her organization toward the 
goal of a codified family law.222 Jamshīr had recently received a great amount of media 
attention, both in Bahrain as well as regionally, due to three cases lodged against her in 
the Bahraini criminal court. In May of 2005 judges in the sharīʻa court accused Jamshīr 
of defaming them in remarks she made in person, in materials distributed to the public, 
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and in one case, during a private telephone conversation.223 While the case was 
eventually dismissed and all charges against her were dropped, the publicity her case 
received served to re-ignite public debate over the state of the sharīʻa courts and the 
possibility of the codification of family law.  
 During the course of the interview, Jamshīr made several claims concerning the 
current practice of Islamic law. She argued that those who represent Islam, or the 
“leaders of Islam” (al-qā’imīn al-Islām) pretend to uphold Islam, but their actions are 
contrary to Islam in one of two ways.224 Either they engage in practices that are 
dishonest, such as when judges accept bribes, or they follow jurisprudence that no 
longer applies to contemporary life and that, on the contrary, creates hardships, 
especially for women. The first part of the argument is rather straightforward: a judge 
who accepts bribes would be considered unjust by any standard. The second part of the 
argument, disputes the judicial philosophy used by the judges. Like the PLC, Jamshīr’s 
approach is modernist in that she denies the applicability of past rulings to the 
contemporary era, and advocates a re-reading of the primary Islamic texts in light of 
changed social and economic circumstances.   
 The host of the show, Turkī al-Dakhīl, focused on asking Jamshīr to respond to 
the assumption that those who defend women’s rights are opposed to Islam. Jamshīr 
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stated that this assumption is exactly what she aims to correct. She takes to task those 
who make this assumption for their definition of Islam: “people attribute [certain] 
customs to Islam incorrectly, while Islam is innocent of this.”225 Specifically, Jamshīr 
argues that it is male scholars who are invested with the responsibility of maintaining 
Islamic institutions, such as the sharīʻa court judges, that are misrepresenting Islam: 
“Islam honors women. The Prophet, peace be upon Him, said, ‘No one honors women 
except the honorable, and no one humiliates them except the dishonorable.’ He also 
said, ‘Be merciful with fragile women.’ Where is all of this? I see nothing of it.”226 
Asserting that these male scholars grant men their rights, while ignoring those of 
women, she stated, “The Holy Qur’an was not revealed to the Prophet (PBUH) only for 
men…We are equal in rights and obligations.”227  
Al-Dakhīl asked if Jamshīr could provide specific examples of the judges 
denying women their rights. She then brought out a stack of documents which were 
presumably sharīʻa court decisions and proceeded to describe four actual cases. In the 
first case, from the Jaʻfarī court, a couple signed a marriage contract after which the 
wife discovered that the husband suffers from Hepatitis B. She then sought to divorce 
him on the grounds that he would endanger her health and the health of any children 
that would issue from the marriage. According to the Jaʻfarī school, these are adequate 
grounds for awarding the wife a divorce; one in which she would retain her right to 
nafaqa.228 Instead of granting the wife the divorce, Jamshīr explained that the Jaʻfarī 
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court suspended the case and reportedly sought to classify the divorce as a khulʻ 
divorce.  
In the fourth case, also a divorce case from the Jaʻfarī court, the judge awarded 
custody of the couple’s five daughters to the husband upon the girls’ reaching age 
seven. Because the husband was judged to be at fault, the wife was granted nafaqa and 
sakan. However, the wife surrendered these rights in exchange for permanent custody 
of her daughters. Jamshīr expressed outrage at the conditions that would force a woman 
to abandon her basic rights in order to keep her children, explaining that now this 
woman has no money, has begun to beg in the streets, and has applied for welfare 
housing from the government. This custody ruling, it should be noted, accords with 
standard practice in the Jaʻfari as well as some of the Sunni schools.229 The mother is 
granted temporary custody until the child reaches a specified age, usually on or near the 
age of puberty, after which the husband is given permanent custody. Jamshīr considers 
this ruling exceedingly unjust, contrary to Islamic principles, and simply the result of 
biased male interpreters: “The mother is the one who conceives, delivers, raises [the 
children] and suffers. The Prophet (PBUH) said, ‘Your mother, your mother, your 
mother, and then your father.’ When a child is seven years old, they deprive him of his 
mother and give him to the father for what reason? Did the Qur’an say so? There is no 
sūra that stipulates this. There are only the results of ijtihād and fatwās.” The 
interviewer then interrupted to take issue with this last comment, and Jamshīr 
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continued, “We are not bound by ijtihād and fatwās…we are only bound by the Qur’an 
and the Sunna. We should only choose those rulings which fit our era.”230      
 What is perhaps Jamshīr’s most distinctive strategy for advocating for the 
government’s codified family law is the organization of public demonstrations outside 
the sharīʻa court buildings. Like women activists in other Muslim countries, Bahrain’s 
women activists hold demonstrations in which the activists proclaim their positions on 
legal reform. What make Jamshīr’s demonstrations unique is that they are comprised 
mostly of the court litigants themselves, both Sunni and Shii women who were ruled 
against in divorce or child custody cases. A factor that has made it difficult for women 
activists to prove their claims is that Bahrain’s sharīʻa court rulings are not published. 
There is no public record to which Bahrainis can refer to compare judgments or assess 
the performance records of judges. While being interviewed on legal procedure in the 
sharīʻa courts, lawyers I spoke with expressed frustration at this fact. Attorney Jalīla al-
Sayed maintained that the foremost problem in the sharīʻa courts is inconsistency in 
rulings.231 She described the process lawyers go through upon taking a case. She said 
that first, the jurisdiction to which the case belongs must be determined, Sunni or Shii. 
This depends on two factors: the husband’s sect, and the court that endorsed the 
marriage certificate. Then the lawyer must find out which judge will be hearing the 
case. Cases are distributed to judges at random. Then the lawyer must examine that 
judge’s precedents if he/she is able to gain access to them.  
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Attorney Muhammad al-Muṭawwaʻ explained that lawyers must be familiar with 
all the madhhabs. In the Shii court, the judges follow several different religious 
authorities (marjaʻs): Ᾱyatollāh Khomeinī, Shīrāzī, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn 
Faḍlallāh, ʻAlī al-Sīstānī and Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr.232 Al-Sayed said that, “They 
[the lawyers] can go online and look at statements the marjaʻ made and print them out 
and use them as a fatwā. People have also done this by letter. Mostly lawyers do this (as 
opposed to litigants).”233 Al-Muṭawwaʻ explained that the litigant’s own marjaʻ is 
irrelevant: “The lawyer cannot force the judge to accept a ruling from a marjaʻ just 
because that is who the litigant follows. As lawyers, they know the judges after working 
with them extensively, so once they find out which judge the case is going to, they can 
prepare their case based on that judge’s ideology.”234 It is the same for the Sunni court. 
There are judges from all four of the major Sunni madhhabs, therefore lawyers must 
research texts from all four schools.   
As al-Muṭawwaʻ said, after working in the sharīʻa courts for a long period of 
time, each lawyer accumulates his/her own records, but otherwise, he/she is dependent 
upon other lawyers for sharing information. Al-Sayed said that some lawyers do not 
consider sharing information about specific judges’ inclinations to be appropriate, and 
thus keep their experiences confidential. Finally, once the lawyer has assembled the 
judge’s previous rulings, he/she faces the difficulty that there is inconsistency even with 
regard to the same judge’s rulings on the same issue: 
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  They don’t feel obliged to follow precedents, even from  
their own court, or their own decisions. They make  
decisions at their own discretion. For instance, in the  
case of a battered woman who is seeking divorce using  
battery as the grounds, there may be a case in which she  
presented a medical certificate stating that she suffered  
such and such injuries, and that may be enough in one  
case. However, in the next case, the judge may require  
two witnesses to the battery. Obviously if it happened  
in their home, it will be difficult to get witnesses.  
Because maybe in the other case, the neighbors heard  
the woman say “don’t hurt me- don’t break my arm,”  
and then heard the man say “I will break your arm,”  
and then the certificate says that she did indeed suffer  
a broken arm.235 
 
In addition to the problem of inconsistency, there is the issue of impartiality: 
“Judgments are to some extent subjective. Objectivity is not enough. Rulings depend on 
who the litigant is, who the judge is, the social rank of the litigant, and their gender. The 
case of a woman is harder to be substantiated than that of a man.”236 
 After listening to the heartbreaking stories of hundreds of women who lost 
custody of their children, were thrown out of their homes, or who had been waiting up 
to a decade for their divorce cases to be resolved, Ghāda Jamshīr took matters into her 
own hands. In 2002, she began organizing demonstrations in which those women who 
were able and willing stood in front of the department of justice buildings holding signs 
that displayed the name of their judge, the case number, and the decision received.237 
The decisions were frequently accompanied by the litigants’ own assessments of the 
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rulings in which they qualified the rulings as unjust, procedurally incorrect, or 
incompatible with Islam.  
While attending one such demonstration on June 4, 2005, I photographed some 
of the signs held by the demonstrators. Photo 1 shows two signs that refer to the same 
case, case #142 of 2005. The signs are being held by the litigants’ children, and were 
ostensibly written by them.  
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Photo #1                                                                                                     SANDY 
RUSSELL JONES 
 
The sign on the left gives the case number at the top and then reads: “Does this woman 
who sacrificed her life and her youth on behalf of her children deserve to be kicked out 
of her house? Who will see that justice is done for this woman?” The second sign also 
gives the case number and then reads: “From the children of this oppressed woman: We 
demand the re-consideration of my mother’s right to full support (nafaqa) and housing 
(sakan) from the Jaʻfarī court of first instance. Where are our rights?” What is 
interesting to note about the second sign is the way in which the mother’s rights are 
expressed. The term nafaqa refers to a husband’s support of his wife, and is a standard 
element of the Islamic marriage contract. It includes what are considered to be 
reasonable expenses for food, housing, clothing, and related items required to maintain 
the wife in a manner consistent with that of her own family. Following a divorce in 
which the wife was not judged to be at fault due to disobedience (nushūz) or because 
she initiated the divorce without cause (khulʻ), all schools of law agree that the husband 
should continue to provide the wife with nafaqa for a specified time period.  
As mentioned above, housing, sakan, is considered a normal and in most 
situations the most essential component of nafaqa. These are considered a Muslim 
woman’s basic rights within Islam. The woman involved in Case #142 was reportedly 
denied these rights, and the words referring to them are highlighted on the second sign 
by being enclosed in what appears to be embellished parentheses. When Qur’anic text is 
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included in most Arabic documents whether they be religious documents or otherwise, 
the text is usually enclosed by such embellished brackets to indicate the sacred nature of 
the quotation. It is quite possible that the person who wrote the second sign sought to 
emphasize the sacred nature of these rights, therefore making the statement that the 
judge who decided the case did not comply with Islamic law.  
These demonstrations received a great amount of media attention, and threw a 
national spotlight on what had been an exclusive arena to which only male sharīʻa 
officials were privy. One case in particular received so much attention that it elicited a 
surprising response from the king. Jamshir publicized the custody case of Badriyya 
Rabīʻa, a mother who lost custody her two children to her husband, who had reportedly 
bribed the court. The case was so embarrassingly mishandled by the Sunni sharīʻa court 
that the king dismissed six judges who had been granted lifetime appointments.   
 Despite receiving a great amount of criticism and even threats for her actions, 
Jamshīr passionately believes in her right as a Muslim to fight injustice. In the 
introduction to her book, The Executioner and the Victim, Jamshīr explains that her 
committee has taken upon itself the task of defending the many women who suffer 
injustice in the sharīʻa courts. The committee has assumed this task despite the fierce 
opposition it has encountered. Jamshīr writes that although it has been a dangerous 
endeavor, the committee feels it must continue for the sake of the victims, and that its 
work is supported by the hadith of the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him): “He amongst you 
who sees something abominable should change it with the help of his hand. If he does 
not have enough strength to do it, then he should do it with his tongue. If he does not 
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have the strength to do that, then he should abhor it in his heart, and that is the least of 
faith.”238 Since creating the WPC in May of 2002, hundreds of women have come to 
Jamshīr for help: for legal assistance, for advice, or just for someone to hear their 
stories. One of those women had a story like many others: Fāṭima al-Ḥasan239 lost 
custody of her daughter during her divorce. She is only allowed to see her during short 
visits three times a week, and even then she sometimes shows up at her husband’s 
residence to find that he sent their daughter to his sister’s house, conveniently 
“forgetting” about Fāṭima’s visit. While losing custody of one’s child is already a heart-
rending state of affairs for any mother, Fāṭima’s situation is made even worse by the 
fact that during one of her visits with her daughter, the girl told her mother that during 
the times her father sends her to her aunt’s house, a male relative there abuses her. At 
the time of the interview, Fāṭima had been through three lawyers, none of whom had 
been able to help her. She implied that her husband has some connection with the court 
which has allowed him to manipulate the case in his favor.240 In Jamshīr’s view, if a 
mother losing her child and then being prohibited from taking action while that child is 
being abused does not qualify as “something abominable,” surely nothing does.   
 
 
 
                                                
238 Jamshīr, al-Jalad, p. 11. This hadith is found in Sahih Muslim, Book 1, Number 79. For a discussion 
on the intellectual history of this idea, see M. A. Cook, Commanding right and forbidding wrong in 
Islamic thought, Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.  
239 Personal interview with Fāṭima al-Ḥasan, Budāya, March 23, 2006. The litigant’s name has been 
changed in the interest of protecting her privacy.  
240 Ibid.  
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Claiming rights as citizens 
 
 “Citizens are equal before the law in rights and duties. There shall be no 
discrimination between them because of gender, origin, language, religion, or 
creed.”241 
 
During the almost three decades that women activists in Bahrain have been 
fighting for a codified family law, they have run up against notions of femininity that 
frame their public activism as dishonorable, disobedient and unsightly. A telling 
question put to Ghāda Jamshīr by the al-Arabiyya interviewer was the following: 
“Don’t you think the results would be better if your voice was a bit lower?”242 While it 
can surely be said that Jamshīr has held nothing back (see Chapter 1, section on Jamshīr 
and the PLC), The Personal Law Committee, which has taken a much more moderate 
approach, has received nearly as much condemnation by those who would silence 
women who speak in public on the issue of Islamic law. After voicing their support for 
King Ḥamad’s 2003 initiative to form a family law drafting committee, members of the 
PLC were treated to a tirade of angry criticism from religious scholars. Farīda Ghulām 
Ismaʻīl, a member of the PLC, expressed sadness and anger at some of the ʻulamā’’s 
responses to her organization’s efforts: “They say we want to get rid of the men of fiqh, 
that we are lovers of the Tunisian experiment243…that we are lost and feverish, panting 
                                                
241 Bahraini constitution, Article 18.  
242 Al-Arabiyya, “Idāʻāt.” Al-Dakhīl may not have been aware that many observers attribute all of the 
most significant recent changes in the court to the work of Ghāda Jamshīr, among them Secretary-
General of the Supreme Council for Women Lūlwa al-Awādhī, Interview, March 26, 2006.    
243 This is a reference to the Tunisian Law of Personal Status, passed in 1956. Many religious scholars 
believe the law contravenes Islam because it indirectly prohibits practices widely accepted by jurists as 
permitted, such as polygamy and extra-judicial divorce. 
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for Western ignorance…that we are sick and confused.”244 She explained that despite 
the activists’ repeated assurances that they were committed to preserving the sharīʻa 
and the doctrinal specificities of both sects, the ʻulamā’ accused them of being 
secularists and of attempting to destroy the sects. On the contrary, she said, “we agree 
with the ʻulamā’ that sharīʻa needs further study and discussion, but we disagree that 
they are the only ones who can legislate on it.” Like Ghāda Jamshīr, members of the 
PLC believe that ordinary Muslims, lay people, have the right to engage in legal 
discourse and participate in steering the course of legal reform. Initially a small 
committee of lawyers and NGO officials, the PLC grew to become a broad organization 
in which women from all socio-economic strata, and both sects, participate. As well as 
grounding their claim to rights in Islamic texts, the PLC also looks to the modern 
political authority of the Bahraini state as a source of rights.  
While the PLC has engaged in public demonstrations, their approach is 
characterized by a dogged persistence in proceeding through existing legal and political 
channels. Since their founding in 1982, the Committee has continued to pursue their 
cause through standard NGO strategies such as gathering petitions for submission to the 
government, meeting with government officials to discuss their demands, formally 
submitting specific recommendations to the ruler, garnering the support of religious 
scholars sympathetic to reform, and forming coalitions with other Bahraini NGOs as 
well as networking with women’s NGOs in other Arab and Muslim countries (see 
Chapter 1, section on the PLC).  
                                                
244 Interview with Farīda Ghulām Ismāʻīl, Manama, Bahrain, September 13, 2003.  
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A key strategy used by the PLC especially in the context of its communications 
with the government is to claim the right to equality which is granted to them as citizens 
by the Bahraini constitution. In a statement submitted to the king in 2003, the PLC 
writes: 
 
 We, the civil organizations, turn to you with a call,  
Honorable King Ḥamad ibn ʻῙsa ibn Salmān Ᾱl Khalīfa  
of the Kingdom of Bahrain, to carry out your constitutional 
responsibility to protect the rule of law, the constitution,  
human rights and institutions and their freedoms. We hope  
that Your Honor will enact what is in Article Five of the  
constitution: “The family is the basis of society, and it is  
founded on religion, morality, and patriotism. The law  
preserves its legal status.” 
 
 and in Article Eighteen: 
 
 “People are equal in human dignity, and citizens  
(al-muwāṭinun) are equal before the law in rights and  
duties. There shall be no discrimination between them  
because of gender, origin, language, religion, or creed.”245  
 
Looking at Article Eighteen first, on its face, the wording would seem fairly 
straightforward: citizens are equal before the law. Like most Arab countries, upon 
independence from colonial powers, Bahrain wrote and promulgated a constitution. 
Although there is no necessary relationship between constitutions and democracy,246 the 
constitution came to symbolize progress, democracy, and liberalism. As a legal 
instrument that provides a basic framework for governing, it was widely assumed that 
                                                
245 Personal Law Committee, “Nidā’ mu’assasāt al-mujtamaʻ al-madanī li-iṣḍār qānūn aḥkām al-usra fī 
Mamlakat al-Baḥrayn” (Call of civil community organizations for the promulgation of the family law in 
the Kingdom of Bahrain), 2003.    
246 See Nathan J. Brown, Constitutions in a Non-Constitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the 
Prospects for Accountable Government, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002, pp. xiii-13.   
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the purpose of the constitution was to limit state power and to establish the relationship 
between the state and its legal subjects. The citizen, according to early twentieth century 
Western political theory was the individual who freely entered into a contract with the 
state. This citizen, who was represented as a generic, universal person, enjoyed a variety 
of political, civil, and social rights in exchange for certain specified duties: obedience to 
the laws of the state, submission of taxes, etc.247 Termed “the social contract,” after 
Rousseau’s 1762 treatise of the same name, this relationship was considered a triumph 
in that it freed individuals from the tyranny of oppressive forms of government. In The 
Sexual Contract published in 1988, Carole Pateman demonstrated that while the social 
contract did in fact provide the individual with more rights and freedoms vis a vis the 
state, that individual was a gendered one. Because women were defined as the legal 
property of either their fathers or their husbands, women did not share in equal rights as 
citizens.248 In her work on women, kinship, and the state in Lebanon, Suad Joseph takes 
that analysis even further, and details the specific ways in which Middle Eastern states 
act to qualify the citizen as male.  
 The state defines the rights and duties of its citizens in part through legislation. 
There are many examples of state laws and policies in the Middle East that privilege 
men, such as those that permit men to pass citizenship on to their wives and children, 
but prohibit women from doing the same. Such laws exist despite states’ claims to treat 
all citizens equally. The Bahraini state has recently acknowledged the difficulties faced 
                                                
247 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1950. 
248 Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988. 
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by Bahraini women who marry foreign men by granting citizenship to over 370 children 
of Bahraini mothers and noncitizen fathers in September 2006.249 However, this was an 
ad hoc decision made by the king, and no law has been passed since then to amend the 
existing law, Article 7 of the Bahraini Law of Citizenship of 1963, which permits only 
male Bahrainis to pass on their citizenship to their foreign wives and children.250   
Another reason that citizenship in Middle Eastern countries is gendered is that 
the “social contract” is not often between the state and the individual, but between the 
state and members of subnational communities, meaning collectivities based on 
religion, kinship, ethnicity, or tribe. In the case of Bahrain, citizenship is constituted in 
part through membership in a religious community. There are several ways that 
religious identity is instituted as political identity. Although Bahrain’s ruling family is 
Sunni, and nearly all top government posts are filled by officials who are Sunni, the 
forty-seat elected Parliament is more representative of the population. Currently 
seventeen out of those forty seats are held by Shiis. Several of the Parliamentary blocs 
are organized by religion. Thirty out of the forty Parliamentary members are part of 
religious blocs. Citizens’ official documents, such as the identification card, indicate the 
bearer’s religion. The country itself is defined as a religion-ed (comparable to 
“gendered”) body. Article 2 of the constitution declares Islam as the official religion of 
the nation. Most significant for our purposes, the article also names the sharīʻa as a 
“primary source of legislation” (masdar ra’īsī li-l-tashrīʻ).251 When a state grants legal 
                                                
249 Habib Toumi, 'Children of foreign fathers get Bahraini citizenship,' Gulf News, September 20, 2006. 
250 Freedom House, “Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa, Gulf Edition,” Bahrain 
Report, February 11, 2009.  
251 Kingdom of Bahrain, Dustūr Mamlakat al-Baḥrayn, February 14, 2002.  
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authority to a religious institution, such as the sharīʻa courts, it mandates compliance 
with the rules of religion. The rules of religion in the case of the Jaʻfarī Shii and the 
Maliki Sunni schools of law in force in Bahrain assign women rights and obligations 
that differ from those they assign men.  
Further implementing the differentiated treatment of women and men is Article 
Five, which declares the family as the basic unit of society. Thus, the state establishes 
its primary relationship with the family rather than the individual. The family is 
regulated by religious laws which in turn declare the husband/father the head of the 
family. Therefore, the social contract exists only between the state and the male heads 
of families. Women’s rights, then, flow not from the state, but through their 
relationships with fathers, husbands, sons, etc. The result is that they suffer from 
“double jeopardy” 252  in that they bear the limitations that accompany full civic and 
political participation, while also being denied full legal status by being defined as 
dependents of their male relatives in matters related to the family.  
 Another way that citizenship becomes gendered is through the production and 
re-inscription of “civic myths” that lend the idea of the citizen with a historicity that 
seems to precede the state. 253 Such civic myths “naturalize” what it means to be a 
citizen, and “regulate forms of inclusion and exclusion that inevitably transport all 
manner of inequalities – gender, racial, ethnic, class.”254 An example of this is the 
employment of images of the woman as the symbol of the nation. Much has been 
                                                
252 Deniz Kandiyoti’s phrase in Deniz Kandiyoti, “Foreward,” in Gender and Citizenship in the Middle 
East, ed. Suad Joseph, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000, p. xiv. 
253 Rogers M. Smith (1997) as described in Suad Joseph, Gender and Citizenship, p. 8. 
254 Joseph, Gendering Citizenship, pp. 8-9.  
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written about the way in which both liberal nationalist groups as well as conservative 
Islamists utilized the role of women in society as a marker of authenticity during the 
transition to modern nation-states.255 In the face of colonialism, cultural imperialism, 
and internal political struggles, women became a tool for the deployment of one’s ideal 
“imagined community.”256 While women have at times engaged in the production of 
woman-as-nation imagery as much as men have, it has not, in general served women’s 
interests particularly well.257 In the case of the family law debate in Bahrain, 
participants in the debate have used the image of the woman and the family in similar 
ways. The PLC calls upon the king to defend and protect the family, though the way in 
which the family is defined is greatly contested.  
 In the 2005 family law campaign, it was rumored that the Supreme Council for 
Women spent a vast amount of funds on promotional materials: beautifully designed, 
glossy pamphlets, colorful posters, and even T-shirts and pens. These showy materials 
raised the ire of some long-time women activists because they created the illusion that 
the SCW was chiefly responsible for family law reform. While other activists had 
worked diligently for decades, the SCW was only established in 2001. Furthermore, 
some activists charged that the SCW would not allow the activists to participate in the 
decision-making process of the campaign: “They say they want to work as partners with 
us, but they won’t allow us to make any decisions…They want workers, not 
                                                
255 Deniz Kandiyoti, “Introduction,” in Women, Islam, and the State, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti, Philadelphia, 
P.A.: Temple University Press, 1991, pp. 3-9.  
256 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism, 
London; New York: Verso, 1991.  
257 Beth Baron, Egypt as a Woman: nationalism, gender and politics, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005.  
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partners.“258 Most of the promotional materials carried an image of a happy Bahraini 
family, with father, mother, girl and boy all in traditional dress. The image was 
accompanied by the slogan: “A Secure Family = A Secure Nation.” (see Photo #2).  
 
 
    Photo #2                   SANDY RUSSELL JONES  
    
One of the controversial elements of the image was that the mother is not wearing a 
headscarf (ḥijāb). Since the 1990’s, a majority of Bahraini women have adopted the 
ḥijāb, while very few wore the head covering in the 1970’s and early 80’s. May Seikaly 
                                                
258 Interview with Laylā Rajab, family law reform activist, ʻIsā Town, March 15, 2006. 
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notes that during the time she served as a faculty member at the University of Bahrain, 
1983 - 1993, the number of students who wore the ḥijāb climbed from 5 percent to 95 
percent.259 She attributes this change to the local social, economic and political effects 
of the authoritarian rule of the Ᾱl Khalīfa. The rise of unemployment, the widening gap 
between the upper and lower classes, the perceived moral degradation caused by a 
Saudi presence on Bahraini soil (mainly for entertainment purposes260), and the 
complete lack of legal or political channels through which to express grievances created 
a vacuum which Islamic revivalism could exploit. She notes that, “While the Gulf 
society generally had always been a more genuinely religious and conservative one, 
when compared to other parts of the Arab world this modern return to tradition was 
shocking in its intensity and assertiveness.261  
Having been made aware of the government campaign, the Shii ʻUlamā’ Islamic 
Council (UIC) quickly produced a competing illustration. In the UIC version, a similar 
family is shown, but with a mother and little girl who are in ḥijāb, as well as a father 
with a full beard rather than the fashionable goatee the father in the SCW poster wears. 
The UIC slogan counters that of the SCW: “No Security Without doing one’s utmost for 
Religion” (see Photo #3).  
 
                                                
259 May Seikaly, “Bahraini Women in Formal and Informal Groups: The Politics of Identification,” 
Organizing Women: Formal and Informal Women’s Groups in the Middle East, ed. Dawn Chatty and 
Annika Rabo, Oxford:Berg Publishers, 1997, p. 144, f.n. 5. 
260 The 22 kilometer causeway between the two countries was built in 1986. Bahrain offered Saudis many 
recreational opportunities that because of the kingdom’s restrictive laws were not available to them at 
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various illegal activities which are rumored to be available).  
261 Seikaly, “Bahraini Women,” pp. 134-135. See also May Seikaly, “Women and Social Change in  
Bahrain,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Aug., 1994), pp. 415-426.  
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Photo #3               SANDY RUSSELL 
JONES 
 
 
The two images are accurate symbols of the self-understandings of the opposing sides 
in the family law debate. The Shii ʻulamā’ present themselves as authentic Muslims, in 
opposition to the (Sunni) government and women activists, cast as secularists aping the 
West. Alternatively, the government presents their family as progressive and modern, 
suggesting that the lack of a law allows for a lack of security, which could mean 
national security, or security for women within the family. While the Shii ʻulamā’ 
frequently trot out the accusation that supporters of the codified law have been infected 
 161 
by the West, the juxtaposition of the two sides’ slogans exposes a more entrenched 
divide, that between the ruling minority (the Sunnis) and the oppressed majority (the 
Shiis). While the SCW could have chosen many other elements to emphasize in their 
slogan (justice, equality, impartiality), they chose to emphasize security. Given the 
recent sectarian conflict of the 1990’s, perhaps it was hoped that the promise of healing 
the country-wide rift would appeal to Bahrainis’ desire for a resolution to domestic 
political tensions. Kandiyoti argues that although the West is often portrayed as “the 
Other” in narratives about cultural authenticity, this move can mask different, 
underlying problems: “The term representing the threatening and invasive Other can, in 
fact, take very different forms. Anti-imperialistic pronouncements about the West are 
often a thinly disguised metaphor to articulate disquiet about more proximate causes for 
disunity,”262 It has also been suggested that a Bahraini emphasis on security reflects a 
wider, regional concern with unremitting political instability in the Gulf.263   
  
 
Claiming rights as Arabs 
“What characterizes these [legislative trends] are the effects of nationalism which are 
similar in each of these societies and countries. They are thus bound by heritage and by 
historical, cultural and religious factors.”264 
 
                                                
262 Kandiyoti, “Introduction,” p. 8.  
263 Toby Jones, Assistant Professor of History, Rutgers University, and past Gulf Analyst for the 
International Crisis Group, 2003-2004, personal conversation, January 15, 2010.  
264 Ḥasan ʻAlī Rāḍī, “Naẓra fī ittijāhāt al-tashrīʻāt fī qawānīn al-aḥwāl al-shakhsīa fī-l-dūwal al-
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 In the two years following Bahrain’s attendance at the 1985 United Nations 
Conference on Women in Nairobi, Bahraini women’s NGOs greatly increased their 
efforts toward legal reform. The Nairobi conference reviewed the achievements of the 
U.N. Decade of Women (1976-1985), and created an action plan for advancing 
women’s rights during the following ten years. In 1986 and 1987, members of the 
newly formed PLC spoke at conferences, initiated a study of sharīʻa court cases, and 
organized a three-day conference on women’s legal rights. While the main focus of 
these activities was local, namely, the reform of Bahraini law, the activists’ approach 
made use of an increasingly common discourse about rights, and reflected an 
international perspective in which Bahrainis saw themselves as part of a larger 
community of Muslim nations, as well as a global community of women. Not only did 
they adopt reform strategies that had proven to be successful elsewhere, they also began 
to examine specific codes that had been enacted in the laws of other countries. Having 
met and formed networks with women’s groups from other countries in the region and 
around the world, Bahraini activists began to share in a common language regarding 
women’s rights and human rights. While the use of a common lexicon was a necessary 
step in a cross-cultural exchange of ideas and the creation of common plans of action, 
the terms used in such discourses cannot always be assumed to mean the same thing 
when different parties use them.  
 In her study on women in Iran, Arzoo Osanloo discusses the way in which the 
term “rights” is often assumed to have a universal meaning; one that is contrasted with 
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“culture.”265 For instance, those who advocate human rights often find themselves in 
opposition to “cultural” practices that resist the encroachment of “universal” ideals such 
as equality and freedom. Osanloo argues that it is important to understand that these 
“universal” ideals as well as the discourse about them have themselves been constructed 
in particular historical circumstances. “Rights, in general, and rights talk in particular,” 
she explains, “are cultural practices emerging from a European-American historical and 
political trajectory that includes colonialism, and thus are shaped by global power 
relations.”266 So, wherever rights discourse is used, it is embedded with certain Western, 
liberal values. However, when it is used in non-Western contexts, it does not remain 
untouched by local circumstances: “In local contexts…international human rights talk 
takes on a vernacular language, mindful of indigenous values, consisting of a layering 
of social concerns.”267  
In Bahrainis’ discussions of human rights and women’s rights, many local 
concerns are present. Bahrain has a specific history of gender relations that has been 
affected by custom, tradition, religion, and especially sectarian relations and domestic 
political issues. Bahrainis’ use of rights discourse has also been shaped by the local 
appearance of Islamic revivalism from the mid-1980’s onward. Islamist activists are 
aware of the Western origins of discussions of individual rights, thus women’s rights 
activists have been viewed as promoting secular, liberal values. In the 1990’s and later, 
Bahraini women activists begin to alter their strategies and terminology in order to 
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accord with the Islamic idiom. The name of the PLC itself that was created in the 
eighties, Lajnat al-Aḥwāl al-Shakhṣiyya, The Personal Status Law Committee, is 
derived from the Western term “personal status law.” In PLC press statements and 
organizational material, the law that the committee advocates is referred to as a 
“personal status law.” In the late 1990’s, the PLC begins to refer to the law as the 
“family law,” qanun al-usra. While the term al-aḥwāl al-shakhṣiyya has been in use in 
Arab countries for most of the latter twentieth century, it is generally associated with 
the West and a focus on the individual rather than the community or the family.  The 
PLC’s change in terminology reflects a growing preference for finding an indigenous 
solution to the problem of legal reform, and especially, one that is based in Islam. To 
speak about a law for the “family” counters the focus on the individual in “personal 
status law.”  
Bahraini activists’ understanding of rights has also been shaped by regional 
discussions of legal reform. Bahrain’s independence (1971) came later than that of 
many other countries in the region (Egypt, 1922; Kuwait, 1961; Lebanon, 1943). Egypt 
especially has had more time to develop a legal system in the context of the modern 
nation-state, and its legal system has served as a role model for other Arab and Muslim-
majority countries. Bahrain’s activists have studied the laws of Egypt as well as the 
reform strategies used by Egyptian activists in order to create a model for its own 
process of reform. The fact that Egypt, Kuwait, and the other countries Bahrainis have 
used as models are predominantly Muslim countries make them legitimate sources of 
conceptions of justice and definitions of rights. The section below details the ways in 
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which Bahraini activists see themselves as part of a larger Muslim and Arab, and post-
colonial community; a community that supports particular ideals of justice which 
Bahrainis use as a source of the rights they claim.  
  
********************* 
 
 In 1982, one of the first practicing women lawyers in Bahrain (and member of 
the royal family) Shaykha Hayā bint Rashīd Ᾱl Khalīfa told the press that Bahrain 
needed a code of civil rights, and that “in the absence of such a law, there is no surety 
for women’s rights.”268 Shaykha Hayā was among the Bahraini delegates to the Nairobi 
conference, and a charter member of the PLC. Upon her return to Bahrain, she and the 
other members of the PLC, together with several concerned individual volunteers, 
formulated a plan for legal activism. One of their strategies was to produce a study of 
sharīʻa court rulings, “Study on the laws of Personal Status for the Family.”269 As 
mentioned above, for each type of case examined the committee compared the rulings 
of Bahraini judges with the laws of other Islamic countries including Iraq, Algeria, 
Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Somalia, and Kuwait. One of the 
group’s recommendations was the enactment of a personal status law that would be 
similar to Kuwait’s Code of Personal Status, promulgated on July 7, 1984. The 
spokeswoman for the committee, Shaykha Maryam Ᾱl Khalīfa, explained that Kuwait’s 
law served as an appropriate model because it laid down a unified interpretation of 
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 166 
sharīʻa: “There is no specific law in Bahrain that guarantees a woman her rights. There 
are several interpretations of the Sharia law…In Bahrain, the one which is hardest on 
women is applied.”270 Like Bahrain, Kuwait has a population that is divided between 
Sunnis and Shiis, although in Kuwait Sunnis are the majority.  
 By comparing their own legal system with those of other Arab and Islamic 
countries, the Bahraini activists saw themselves as part of a larger Muslim world, a 
transnational Muslim community that offered them an alternative Islamic paradigm. 
Ḥasan ʻAlī Rāḍī, a lawyer who has volunteered his efforts to the PLC since its 
inception, spoke to the press on the occasion of the PLC’s submission of the study to 
the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs. Rāḍī explained that in light of the laws of 
other Arab countries, Bahrain’s sharīʻa judgments appear to be governed more by 
tradition than by strictly religious principles: “The general principles which govern 
Islamic law are sound but their interpretation depends on the judge concerned. That is 
where the problems come [in].”271 In a recent interview, Rāḍī gave an example of how 
Bahraini judges relied on custom when the Islamic texts did not warrant it. He described 
the issue of the “bayt al-ṭāʻa” in which a disobedient wife is restricted to her husband’s 
house by force. While Islamic texts do prescribe a wife’s obedience (ṭāʻa) to her 
husband, there is nothing that requires her imprisonment in her husband’s house if she 
does not want to remain there. She would simply be considered disobedient (nāshiza) 
and would lose certain marriage rights, but she would not be held against her will. 
However, Rāḍī said, this custom still persists: “until recently they used to use the police 
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to enforce the bayt at-ṭā`a. It was ridiculous – the police would go and get the wife 
from, say, her father’s house and bring her back to her husband’s house, and as soon as 
they drove away she would leave again.”272 By casting themselves as part of a larger 
Muslim world and appealing to a wider shared cultural framework, Bahraini activists 
can challenge local tradition and constraints, and appeal to a more purely Islamic form 
of religion against local practices.  
While the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs denied the PLC’s charge that 
Bahraini judges are improperly applying sharīʻa, spokesman Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥmān 
ibn Rashīd Ᾱl Khalīfa admitted that codification could be beneficial in that it could 
“facilitate the uniformity of justice.”273 He mentioned that the Arab world was 
considering a draft law that was drawn up by a special committee established by the 
Council of Arab Justice Ministers, an international coalition of Arab justice officials. 
Generated during a series of conventions held between 1981 and 1985, the draft was 
reportedly derived entirely from sharīʻa, and was created in the interest of providing 
Arab countries with a standardized, though fully Islamic personal status and family 
law.274  
The PLC was also aware of the Council’s draft and analyzed it during their own 
conference, entitled “Perspective on the position of women in the issue of personal 
status law,” hosted by the Bahraini Young Ladies Association on December 5-7, 1987. 
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In the conference materials, the introduction explains that there has been an increased 
awareness of women’s issues in society, and that the question of the personal status law 
is now being discussed in every Muslim country. The PLC sees these developments as 
confirmation of its crucial role in raising awareness in Bahraini society, and doing the 
work of assessing the suitability of the codified personal status law for Bahrain.275 The 
conference participants included representatives from ten different organizations 
dealing with women and family issues and legal affairs. The four primary goals of the 
conference were: 
 
1) to study the necessity of a personal status law for Bahrain 
2) to compare and contrast the differences and similarities  
among the personal status laws of Arab countries 
3) to support the activities of the PLC 
4) to summarize the results and basic indications gleaned  
from the conference276 
 
Papers presented at the conference addressed topics such as the effects of social and 
economic changes on the family in Bahrain, divorce in Bahrain, the role of the women’s 
organizations in advancing women’s rights, the comparison of the personal status laws 
of Arab countries, and a critical examination of the draft unified personal status law 
issued by the Council of Arab Justice Ministers.  
 
Claiming rights as humans under international law 
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“The lack of a codified law obscures the many rights of the litigants and violates those 
rights, which are guaranteed to them by Islam, the constitution, and international 
agreements which Bahrain has signed.”277 
 
 The substantive legislation of other Muslim-majority countries is a source that 
Bahraini women activists draw upon to counter the rulings of the kingdom’s sharīʻa 
courts. In the studies detailed above, the activists examined very specific issues to see 
how these issues were dealt with in the laws of other countries, for example, use of the 
khulʻ divorce, or limits on the minimum age of marriage. The fact that their examples 
are all taken from Muslim-majority countries, or as the activists frequently refer to 
them, “Arab” countries, is designed to lend them legitimacy in the eyes of a public that 
resists external interference in local affairs. The activists also understand women’s 
rights to derive from another source that possesses less legitimacy for the public, but 
nevertheless provides them with a yardstick by which to measure the Bahraini woman’s 
status, and offers real legal grounds for their claims.  
Since the United Nations issued the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
1948, the document has been translated into 370 languages. By its own definition, the 
Declaration claims to be universal, and to specify “the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family.”278 As Osanloo has demonstrated, the idea that there are 
a priori principles regarding the rights of humans that preexist and override local values 
and ideologies derives from the West.  Originating in the thinking of Western 
revolutionaries of the late eighteenth century, the term “human rights” emerged in the 
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context of specific historical and geo-political circumstances, and embodies its creators’ 
own ideals, values and beliefs. Nevertheless, the United Nations’ Declaration of Human 
Rights as well as its subsequent documents and treaties have been recognized 
worldwide as ideals for governments to strive for. Whether or not they have in fact 
complied with them, many governments have become signatories of these treaties, and 
have at least professed to uphold the norms and principles contained therein.  
  
 Bahrain is a signatory to various U.N. conventions on basic human rights, the 
rights of women and children, and treaties against some forms of discrimination. In 
assessing the rulings of Bahrain’s sharīʻa courts, activists have found that they often 
conflict with the guidelines established in the U.N. treaties. Founder of the PLC Ghāda 
Jamshīr worked closely with the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (hereafter, BCHR) 
during the course of fighting the defamation charges brought against her by the sharīʻa 
court judges in 2005. Jamshīr’s alleged crime was accusing the judges of corruption, in 
public and in private. The BCHR defended Jamshīr, publicizing the case and declaring 
that a guilty verdict would constitute an infringement on her freedom of speech. The 
BCHR also appealed to the international community to support Jamshīr’s and all 
Bahrainis’ human rights.  
 The publicity involving Jamshīr’s own personal rights served to generate more 
exposure for her organization’s cause. NGOs such as Amnesty International and 
Women Living Under Muslim Laws were made aware of Bahraini women’s status in 
the sharīʻa courts. Jamshīr established relationships with international rights 
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organizations, and issued formal statements to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, 
exposing specific incidents of concern. Jamshīr clearly spelled out the legal grounds of 
her complaint as resting on domestic and international law:  
 
We turn to you on the basis of the principles of equity  
and human dignity, as stipulated by the Bahraini  
constitution in Article 18 which declares all citizens  
equal before the law and equal in all civil and legal  
rights and obligations, including being equal before  
the court in all its forms, such as the sharīʻa courts.  
It is worth mentioning that this principle is strengthened  
by the international declarations, treaties and agreements  
on human rights, among them the Convention on the  
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).279  
 
First, she calls upon the authority of the Bahraini constitution, and then that of the U.N. 
treaties. She also invokes a recommendation made by the U.N. to Bahrain, specifically: 
“We also encourage the implementation of the recommendation by the U. N. Human 
Rights Committee made in May 2005 to enact a personal status law.”280 During a 
session of the Committee Against Torture held on May 12, 2005, U.N. representatives 
asked Bahraini officials to respond to concerns regarding the treatment and rights of 
prisoners. Among the issues addressed was the issue of violence against women, as 
prisoners, but also in general. The Committee was made aware that wives who had 
presented medical evidence of physical abuse at the hands of their husbands were 
ignored by judges. The Committee expressed a formal concern with: “The overbroad 
discretionary powers of the Shariah court judges in the application of personal status 
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law and criminal law, and in particular, reported failures to take into account clear 
evidence of violence confirmed in medical certificates following violence against 
women.”281 In its final conclusions and recommendations, the Committee urged the 
enactment of a codified family law to prevent violence against women.282  
 The PLC also draws upon international human rights principles in their 
recommendations for reform. Although the Committee’s efforts in the 1980’s focused 
on locating Arab legislation that could be used as a model for Bahrain, the PLC came to 
refer more often to international rights treaties between 2003 and the present. In a 2003 
interview, member Farīda Ghulām described the PLC’s renewed approach in light of 
King Hamad’s recent announcement of the formation of the draft committee. Ghulām 
explained that the ʻulamā’ were telling the public that the government’s attempt to 
codify the family law replicates the legal hegemony of the Ottomans and the British, 
and that it sought to erode religion. The ʻulamā’ referred to Iran’s as a more legitimate 
form of government. Ghulām argued that, “our national council are not mujtahidīn! We 
are supposed to be governed by democratic principles.”283 She said that the ʻulamā’ do 
not take the injustices women suffer seriously: “The only way to solve these problems is 
to cleanse the judicial system…law is the basic vehicle through which this can be done. 
Only through the rule of law can you eliminate injustice and chaos.”284 
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 PLC demands made to King Ḥamad include many references to assumed, 
presumably universal standards of equality, transparency, and professional competency 
(of judges). In their 2005 statement, four of five recommendations make reference 
either to international standards or to principles described as “scientific (al-ʻilmīyya)” or 
“enlightened (mustanīr)” words which I argue are used here as euphemisms for 
Western, liberal notions: 
 
  Our Demands:   
 
1) An initiative to promulgate a unified and enlightened  
(mustanīr) law to govern the family based on the rules and 
principles of the Holy Islamic Sharīʻa that would also fulfill 
Bahrain’s commitment to comply with international  
agreements and treaties, especially that of the Universal  
Declaration of Human Rights, CEDAW, and the agreements  
on the rights of children. 
 
2) The participation of legal specialists, rights activists, and  
NGOs in the discussion of the specific articles of this law and 
their review; the consideration of their opinions [on the  
aforementioned articles], therefore [resulting in] the basing 
of the law on a scientific standard of equality (miʻyār al-kafā’a 
al-ʻilmīyya) and scientific experience.  
 
3) An initiative to put a rapid plan in place to reform and  
develop the sharīʻa courts, the court administration, and all  
related administrative [structures]; a review of judges’ training 
and qualifications, making them subject to compulsory  
refresher courses in sharīʻa and jurisprudence to raise their  
level of competence to perform the duties of the job; the use of  
standards of transparency, equality, education, professionalism, 
and impartiality in the appointment of new judges, and the  
dismissal of lifetime appointees for inadequacy or lack of  
competence.  
 
4) To pursue the creation of legislation specific to Bahraini  
women using international and human rights standards;  
to pass resolutions and procedures that guarantee the  
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speed of transactions in the petition of lawsuits before  
the sharīʻa courts. 
 
The last demand focuses on the institution of state support in cases in which husbands 
are not satisfying their marital responsibilities, or not complying with judgments issued 
against them: 
 
  5) To set up the appropriate procedures to make use of an  
alimony fund; to work on opening centers for family and  
legal guidance, and shelters for victims of domestic violence 
in every district. 285 
  
Both the PLC and Ghāda Jamshīr’s WPC ground their demands for rights in the 
international treaties to which Bahrain is a signatory. Perhaps the most relevant 
agreement to the women’s concerns is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, or CEDAW as it is commonly referred to, that 
entered into force in 1981. The Convention defines the meaning of equality for men and 
women, and explains how it can be achieved. As “an international bill of rights for 
women,” the document serves as universal reference for countries interested in 
promoting women’s rights and correcting disparities between men and women.286 
Bahrain acceded to CEDAW on June 18, 2002, however, it entered several reservations. 
Specifically, Bahrain took issue with Articles 2 and 16 of the Convention, insofar as 
they are incompatible with the Islamic sharīʻa. Article 2 instructs all member states to 
affirm equality between men and women in constitutions and all legislation involving 
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the rights of citizens. It also directs member states to abolish or amend any and all 
existing legislation which constitutes discrimination against women. More specifically, 
Article 16 orders that states take all appropriate actions to establish equality between 
men and women in the realm of marriage, divorce, child custody and all other matters 
related to the family. These recommendations conflict with the sharīʻa in basic ways: 
the sharīʻa prescribes different roles for men and women in marriage in that the 
husband is responsible for providing financially for the wife while she in turn is 
obligated to defer to his judgment; it assigns them different grounds upon which they 
can initiate divorce; in most situations it requires that the woman’s marriage be 
contracted by a male guardian, while men of the age of majority may contract their own 
marriages; etc.  
 So, if Bahrain cannot comply with major directives of the agreement, why sign 
it? Ann Elizabeth Mayer has studied the relationship between Arab or Muslim-majority 
countries and the CEDAW treaty. She suggests that there could be several reasons why 
these countries would sign the CEDAW agreement, including the growing prestige of 
international human rights, the desire to correct or assuage stereotypes of Arab 
countries as being anti-woman, or specific political goals that may be easier to attain if 
countries cast themselves as cooperative players in the global community.287 Mayer 
offers the example of Saudi Arabia which ratified CEDAW in 2000. At the time, Saudi 
Arabia was attempting to qualify for membership in the World Trade Organization.288 
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Judging Arab countries’ intentions to actually enact the provisions offered in the 
agreement as false, Mayer refers to the phenomenon as “the New World Hypocrisy,” 
and demonstrates that Western countries should not be excluded from this indictment, 
analyzing the United States’ interactions with the CEDAW committee and its continued 
rejection of the Equal Rights Amendment.289  
 With regard to Bahrain’s reservations to CEDAW, women’s rights activists are 
not naïve. They understand well that when the government signed the treaty, some of its 
intentions did not involve effecting the full equality of women in Bahraini society: 
“Most of what [you find] in the media is a display of the conventions on the rights of 
the family, women, and children that are signed by the Kingdom, but everyone is aware 
that it is just ink on paper unless the authorities support and enact realistic and 
systematic procedures and just laws that are strongly backed by those in power.”290 All 
of the actors involved are also well aware that in the end, the U.N. has no authority to 
enforce compliance with its treaties. They are entered into voluntarily, and countries in 
violation of them are not prosecuted except in exceptional cases such as genocide. This 
does not mean, though, that the treaties are useless. Even in the case of Arab 
governments, the fact of formally accepting international human rights law is both a 
sign that the government is already open to some degree of change and an action that 
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“sets in motion a dynamic that over time should lead to mounting pressures for actual 
compliance with human rights standards.”291  
The women activists’ role in this process cannot be underestimated. As we saw 
above, Ghāda Jamshīr has petitioned the U.N. directly, describing in detail the status of 
women in Bahrain. After studying the CEDAW Committee sessions, Mayer found that 
Committee members’ background on member countries is augmented by information 
submitted to them by women’s groups and human rights NGOs. Representatives from 
the member countries are then obliged to respond to the material presented by these 
groups, such as Bahrain did in the sessions of the Committee against Torture and the 
CEDAW Committee.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 Bahrain’s women activists have been struggling for family law reform for over 
three decades. In May of 2009, a codified law was passed. However, this law only 
applies to the country’s Sunni minority. The corresponding Shii law was immediately 
rejected by Shii members of Parliament. It is still too early to tell what the effect will be 
on Sunni families, and activists have expressed frustration that the majority of the 
kingdom’s women continue to be subject to what they consider to be a broken system. 
Even so, the activists have arguably effected significant change. They have played a 
role in not only the enactment of the Sunni law, but are also responsible for many other 
changes that have produced real differences in women’s lives: the establishment of an 
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alimony fund for women whose husbands have defaulted on support payments,292 the 
dismissal of six judges reputed to be corrupt and/or unqualified from the sharīʻa courts, 
and some procedural revisions that have made processing family cases more efficient. 
Women’s NGOs involvement with international bodies such as the U.N. has acted to 
exert pressure on the state to bring its laws into compliance with the rights agreements it 
has already signed.  
 Women’s engagement in these activities has been made possible in part by the 
opening of a “religious public sphere” in which lay people participate, along with 
religious scholars. The activists’ participation in public discourse affects ideas about 
what the role of both religion and the state is or should be with respect to family law. 
The response of the ʻulamā’ and the government to the women’s activity signals a shift 
in power relations in which women and lay people are playing a greater role in the 
determination of the meaning of sharīʻa and hence of religion in society.    
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CHAPTER 5: THE STATE 
 
 The family law debate in Bahrain has become the battleground upon which a 
struggle for religious, legal, and also political authority is being fought. Both those who 
support the government-sponsored codified law as well as those who oppose it claim 
the right to determine the future of the sharīʻa courts and the laws that regulate them. 
Shii ʻulamā’ argue that Islam demands that no one but religious specialists are 
authorized to engage with family law, while lawyers and women activists contend that 
lay people can also participate in legal discourse. Many strategies are used: the women 
activists invoke the Bahraini constitution and international human rights treaties, and 
the ʻulamā’ pursue political activism through the elected Parliament. Both sides are 
striving to win the support of the public as well as the ear of the government, but what 
of the government?  
 The Bahraini government is an authoritarian regime. Power is concentrated in 
the hands of the ruler, King Ḥamad ibn ʻῙsā Ᾱl Khalīfa, and he does not require the 
consent of the population to pass laws or to issue binding decrees. The elected 
Parliament, while structured as a fully-authoritative legislative body serves, in practice, 
more as an advisory body, as the laws it passes need not be enacted if the king does not 
choose to do so. With regard to the family law the state does not have to justify its 
authority. Unlike other actors in the debate, it already has the power to pass the law at 
any time. If the ʻulamā’ incite their followers to revolt, as they have threatened to do if 
the family law is passed, the police could crush their resistance in a matter of hours. 
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Through various initiatives and public statements, the king has made clear his intention 
to pass a comprehensive codified family law. After seven years of efforts toward this 
end, in May of 2009 Bahrain did enact a family law, but it fell far short of what Ḥamad 
had originally intended. The 2009 law applies only to Sunnis, a minority of the 
population. To a large extent, the same problems remain: hundreds of divorce cases 
stalled in a huge backlog, hundreds of divorced women without homes, and the 
continued procedural and professional deficiencies in the sharīʻa courts that handle the 
bulk of Bahrain’s family cases, the Shii courts. What are the factors that have prevented 
an authoritarian state such as Bahrain from carrying out its wishes?    
 Despite the authoritarian nature of its rule, the Bahraini government is 
constrained by various factors. Three of those factors in particular have shaped the way 
in which King Ḥamad has managed the issue of the family law. First, the country’s 
demographic composition serves as a persistent caution to the Sunni rulers. The 
government does not issue formal statistics of the distribution of the population by sect. 
However, at the turn of the millennium international NGOs and other observers 
estimated that Shiis comprise approximately 70% of the population. Estimates now put 
that percentage closer to 60% or less, and many Shiis will argue that this is due to recent 
policies issued with the express goal of altering the country’s demographic balance. A 
report published by Dr. Ṣālaḥ al-Bandar, Political Advisor to the Ministry of Cabinet 
Affairs, in 2006 described certain government officials’ involvement in the recruitment 
of Sunni immigrants from other Arab states, a Shii-to-Sunni conversion program, and 
the corruption of election officials. The Shiis have developed a historical narrative that 
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highlights the Shiis’ indigenous status on the islands and depicts the Ᾱl Khalīfa as 
invaders who took Bahrain by force and subsequently tyrannized the native population. 
Based for the most part in fact (see Chapter 2 for an account of the Ᾱl Khalīfa’s arrival 
on the islands), the Shiis’ narrative, along with the country’s more recent history in 
which the Ᾱl Khalīfa pursued political, economic, and social oppression of the Shii 
population, continue to underlie relations between the two sects. Various actions taken 
by the rulers have triggered that hostility and led to the open revolt of Shii citizens, 
most notably in the 1990’s.  
 The recent efforts of King Ḥamad to redress these injustices have engendered a 
political system that permits greater political participation among all citizens. This 
greater political involvement, while limited, is another factor that has placed constraints 
on the government. Michael Herb, writing on Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), offers a helpful framework for looking at the relationship between political 
participation and state agency. In seeking to explain the divergence in economic 
development between the two countries, Herb found an inverse relationship between 
economic development and the level of political participation. While the UAE’s citizens 
enjoy little to no political participation, the nation’s economic success and ability to 
diversify away from dependence on oil revenues was legendary, at least until the recent 
economic crisis. At the same time, Kuwait has struggled to advance economically 
whereas its elected Parliament arguably holds more power relative to its rulers than any 
other country in the region. Herb demonstrates that Kuwait’s high level of political 
participation acts to deadlock various economic development projects, thus limiting the 
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government’s ability to pursue its policies in this regard. Bahrain’s Parliament has much 
more limited powers, and has even been referred to as “mere theater.”293 Yet, Bahraini 
members of Parliament enjoy a high degree of visibility, and the public activism of the 
Shii bloc, al-Wifāq, in particular has greatly influenced the terms of the family law 
debate. While there are drawbacks to Herb’s model, some of which are discussed 
below, the model is helpful in partially explaining the effect that having an elected 
Parliament has had on the ruler’s pursuit of the family law.  
The third, and I argue, the most significant factor that has constrained the ruler’s 
actions is the existence of a vibrant public sphere in which Bahrainis participate in 
critical debate of public policy and issues. The work of Jürgen Habermas, Dale 
Eickelman and James Piscatori provides a framework for understanding the way in 
which Ḥamad’s own policies of reform, such as those regarding freedom of the press, 
freedom of association, and the rejection of censorship, provided the conditions for the 
emergence of an arena in which individual Bahrainis and organizations representing 
various interest groups could publicly debate the family law. This included not only 
non-governmental actors, but also agencies of the state. Indeed, for Habermas, the 
creation of state bureaucracies in part produced a new sphere of public authority in 
which the various arms of the state, which are tangible objects separate from the ruler, 
participated with other actors in society in public debate. The state is not a unitary 
entity, but a set of institutions, agencies and individuals each of which has its own 
interests that change with time and depend upon the issue at hand. It is in the public 
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sphere that these government agencies compete with non-governmental groups as well 
as with each other not just over power, but over the meaning of symbols that express the 
nation’s identity, and the “rules and discourse that morally bind the community 
together.”294 The sharīʻa court system serves as the symbol of Bahrain’s Islamic 
identity. Because Bahrain has adopted Western commercial and criminal laws, legalized 
the sale of alcohol, and taken various other actions that are seen by conservative 
Muslims as the abandonment of religion, the family courts have been crucial for 
demonstrating the government’s commitment to Islam. For the Shii community 
specifically, the ability to administer Shii family law without Sunni interference allows 
Shiis to preserve their sectarian identity as well as their religion. The agencies of the 
state who are involved in the process of sharīʻa court reform such as the Parliament, the 
Minister of Justice and the judges themselves have varying interests and factors that 
they had to consider when responding to the king’s family law initiative, such as 
religious and legal ideology, political and social implications, gender roles, and the 
maintenance of their own reputations. These interests which at times extend beyond 
Bahrain’s national borders conflict in significant ways. To act quickly or 
indiscriminately on this issue would be disastrous for the ruler and for the country. 
Eickelman and Piscatori argue that “politics may have as much, if not more, to do with 
bargaining among several forces or contending groups as with…compelling 
obedience.”295  The following chapter details the actions taken by the state toward the 
promulgation of a codified family law. By looking at each of the relevant state agencies 
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in turn, the chapter examines each agency’s specific interests with respect to the family 
law and considers the ways in which those interests complicate the ruler’s management 
of the issue. Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates that while the family law initiative 
began as a key component in the king’s genuine plan for reform, it quickly became the 
means by which Ḥamad delicately balanced various political forces and maintained the 
stability of his rule.   
 
 
 
 
The King 
The “path for a better future”296 –National Action Charter  
 
 A new, codified family law was supposed to have been the crowning 
achievement of King Hamad’s new, progressive administration. When Ḥamad ibn ʻῙsā 
Ᾱl Khalīfa acceded to the throne on March 6, 1999, Bahrainis were hopeful for an end 
to the political repression and economic stagnation of his father’s reign. That hope was 
not totally misplaced. Within two years, Ḥamad abolished his father ʻῙsā’s most 
oppressive tool, the State Security Law, and released more than 900 political prisoners. 
He drafted the National Action Charter, a document that provides a blueprint for a 
series of political, economic and legal reforms. In a move that engaged the Bahraini 
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population and secured their enthusiasm for his rule, Ḥamad held a national referendum 
on the charter. On February 14 and 15, 2002, 90% of eligible voters turned out to 
approve the charter by 98%. In addition to endorsing individual freedoms and the rule 
of law through the separation of powers, the document promises, albeit vaguely, the 
enactment of laws addressing the concerns of women and the family: “The state 
endeavors to support women's rights and the enactment of laws on the protection of 
family and family members.”297 While it does not specifically refer to the sharīʻa 
courts, an article on judicial powers provides for the establishment of a constitutional 
court, or at least an official with the authority to assess the constitutionality of specific 
laws: “The state shall complete the judicial system as prescribed in the constitution. It 
shall specify the judicial authority vested with the jurisdiction over disputes as to 
whether a given law or executive regulations are consistent with the constitution.”298  
 The general principles regarding the government’s intention to address women’s 
concerns in the National Action Charter were not just words, but in part represented 
actions that were already underway. In August of 2001, the king had established a new 
government agency dedicated to the advancement of women, the Supreme Council for 
Women (al-Majlis al-Aʻlā li-l-Mar’a).299 Through the Supreme Council for Women 
(hereafter, SCW), the king implemented several policies aimed at addressing women’s 
concerns. Some of these policies which are dealt with in more detail below include the 
establishment of family counseling centers, the provision of free legal assistance for 
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women of lower economic classes, the opening of women’s grievance offices, and the 
initiation of a formal study of divorce cases within the sharīʻa courts. Then, in a move 
long-awaited by women activists, the king authorized the formation of a legal 
committee by the Ministry of Justice to draft a family law proposal in 2002. Also 
addressed in detail below, the 2002 committee produced a workable draft within a few 
months.    
Part of King Ḥamad’s reform efforts was to commit Bahrain to many of the 
international women’s and human rights treaties promulgated by the United Nations and 
other international bodies. Bahrain had become a signatory to the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, the Convention Against Torture, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination Against All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Decree Law No. 5 of 2002 issued on 
March 2, 2002 declared, “We hereby approve the accession of the Kingdom of Bahrain 
into the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
approved by the United Nations General Assembly on December 18, 1979, and attached 
hereto…Ministers shall, each within his jurisdiction, implement this law.”300 In its by-
laws, the SCW was specifically designated as the agency authorized to assess Bahrain’s 
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adherence to CEDAW principles. Bahrain formally acceded to the convention on June 
18, 2002.301  
 A condition for joining such conventions was the participation in meetings and 
sessions in which representatives of Bahrain had to respond to the questions of 
international committees regarding specific practices occurring in their country that 
contravene elements of the treaties. In responding to these questions before an 
international audience, Bahrain’s representatives constructed an image of the nation, 
and an image of the Bahraini government as it pertained to the specific issues being 
addressed. The fact that the family law had not been passed was an issue of concern to 
the CEDAW Committee. The Committee which met on July 21, 2008, expressed the 
opinion endorsed by Bahraini-NGO analysts that the promulgation of the family law 
could address many urgent concerns, and asked Bahraini representatives whether 
Bahrain had immediate plans to address the issue. In responding, the Bahraini delegates 
reported that “Civil consensus is required before a family status law can be 
promulgated.”302 Thus, with respect to the family law issue, the king maintained an 
image at home and abroad of a democratic government that responded to the needs of 
the people. We will also see this theme repeated below in statements made by other 
agents of the state such as the Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs.     
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Unfortunately, the king’s carefully crafted image was severely tarnished almost 
as quickly as it was created. Without warning, and on the heels of the popular 
referendum on his National Action Charter, Ḥamad promulgated a new constitution in 
2002 that rolled back many of the political rights he had just promised to deliver. Shiis 
especially were embittered by this surprise move. Therefore, when the Shii ʻulamā’ 
began to oppose the king’s family law initiative, underlying their resistance was a more 
general discontent with Ḥamad’s performance. The sections below will demonstrate the 
way in which Ḥamad sought to neutralize Shii opposition using the family law 
initiative. While each of the agencies discussed below have their own interests vis a vis 
the family law and acted of their own accord, they were also directed by the king to take 
certain actions either to enact further or to pull back on the family law initiative. An 
analysis of these actions demonstrates the delicate balance Ḥamad sought to maintain 
between the political demands of the Shiis, the stability of his rule, the maintenance of 
the state’s image, and the needs of the population; as well as the ways in which other 
state agencies’ own interests complicated the pursuit of this contentious issue.   
 
 
The Judiciary 
“The court is not for debating religion, it is for fixing problems”303 – Sunni Judge Yāsir 
al-Maḥmīd 
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 Any changes that would be made to the sharīʻa courts would of course require 
the cooperation of the judiciary, and especially, of the sharīʻa court judges. While 
leading members of the Shii ʻulamā’ as well as a minority of Sunni Salafi ʻulamā’ have 
generally been opposed to the government’s efforts, it would be a mistake to assume 
that because judges are also men of religion, they have been opposed to it as well. The 
sharīʻa court system is a government institution. Judges are appointed by the king, and 
their salaries are paid by the state. However, Shii sharīʻa judges do, and Sunni sharīʻa 
judges prior to the enactment of the Sunni family law in 2009 did, maintain a large 
degree of independence. Indeed, that was one of the chief complaints of supporters of 
the codified law, that judges had too much freedom in deriving rulings from Islamic 
texts. Without a standardized set of codes, a judge could produce decisions that 
contradicted those of another judge, or even himself, for the same type of case. Ethical 
issues aside, this relative autonomy could have provided sufficient incentive for sharīʻa 
court judges to oppose codification, as it would infringe upon their authority and 
autonomy.  
 Judges in both courts, however, have demonstrated support for the king’s 
initiative, and have themselves participated in the process of drafting proposals for a 
family law. Although he himself has been the target of some of the women activists’ 
accusations, Shii High Court Judge Shaykh Muḥsin Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr has been working toward 
codification for over a decade.304 In 1998, Shaykh Muḥsin submitted a sample marriage 
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contract for use in the Shii court.305 The following year, he submitted the first part of a 
draft of Shii rules regarding marriage for inclusion in a future personal status law. The 
draft contained 1507 articles, and was published in January, 2000 in Arabic and 
English.306 When asked about the sources he used in developing the rules found within, 
Shaykh Muḥsin said that much of the text was drawn from the works of his ancestors, 
Ḥadā’iq al-nāḍira fī aḥkām al-ʻitra al-ṭāhira, by Shaykh Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī (d. 
1186/1772) and Sadād al-ʻibād wa rashād al-ʻubbād, by Shaykh Ḥusayn Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr (d. 
1802).307 After examining Shaykh Muḥsin’s proposal, the Shii sharīʻa court rejected it. 
According to the SCW, this was because “it was an individual effort that contained 
differences from what is currently in practice.”308 Although no reference is made by the 
SCW to the specific Shii legal school followed by Shaykh Muḥsin, the fact that he is an 
Akhbari, while the majority of the Shii court is Usuli (see Chapter Three) most likely 
affected the reception his proposal received by the Shii court.309 Shaykh Muḥsin said 
that he felt somewhat betrayed by this. He argued that there is a great need for 
codification, citing many of the same criticisms that the women activists have put 
forward, that there is no order in the courts, that it is chaos. The judges all go by their 
own opinions, and 80% of the problems in the courts are caused by the fact that neither 
the judges nor the litigants know sharīʻa, Shaykh Muḥsin claimed. In the Shii court 
specifically, he said there is no consistency because the judges refer to several different 
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marjaʻs, whichever one suits his needs at the time. He noted that there have been over 
11,000 complaints made by women against the courts, and said that it is only getting 
worse. He blamed the Shii ʻulamā’ of the ʻUlamā’ Islamic Council for hindering 
Bahrain’s progress in establishing a personal status law. Disagreeing with their position, 
he asserted that their resistance to the family law is based on ignorance.310 Regarding 
the government’s rejection of his proposals, he defended himself and his scholarly and 
legal abilities, saying that Bahrain’s own scholars are of a higher quality than Shii 
authorities that some of the judges refer to. For instance, regarding the scholars of 
Najaf, Shaykh Muḥsin said that since Saddam Hussein came to power in Iraq, the 
standards of scholarship in Najaf have declined.311  
 While the government declined to use Shaykh Muḥsin’s proposals, another Shii 
judge was more successful in his efforts. Also a judge in the High Shii Sharīʻa court, 
Shaykh Ḥamīd al-Mubārak submitted a draft in 2002 titled “Mashrūʻ qānūn aḥkām al-
usra ṭibqan li-l-madhhab al-Jaʻfarī fī tanẓīm al-zawāj wa-l-ṭalāq wa-l-nafaqa wa-l-
ḥaḍāna (Family law according to the Jaʻfarī madhhab regulating marriage, divorce, 
maintenance, and custody).312 The draft was divided into two sections, one on marriage, 
and the other on its dissolution. The first section included seven chapters covering al-
khiṭba (betrothal), al-aḥkām al-ʻāmma (general rules), arkān al-zawāj (basic principles 
of marriage), shurūṭ al-ʻaqd (requirements of the contract), ḥuqūq al-zawjayn (rights of 
the spouses), anwāʻ al-zawāj (types of marriage), and āthār al-zawāj (al-nafaqa wa-l-
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nasab) (effects of marriage [maintenance and lineage]). The second section had three 
chapters that covered the issues of al-ṭalāq (divorce), anwāʻ al-ṭalāq (types of divorce), 
and al-furqa bayna al-zawjayn (al-ʻidda, al-ḥaḍāna) (separation between the spouses 
[the waiting period, custody]).313  
 At the same time that Shaykh Ḥamīd submitted his draft proposal, three judges 
from the Sunni court submitted another proposal for use in the Sunni court. Judge of the 
High Appeals sharīʻa court Shaykh ʻῙsā Abū Bushayt, judge of the High Sunni court 
Shaykh ʻAdnān Qaṭṭān, and judge of the High Sunni court Shaykh Ibrāhīm al-Marīkhī 
submitted a draft titled “Mashrūʻ  al-aḥkām al-sharīʻa fī aḥwāl al-shakhsīyya  bi-tanẓīm 
al-zawāj wa-l-ṭalāq wa-l-nafaqa wa-l-ḥaḍāna (Draft of sharīʻa rules of personal status 
regulating marriage, divorce, maintenance and custody). The Sunni draft comprised 142 
articles and followed virtually the same arrangement as the Shii draft, except that the 
types of divorce were divided up and given their own individual chapters (al-
mukhālaʻa, al-taṭlīq, and al-faskh). This draft draws from what is referred to as “The 
Muscat Document,” a uniform statute drafted by the Council of Arab Justice Ministers. 
The law, formally named “Muscat Document of the GCC Common Law of Personal 
Status,” was approved during the seventh meeting of the council in Muscat in 1996 and 
has served as a legal reference for several Muslim-majority countries.   
 At this time, in 2002, the Bahraini Minister of Justice presided over the 
formation of a committee to draft a codified law. He included in this committee the 
three Sunni judges who prepared the draft mentioned above, as well as Shaykh Ḥamīd 
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al-Mubārak from the Shii court and two other Shii judges. When the SCW learned of 
the creation of the committee, they requested that a number of women lawyers who 
specialize in family law be allowed to participate. The Minister agreed, and the final 
composition of the committee included three Sunni judges, three Shii judges, and three 
women lawyers.314 Upon examining the two drafts, the women lawyers noticed that 
approximately 70% of the Sunni draft and 81% of the Shii draft included rules that were 
common to both madhhabs.315 They then suggested that the drafts be combined to form 
a single draft, while preserving those elements that were distinctive to each madhhab by 
including them in separate articles to be applied according to sect. The committee 
agreed, and produced a final, unified draft titled “Mashrūʻ qānūn aḥkām al-usra fī 
tanẓīm al-zawāj wa-l-ṭalāq wa-athārhumā (Family law regulating marriage, divorce, 
and their effects).”316 The draft was organized according to the arrangement of the 
Sunni draft and included 87 articles that applied equally to both sects, 13 articles that 
applied only to Sunnis, 19 articles that applied only to Shiis, and 15 additional articles, 
presumably addressing organizational issues, for a total of 134.317  
 In September of that year, the independent newspaper al-Wasaṭ reported that the 
draft was complete and would be made law within months.318 While women activists 
applauded the committee, Shii ʻulamā’ raised objections. Member of the committee 
Zīnat al-Manṣūrī said that the Shii ʻulamā’’s objections surprised one of the 
committee’s Shii judges. He is from Iran, she explained, and said that Iran has a well-
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developed codified law, and this has not resulted in a violation of religion.319 
Immediately after this, the Minister of Justice was replaced. The new minister froze the 
draft and disassembled the committee until further notice. Al-Manṣūrī said that “still no 
one knows why, and no one knows what happened to the draft.”320  
 The freezing of the 2002 draft represented a clean break with the trajectory King 
Ḥamad’s administration was pursuing with regard to the reform of the sharīʻa courts. 
Many Bahrainis felt as though they were at long last on the brink of obtaining a codified 
law, and then it was retracted, without explanation. Women’s groups redoubled their 
efforts. The recently formed Women’s Petition Committee (WPC) took their concerns 
directly to the new Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs Shaykh ʻAbdullāh ibn Khālid 
Ᾱl Khalīfa. Shaykh ʻAbdullah granted them a meeting on September 25, 2002.321 WPC 
founder Ghāda Jamshīr presented her arguments, along with a delegation of more than 
20 men and women. Among the delegation were lawyers who worked in the sharīʻa 
courts such as Attorney Muḥammad al-Muṭawwaʻ and Attorney Fāṭima al-Hawāj, and 
the heads of other women’s NGOs such as president of the Bahrain Businesswomen 
Society, Afnān al-Zayānī, and the Director of the Bahrain Women’s Society. During the 
meeting, the WPC issued two chief demands: the enactment of the unified personal 
status law draft, and the immediate dismissal of some of the sharīʻa court judges. 
Jamshīr also asked that a new law be passed to revoke judge’s current immunity so that 
they can be held responsible for mistakes they may have committed that have resulted 
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in harm to the litigants. She argued that the current practice of sheltering the children of 
divorced couples in police stations may cause the children psychological harm, and 
suggested that social centers and NGOs would be a better alternative. The delegates 
then presented Shaykh ʻAbdullah with a range of anecdotes detailing the experiences of 
recent litigants, highlighting injustices regarding nafaqa awards or lack thereof, 
seemingly unjust custody decisions, and judges’ failure to force husbands to provide 
sakan. Many of the delegates argued that these rights were assured to women by Islam, 
and that the judges, who were supposed to uphold the sharīʻa, were in violation of 
religion. As for procedural oversights, Attorney al-Muṭawwaʻ said that the regulations 
contained in Law No. 26 for sharīʻa court procedures are not followed because judges 
are generally not familiar with them.322 Offering an example, al-Muṭawwaʻ explained 
that he has “appeals in the sharīʻa court for a long period that originated eleven years 
ago, despite the fact that the period of appeal is limited to only 45 days.”323 He then 
described a particularly troubling case that had not yet been resolved. A woman was 
granted a divorce after which, following her prescribed waiting period, she remarried 
and became pregnant from her new husband. Her first husband then appealed the case 
to the Appellate court which declared the divorce invalid and ordered the wife to return 
to him. The first husband appealed to the Supreme Court requesting the annulment of 
the wife’s second marriage which this court denied, and confirmed the validity of the 
wife’s second marriage. Al-Muṭawwaʻ explained that the verdicts were equally 
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authoritative, but came from two different courts (one Sunni, one Shii, but he did not 
specify which was which). Now the woman is in the serious dilemma of being married 
to two men, and there is no procedure in place to resolve the issue.324 Attorney Fāṭima 
al-Hawāj presented similar complaints, saying that judges often lacked professionalism 
and honesty, treated lawyers and litigants with disrespect, and that she had personally 
witnessed instances in which judges allowed themselves to be bribed by women 
litigants with money or favors when they felt that this was the only way in which they 
would be granted their legitimate rights.325 
 After listening to the arguments and complaints of the meeting attendees, 
Shaykh ʻAbdullah pledged to take action: “We will examine the cases our sisters have 
presented, especially those which have not yet been resolved and have not yet received 
a verdict. As for those which have received [judgments], a complaint will be lodged 
with the Supreme Council of Judges to look into it.”326 He added: “If there was any 
harm caused by any judge belonging to the Ministry, it is possible to raise [the issue] 
also to the Supreme Council of Judges to study and investigate it, and issue a conclusive 
decision.”327   
 Several of the sharīʻa court judges responded to the WPC’s accusations, some 
with outrage, some with a measure of humility. Draft committee member and Shii judge 
Shakyh Ḥamīd al-Mubārak told al-Wasaṭ newspaper that the judges never claimed to be 
                                                
324 Interview with Attorney Muḥammad al-Muṭawwaʻ, Manama, Bahrain, March 19, 2006.   
325 Jamshīr, al-Jallād, p. 41.  
326 Ibid., p. 40.  
327 Ibid.  
 197 
in a position that does not require improvement.328 Shaykh Ḥamīd admitted that 
Bahrain’s sharīʻa courts experience problems regarding efficiency and organization. As 
for these procedural matters, “the timing of hearings, manner of conduct, and the way in 
which the hearings are managed, we need a comprehensive plan…Now after the 
creation of the Supreme Council of Judges there is great hope for improvement and 
solving many problems.”329 As for the accusation that many of the judges are not 
properly qualified and have been appointed not due to their competence, but due to their 
friendship with certain officials, Shaykh Ḥamīd responded that even in the highest 
judicial authorities in the world, capabilities vary. With regard to the implied accusation 
of nepotism, he responded that “I personally witnessed in the early 1990’s that the 
system offered many educated religious scholars a chance to become judges, but they 
refused in fear of the social liabilities that accompany this job.”330 As for the serious 
claim that some of the judges intentionally delay divorce cases in order to bribe women 
into temporary (mutʻa) marriages with them, Shaykh Ḥamīd said he never witnessed 
any such behavior. On the subject of the delay of cases, he explained that the new draft 
has addressed this problem in part by allowing the judge to force the husband to divorce 
his wife in cases in which the situation poses a threat to the wife, such as when she has 
demonstrated the occurrence of domestic violence. Judge Ḥamīd stressed that the judges 
did not arrive at this decision because they were sympathizing with women seeking 
divorces, but through exhaustive studies of the Qur’an, Sunna, and the fatwās of 
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prominent Shii religious scholars such as Sayyid Muḥammad Kaẓim al-Yazdī, who 
stated that the judge can utilize ijtihād in any situation that poses a threat to the wife to 
force the husband to divorce her.331 Shii judge Ḥamīd Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr said that it is unfair to 
make broad accusations against all the judges because it would unduly harm the 
reputations of those who are honest and respected, as well as demeaning the entire 
profession. He agreed that people’s opinions are important, and that they have the right 
to issue complaints, but that they should do so through official channels.332     
 Other judges were not so cordial in their responses to the WPC’s accusations. 
Shaykh Jalāl al-Sharqī, judge of the High Sunni sharīʻa court said that the claims are 
reprehensible, alarming, and based on faulty reasoning.333 Quoting the Qur’an, Shaykh 
Jalāl said that those who spread such false rumors without providing evidence will end 
up in Hell: “They follow nothing but conjecture; and conjecture avails nothing against 
truth, 53 (Sūrat al-Najm): 28.” He laid blame for any problems occurring in the courts 
elsewhere, saying that judges can only rely on the evidence that is presented to them. If 
the plaintiff fails to provide sufficient evidence, Shaykh Jalāl said, the judge cannot be 
blamed for what results from it. He added that the Ministry of Justice has placed too 
great a burden on the judges who number only 23 in a population of 600,000 Bahrainis. 
The High court is forced to hear 20 cases each day, and the two lower courts 18 cases a 
day in addition to minor transactions such as the issuance of marriage certificates. 
Shaykh Jalāl therefore called for an increase in the number of judges. He defended the 
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Sunni courts’ handling of cases involving nafaqa and sakan, saying that these issues are 
decided based on the husband’s financial status, and that judges are careful to ensure 
that the wife and children are kept at a standard of living equivalent to what they 
enjoyed prior to the divorce. He did, however, call for the implementation of a codified 
personal status law as long as it is in keeping with the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the four 
Sunni madhhabs. Shaykh Jalāl supports the Muscat document because it is based on all 
these things, and because it standardizes procedures and binds judges in all courts. He 
concluded his statement by exhorting members of the WPC to be pious and devout, and 
to conform to Islamic norms. He also warned them against attacking sharīʻa and fiqh 
from the standpoint of secularism.334  
 As women activists, judges, and members of the ʻulamā’ presented their 
arguments both through official channels as well as to the press, public debate about the 
family law heated up. After months of no official word regarding the fate of the 
initiative, on February 20, 2003, Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs Shaykh 
ʻAbdullah announced the completion of a family law draft in the government-owned 
daily Akhbār al-Khalīj.335 Strangely, he offered no details about whether the draft would 
be presented to Parliament, or what the government’s timeline was for enactment. He 
did describe the draft, however, noting that despite being a unified document, the 
particularities of each sect are preserved in separate articles. The title of the draft was 
“Mashrūʻ qānūn aḥkām al-usra fī tanẓīm al-zawāj wa-l-ṭalāq wa-l-nafaqa wa-l-ḥaḍāna 
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(Draft family law regulating marriage, divorce, maintenance, and custody),” and 
comprised a total of 139 articles. Shaykh ʻAbdullah disclosed the draft’s treatment of 
many of the most significant issues such as the rules for parents travelling with children 
after a divorce, the husband’s obligations for contracting a second marriage, and the 
division of property after a divorce.  
 Again, just as it seemed that the law would be submitted to Parliament, it was 
stalled. By May of that year, members of Parliament began to ask about the draft’s fate. 
In June, the Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs Shaykh ʻAbdullah, who had 
announced the law months before, denied that he had knowledge of its current status. 
On June 20, 2003, he met with some representatives of a Shii religious institute.336 
Tensions were running high on all sides of the family law debate, especially the tension 
between some leading members of the Shii ʻulamā’ and the supporters of the codified 
law. In what would seem like a transparent effort to address that tension, Shaykh 
ʻAbdullah made statements praising the institute’s work, and appeared in photos in the 
government-friendly daily, al-Ayyām, sitting next to a Shii religious scholar, smiling 
and enjoying conversation.337 During the meeting, Shaykh ʻAbdullah was asked about 
his position on the family law. He responded that he is not in charge of the law, that it is 
not the Ministry of Islamic Affairs that handles it, but the Ministry of Justice. He did 
refer to the draft that had been frozen, however, and said that “the law must emerge 
from the will of the people. It must reflect their true wishes above all.”  
                                                
336 Although the article does not offer any names of the Shii scholars, it does not seem likely that any of 
the Shii ʻulamā’ who were leading the charge against the family law were in attendance. 
337 Wisām al-Sabuʻ, “al-Maʻhad al-dīnī al-Jaʻfarī tajriba rā’ida wa nataṭalaʻ li-mazīd min al-taṭwīr,” al-
Ayām, June 21, 2003.   
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 An official explanation was delivered a couple of weeks later from the Ministry 
of Justice. Member of the 2002 drafting committee Judge Ḥamīd al-Mubārak 
announced that the effort to arrive at a workable draft had failed.338 Stating that all sides 
had agreed upon the necessity to codify family law, the issue of unifying the laws of 
both sects had ultimately divided the committee and left them at an impasse. Al-
Mubārak said that the women lawyers on the 2002 committee had almost succeeded in 
getting parts of the legislation passed, but even those efforts failed.  
 A year later, the government started again from scratch. Partly in response to an 
opinion poll conducted by the SCW, detailed below, in which 97% of the respondents 
felt that the family law should be drawn from sharīʻa, a new committee was formed 
exclusively of judges and religious scholars. In addition, separate committees were 
formed for each sect. Member of the Sunni committee, Yāsir al-Maḥmīd, Sunni judge 
of the High sharīʻa court and self-described Salafi said that a meeting was convened 
with the Minister of Justice who said that he wanted a law quickly, within a year.339 He 
told the judges that the Muscat Document was not appropriate because it was 
disorganized, not realistic, and did not provide enough flexibility. Instead, the 
committee looked at the laws of other Arab countries such as Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, and 
Jordan, as well as using the Muscat Document as a guideline. The committee also 
decided not to adhere to a single madhhab, but chose opinions from all four. Al-
Maḥmīd commented that there is no prescription for Muslims to follow just one 
                                                
338 Ḥusayn Khalaf, “al-Mubarak: Kaddunā naṣṣal illā ḥall lākinna ‘al-tawḥīd’ afshala al-mashrūʻ,” al-
Wasaṭ, July 9, 2003.  
339 Interview with Yāsir al-Maḥmīd. 
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madhhab, and that it is best not to have a narrow vision because “the court is not for 
debating religion, it is for fixing problems.”340 When asked about the divisive issue of 
unification of the Sunni and Shii laws, another member of the Sunni committee, Niẓam 
Yaʻqūbī said that he thought it was far too early for such a move. A better approach, 
Yaʻqūbī suggested, is to implement new laws for each court, wait a few years, and then 
decide which articles the sects have in common and which articles should be kept 
distinct.341  
 
Parliament 
“This has become a purely political issue, and the losers are women and families” -
Member of Parliament ʻAbd al-Nabī Salmān342 
 
Because of the history of its domestic politics, the Bahraini political process has 
necessarily been defined by sectarian relations. Therefore, any issue that is raised for 
legislation is immediately measured against its implications for those relations. The 
family law issue is no exception. The fact that women activists had long-supported the 
unification of the laws of the two sects into one code gave Shiis reason to worry that 
any such resulting document could end up jettisoning Shii particularities in favor of 
Sunni preferences. As we saw in the previous section, it was this issue above all that 
divided members of the judiciary and prevented the draft committee from reaching a 
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solution. Shii members of Parliament have stood firm on this issue as well, opposing 
statutory unification, and those who did not lost their popular backing. Sunni members 
of Parliament were divided on a variety of issues.   
The forty-seat elected Parliament was given the authority to propose legislation. 
However, their proposals can be accepted or rejected at the behest of the king. Still, 
members of Parliament have a degree of power by nature of their visibility, and for 
some, the strength of their constituent communities. Bahrain’s Parliament is largely 
organized by religiously-affiliated blocs. The Sunni blocs include al-Minbar al-Waṭanī 
al-Islāmī, which is associated with the international Sunni organization the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and Jamʻīyya al-Aṣāla al-Islāmīyya, a Salafi organization, while the Shii 
bloc is Jamʻīyya al-Wifāq al-Waṭanī al-Islāmīyya, the largest Shii political organization. 
While there are currently fifteen religious political organizations in Bahrain, only three 
hold seats in the Parliament. It can be said that these blocs are often concerned more 
with religious ideology and advancing the interests of those whose religious views they 
share than the technical matters of governance. These interests at times extend beyond 
national borders, and encompass regional actors who advise Bahraini Parliamentarians 
how to vote on certain issues, or who are included in Bahrainis’ consideration of their 
own domestic affairs. We will see below that this is the case with the issue of the family 
law.  
 During the April 1st session of the representative’s council in 2003, five 
members of the al-Minbar bloc proposed a discussion of the issue of codification of the 
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family law.343 The Muslim Brotherhood is generally considered to be a socially and 
religiously conservative organization due to its historical involvement with Islamist 
politics in Egypt and elsewhere. However, the Bahraini Muslim Brotherhood has at 
times been among the most vocal supporters of liberal policies, including the family 
law.344 Al-Minbar members first listed several challenges faced by litigants in the 
sharīʻa courts: cases drag on too long, especially those divorce cases which are initiated 
by women; judges too often deadlock between conflicting judgments; judges 
interpretations are not based on clear verses from the Qur’an or the Sunna; and that the 
courts have no mechanism with which to implement their rulings. They confirmed that 
they were in favor of the enactment of a codified law, and argued that it is possible to 
create a law that is not in violation of Islam as long as it is drafted with the assistance of 
religious scholars and based on Islamic texts. The al-Minbar members argued that the 
law should also be based on studies which assess current social and family conditions so 
that drafters can choose only those religious opinions which are best suited to Bahrain’s 
specific needs. Lastly, they called for an increase in the number of judges, and the 
establishment of training programs to ensure judges’ academic and professional 
competency.345  
                                                
343 Description of April 1st, 2003 Parliament session, Hadiyya Fathallah, Political Assistant, U.S. 
Embassy, Manama, Bahrain, acquired April 20, 2005.   
344 Al-Minbar members have also opposed legislation aimed at restricting the freedom of assembly, and 
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 In the meantime, the Supreme Council for Women also issued a statement 
regarding the family law. On May 3rd, 2003, Secretary-General Lūlwa al-ʻAwaḍī 
announced that the SCW welcomed the enactment of a new law regulating personal 
status issues. She asserted that a unified law would be consistent with King Ḥamad’s 
program for improving the nation: “The new law is in line with the principles of 
national unity stipulated in the National Action Charter, and contains the objectives of 
the amended constitution and His Majesty the King’s reform project.”346 Despite the 
great amount of talk about the law, so far the government had not given any indication 
of when they would set the process in motion. Members of Parliament became 
frustrated. During the May 6th session, member of the al-Minbar bloc Dr. ʻAbd al-Laṭīf 
al-Shaykh threw out the first question to the Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs, 
asking why there has been such a considerable delay in enacting the law. The Minister 
replied that the Ministry has a number of drafts to consider, and that it is still in the 
process of studying them. He did not comment on the committee that was formed in 
2002, or on the draft they had produced.347  
 Public discussion continued between various agents of the state: judges, 
members of Parliament, and members of the SCW. On Tuesday, May 13, independent 
member of Parliament, self-described as Salafi in religious orientation, Jāsim al-Saʻīdī 
stated to the press that he was surprised by a recent exchange between a group of 
ʻulamā’ and the king.348 The ʻulamā’ expressed the opinion that scholars of religion 
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should be involved in the drafting of any law that would apply to personal status or 
family issues, and the king reportedly responded favorably to their request. Al-Saʻīdī 
said that he appreciates the ʻulamā’’s concern for the country’s interests, he would like 
them to know that the approval or dismissal of the personal status law is none of their 
concern, but that of the members of Parliament: “I would like to remind them that the 
National Action Charter and Bahrain’s constitution is clear about this matter, and that 
there is a legislative council that has been chosen by the people to represent them and to 
convey their needs.”349 He said that the law needs to follow the legislative process in the 
Parliament, and be presented to the Legal Affairs Committee which is comprised of 
legal specialists, religious scholars, and researchers who are deeply knowledgeable in 
these matters. After that, the law will be presented for a vote by the general assembly. 
Al-Saʻīdī also made an assurance that the law is drawn from the Qur’an, the Sunna, and 
will not be drafted from any source other than Islam. This is because, he argued, the 
constitution clearly states that Islam is the country’s official religion, and on this basis, 
the law will not be incompatible with Islam.350  
 Al-Saʻīdī’s position opposed that of the Salafi bloc. Upon the occasion of the 
launch of the SCW 2005 family campaign, Salafi bloc members reported that they were 
against the law because of the fear that it would violate the sharīʻa.351 In 2009 when the 
Sunni draft came up for a vote, the three Salafi MPs, ʻAbd al-Ḥalīm Murād, Ibrāhīm 
Abu Ṣandāl and Ḥamad al-Muhanndī were the only Sunnis to vote against it. The 
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reason they gave is that they had consulted Salafi authorities outside Bahrain who had 
advised them to oppose the law.352  
 The issue of whether the family law should even appear in Parliament drew 
some of the most heated debate between MPs and judges. Shii Judge Shaykh Muḥsin Ᾱl 
ʻAṣfūr and others who spoke during a conference of religious scholars disagreed with 
al-Saʻīdī’s position. Shaykh Muḥsin agreed that the codified law was a necessity, but 
said that members of Parliament and members of the appointed cabinet (Majlis al-
Shūra) should not be legislators in this case, and nor should the law be subject to voting. 
Because most legislators are uneducated about the specifics of sharīʻa, “subjecting 
God’s laws to such parliamentary procedures is an insult to their dignity and 
sanctity.”353 Even if it were to pass both councils without being altered, he said the law 
would be subject to amendment in the future either by the Minister of Justice or by 
royal decree, relying on an argument similar to the one used by Shii ʻulamā’. Another 
speaker, ʻAbd al-Laṭīf al-Maḥmūd, argued that just because the constitution stipulates 
that laws must be in line with the rules of sharīʻa does not mean that this will be the 
case. He said one cannot trust politics, “as it is the biggest liar.”354  
 On June 20, 2003, three members of Parliament presented their views on the 
enactment of a codified law at a seminar convened to discuss the issues surrounding the 
law.355 ʻAbd al-Laṭīf al-Shaykh (Muslim Brotherhood), ʻAbdullah al-ʻAālī (Shii), and 
Farīd Ghāzī (non-religious Economists bloc) presented their perspectives and welcomed 
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questions and comments. Al-Shaykh began by saying that when he questioned the 
Minister of Justice about why there was such a lengthy delay in the enactment of the 
law, it stirred up a tumult in the streets, and that there was much confusion that needed 
to be cleared up. He then defined exactly what is meant by codification: the 
organization of rules found in the sharīʻa and setting them down on paper, and 
establishing conditions that judges must follow. He said that these rules would only be 
drawn from the sharīʻa, and argued that there is Qur’anic text that allows space for new 
interpretations. Al-Shaykh explained that the principle of codification should not be a 
sticking point: “The idea of codification is not an invention of bidʻa outside the sharīʻa, 
rather we say that a study of the law must be completed from the perspective of those 
who are specialists.”356 He said that regarding the issue of the unified law, there was 
much talk about the difficulties of applying one law in two separate courts. Al-Shaykh 
argued that it was entirely possible to work with one law without having to dissolve the 
separate courts. He said that the majority of the law would apply to both sects, while 
those issues on which there is sectarian particularity would be left to the ijtihād of the 
judge.  
 Member ʻAbdullah al-Aʻālī spoke next, and affirmed his absolute opposition to 
the law. Al-Aʻālī explained that codification is exactly what he is opposed to. He said 
that the idea of codification originated in the West, and that even today, Western culture 
treats women in an unjust manner. Supporters of codification had responded to the Shii 
ʻulamā’’s opposition with the argument that Iran, a Shii-majority country with a Shii 
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government had had a codified personal status law for some time, and that it had served 
the population well. About the fuqahā’ (scholars of jurisprudence) in Iran, Al-Aʻālī 
stated: “They were helpless before the authority of the Shah. They passed that law, 
limiting sharīʻa. Even now in Iran we find fuqahā’ who are opposed to the personal 
status law there.”357   
 Farīd Ghāzī defended codification, claiming that one will not find a personal 
status law in any Arab country that is incompatible with the Islamic sharīʻa and makes 
its demise necessary. Nor do you find a situation in which the Islamic sharīʻa treats 
women justly and then the personal status law deprives her of that. This is because, 
Ghāzī argues, “the law and religion are in agreement.”358 He lamented that, in his view, 
“Bahrain is the only country that abandons a [whole] part of its people.” Ghāzī 
dismisses as irrelevant the frequent charge of the opposition that the idea of codification 
comes from the West, and that the term “personal status law” is a Western term: “The 
term ‘personal status law’ is a Roman term, and ‘family law’ is an English term. But we 
are talking about a law, not about terms.”359 He asserted that despite what 
Representative al-Aʻālī said about the Islamic texts, the law will be drawn from sharī`a, 
and from these texts. Ghāzī concluded with a comment about the opposition: “I don’t 
find justification for…dividing the country into two Bahrains. They say that everything 
that has to do with religion, even questions regarding the muezzins should be kept from 
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Parliament. Should we establish a special legislative body for the ʻulamā’ so they can 
rule on [these questions]?”360 
 The most dramatic stand taken by members of Parliament came after the SCW 
launched their family law campaign in 2005. Together with the council of Shii ʻulamā’, 
al-Wifaq organized a mass demonstration against the family law on November 5th.361 
The rally was attended by over 100,000 people, a significant percentage of Bahrain’s 
total population. Members of Parliament and the ʻulamā’ specified that it was not 
codification itself they opposed, but codification by individuals who were not also 
scholars of religion. They also opposed the unification of both sects into one law, and 
the fact that any law coming out of the Parliament could be subject to amendment in the 
future by the legislative body. Al-Wifāq’s chairman Shaykh ʻAlī Salmān stated that the 
Shii bloc would support a codified law only if the constitution was amended to include 
a provision that would ensure that, “no authority, even the two chambers of the 
Parliament, has the right to deal with it…The law must be drafted and, if need be, 
amended only by a religious panel.”362  
 Not all Shii members of Parliament agreed. Although he is Shii, member ʻAbd 
al-Nabī Salmān was a member of the Economic bloc, and supported the 2005 family 
law campaign. Citing economic stability and the needs of Bahraini women and children, 
Salmān said he believed the country desperately needed the codified law.363 As a Shii, 
Salmān tried to broker a settlement between al-Wifāq members and those who 
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supported the law, but he was ultimately unsuccessful. Taking the position he did was a 
risky move, as the next Parliamentary elections were to be held in November of 2006. 
Salmān knew the risk. He described a meeting called by head of the ʻUlamā’ Islamic 
Council Shaykh ʻῙsā Qāsim in the early spring of 2006. Qāsim had called all Shii 
members of Parliament to meet with members of the UIC to discuss the family law. By 
that time new drafts had been created by a new committee, one for each sect. It was 
rumored that the drafts would be presented to Parliament sometime before the 2006 
elections. According to Salmān, Qāsim had called the MPs together to instruct them to 
walk out on the vote. If they refused, Qāsim threatened to withdraw his support, and 
therefore that of the majority of the Shii population.364 Despite this threat, Salmān 
continued to support the family law, and in November was voted out of his seat. 
 
 
Supreme Council for Women 
“Separated families and small children are the ones most affected by the absence of the 
family law…The family law is a purely social issue and it is wrong to politicize it.” - 
ʻIṣmat al-Mūsawī, SCW Member365 
 
At the same time that the Nation Action Charter was being drafted, Ḥamad 
created the SCW. Emiri decree #44, dated August 22, 2001 established the SCW as an 
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advisory body with legal status to assess women’s status in political, civil, and social 
life.366 Article 1 of the decree states: 
 
  The Supreme Council for Women is to be established  
under the authority of His Majesty, have legal status,  
and be considered an advisory body on women’s affairs  
for all official agencies…It will express views and decisions  
on issues directly or indirectly related to women’s status.  
All official bodies will have to consult the Supreme Council  
for Women before making decisions in this regard.367 
 
The king’s first wife, Shaykha Sabīka bint Ibrāhīm Ᾱl Khalīfa was made the 
chairwoman of the SCW, and the council included sixteen members who would be 
appointed by the king. Shaykha Sabīka would choose the deputy chairwoman. The 
council was empowered to perform duties including the proposal of public policy 
regarding the development of non-governmental organizations; the prevention of 
discrimination against women in public life; and the drafting of a national strategy to 
improve the status of women and address various problems they may face. The 
responsibilities of the SCW also included collaboration with ministries and other 
government agencies as well as non-governmental organizations in order to put into 
practice principles regarding women’s status laid out in the National Action Charter and 
the Bahraini constitution; following up on the application of laws, resolutions and 
international conventions regarding women; and the submission of proposals for the 
amendment of existing legislation related to women; and the expression of views on 
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draft laws and decisions dealing with women before they are referred to the appropriate 
authority. The council was also authorized to recommend specific draft laws required to 
improve the condition of women.368  
 In a significant statement of the king’s seriousness in regard to enacting reform, 
he chose Lūlwa al-ʻAwaḍī to be the Secretary-General of the council. One of the two 
first women lawyers to set foot in a Bahraini courtroom, prominent women’s rights 
activist, and pioneering member of the Personal Law Committee, al-ʻAwaḍī would not 
serve merely as a mouthpiece for the king. Other well-known champions of women’s 
rights were also appointed to the council: Dr. Shaykha Maryam bint Ḥasan Ᾱl Khalīfa, 
Shaykha Hind bint Salmān Ᾱl Khalīfa, and Dr. Munīra Aḥmad Fakhrū. From the start, 
one of the initial tasks of the SCW was to begin preparations for the reform of the 
sharīʻa courts, and the choice of al-ʻAwaḍī and the others with their histories of 
activism affirmed the king’s earnestness to reach this goal.  
On February 25, 2002, Ḥamad authorized the SCW to conduct a study on 
divorce cases in the sharīʻa courts.369 In cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and 
Islamic Affairs, the study was carried out by four women lawyers who were members 
of the council and specialists in the area of family law. The study analyzed 306 divorce 
cases with the primary goal of generating concrete recommendations for alleviating 
some of the difficulties arising from both the processing of cases and the issuing of 
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rulings.370 Specifically, the goals of the study were to ascertain the duties of the courts 
according the code of procedure with regard to the time period within which appeals 
can take place, and the conditions of retrial; to measure the time required for the courts 
to hear initial petitions, the length of time it took these cases to be brought to a 
conclusion, whether they were concluded solely in the court of first instance or if they 
involved an appeal; to discover the standards used to determine the amounts and details 
of nafaqa (maintenance) and sakan (wife’s housing after a divorce) rulings; and to 
examine “the reasons for [why judges] abstained from applying the legal principles 
found in the Qur’an in cases of marital discord.”371 Organizational meetings took place 
in early April after which the council commenced the study.  
The SCW’s findings echoed those which had been published by the PLC nearly 
two decades before. Women who initiated divorce cases were left in “desperate 
situations” as the majority of their cases were dismissed.372 Women in the Sunni court 
often forfeited their rights and the rights of their children because of the difficulty of 
proving their claims. In the Shii court, cases brought by women usually ended in 
dismissal, or the judge forced the wife to pay compensation for a khulʻ divorce, despite 
evidence of harm. With regard to nafaqa, the council found that neither court referred to 
any objective standard when determining nafaqa awards, and did not take socio-
economic status, class, life circumstances, or the educational level of the children into 
account. Several factors contributed to the reduction of awards, including administrative 
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fees and the sector in which the husband was employed, for instance if he was not 
employed in the public sector (in which salaries are easier to confirm), nafaqa awards 
tended to be smaller.373  
The most substantial problems occurred with regard to sakan, the provision of 
housing for the wife after the divorce for a specified period of time. In 99% of the cases 
examined in the study, following the divorce the wife and children were forced to live 
with relatives due to the lack of housing provided by the husband. In the few cases in 
which the husband was required to provide housing, the judge did not require the living 
space to be furnished. These rulings seemed especially injurious to some of the wives 
whose husbands were in the process of establishing a second family.374   
In their final recommendations, the council advised amending the code of 
procedures to include measures to expedite the processing of family-related cases; the 
designation of a special court that would ensure the execution of rulings; and the 
establishment of a nafaqa fund.375 They also suggested that the procedure of evidence 
be amended in the manner of those rules in force in the personal status laws of other 
Islamic countries. The council mentioned the rules of Kuwait specifically, which 
require the wife and the close relatives to give oaths in cases in which the wife is 
claiming harm.376  
With the king’s approval, the SCW had also begun to act definitively on many 
of the concerns that had been raised by women’s groups and its own study on divorce. 
                                                
373 Ibid., pp. 4-6. 
374 Ibid., p. 5. 
375 Ibid., p. 8.  
376 Ibid., p. 5. 
 216 
In April of 2003, a special committee was established to provide legal assistance to 
women who cannot afford it for themselves.377 The legal assistance committee worked 
with the Ministry of Justice to arrange for lawyers who would be assigned to help such 
women. To further assist Bahraini women in understanding their legal rights and 
obligations, the SCW published a legal guide titled Women’s Guide to Judicial 
Procedures in the Sharīʻa Courts.378 The guide covers both procedural rules for 
initiating cases and women’s rights regarding substantive issues. Also in April of 2003, 
the SCW secured authorization to establish a grievance unit to receive calls on all issues 
of concern to both Bahraini and ex-patriot women living in the kingdom. 379  Field 
offices were opened in all five governorates to receive complaints. The field offices 
report to the Secretary-General’s office, which then studies the complaints and develops 
solutions to the larger, systemic problems. The SCW then works with lawyers to 
generate recommendations for legislation that could immediately address these 
problems. The head of the Grievance Unit explained that calls began coming in to the 
SCW in 2002, shortly after the council was formed.380  Between 2002 and 2004 when 
the Grievance Unit officially opened, more than 11,000 calls had come in. 40% of these 
calls were from women asking for government housing, most of them having been 
thrown out by their husbands after divorce. 10% of the calls were from Bahraini women 
who were married to foreign men, asking for official citizenship for their husbands 
and/or children. Although the SCW does not have the authority to issue or amend laws, 
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they can take formal requests to the king. The Grievance Unit is actively working with 
the Ministry of Housing and Social Affairs to add housing options for divorced women. 
They are also planning a campaign to change nationality laws at some point in the 
future.381   
 In addition to these initiatives, on April 1, 2004, the king approved the creation 
of a family counseling center in each governate for those families suffering from marital 
disputes and domestic legal issues.382 The centers also provide supervision and 
protection of children of such families in place of police stations which had been used 
for this purpose previously. The SCW works together with the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs and the Supreme Council of Judges to instruct judges how to deal 
appropriately with this issue.383  
 
  
SCW Family Law Campaign 
 The government’s attempts to arrive at a family law draft in 2002 and 2003 
failed partly because none of the parties involved could agree upon a unified draft, and 
partly because the Shii population saw it as yet another attempt by the Sunni rulers to 
subjugate them. The Shii ʻulamā’ had gained public support for their position, speaking 
about the issue in Friday sermons, and giving statements to the press. In an effort to 
counter the ʻulamā’’s presence in the public arena, the government formulated an 
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extensive campaign to win public approval for the enactment of a codified law. The 
campaign was organized and directed by the SCW. It began with the administration of a 
public opinion poll. The SCW contracted the Bahrain Centre for Studies and Research 
to survey Bahraini’s opinions on the question of the codified family law.  
 The study began in January of 2004, during which initial statistics and 
information were gathered during focus and discussion groups.384 A sampling of an 
initial glance at the main issues was prepared and examined. During the months of 
February, March and April, the scope of the study was determined and questionnaires 
were distributed. Analysis was completed and a final report was prepared in May and 
June, after which the report was published. The study was completed using the 
responses of 1261 Bahrainis, and covered seven chief topics: 
 
1) the extent of the necessity to enact a law that codifies sharīʻa rules  
related to the family 
2) the role of the sharīʻa courts regarding the law 
3) the competence of the sharīʻa judges 
4) the Personal Status laws of other Arab and Islamic countries 
5) the Parliament and its role in the enactment of a family law 
6) how to deal with disputes between spouses in the different madhhabs 
7) the basic elements presumed to be included in such a law.385   
 
A variety of statistics about the group of respondents is presented in the report. 53.8% 
of the respondents were female, while 46.2% were male. 70.3% were married, while 
29.7% were single. Age groups of the respondents were broken down as follows: 18 – 
24 years old, 25.5%; 25 – 31 years old, 21.1%; 32 – 40 years old, 28.9%; 41 – 50 years 
                                                
384 SCW, “Istiṭlāʻ,” p. 37.  
385 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
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old, 16.4%; 51 – 60 years old, 5.9%; and older than 60 years, 2.2%. Educational 
background was also taken into account. 6.2% of the sample completed less than 
primary school; 17% completed less than secondary school; 46.2% completed 
secondary school; 29% completed university studies; and 1.6% completed graduate or 
professional school.386 The one statistic that is highly relevant to the family law issue 
that was not included in the study is the sect of the respondent.   
 After being asked about their personal information, the respondents were asked 
if they had knowledge of the rules and principles regarding the family currently applied 
in Bahrain. A majority (58.8%) admitted that they did not have knowledge of such 
rules. They were then asked if they thought it necessary to establish a codified law. 
26.8% strongly agreed, 46.9% agreed, 14.8% were not sure, 9.8% did not agree, and 
1.7% strongly disagreed that a law was necessary.387 The study included a breakdown 
of the sex of the respondents to this question and found that of those who agreed or 
strongly agreed, the majority were women (56.08%), and of those who disagreed or 
strongly disagreed, a majority were men (64.38%). When asked if the law should be 
drawn from the sharīʻa, an overwhelming majority answered that it should (66.9% 
strongly agreed, and 30.1% agreed), while only 6% answered that it should not. A large 
majority (28.2% strongly agreed, and 44.2% agreed) also believed that the enactment of 
a family law would limit the occurrence of the break-up of families, and 20.2% were 
not sure.388 Regarding the issue of whether to unify the law to apply to both sects, or 
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keep two separate laws, the respondents were fairly evenly divided. They were given 
four options and asked to choose the one they preferred: 30.1% preferred a unified law 
for both sects; 34.6% preferred a unified law that would include separate sections for 
each sect to cover certain issues; 29.8% thought the laws should be kept separate; and 
5.6% did not believe any law should be enacted.389 Last, the respondents were asked 
who should draft the family law. They were given three options: 1) a group of scholars 
of jurisprudence (al-fuqaha’ al-sharʻīyyīn) and religious scholars (ʻulamā’ al-dīn), 2) 
legislators, or 3) a committee composed of all of the above in addition to members of 
some NGOs. A slight majority of respondents (53.6%) chose the last option, while 
45.9% chose the first option, and only 12.1% chose the second.390  
 The public opinion survey was the SCW’s first step in attempting to establish 
national consensus on the enactment of a codified family law. In the meantime, the king 
made a move that shocked the nation. In March of 2004, King Ḥamad suspended six 
sharīʻa court judges indefinitely. The six judges were some of the same judges accused 
by Ghada Jamshir and the PLC of misconduct.391 They were replaced by judges who 
were comparatively more qualified, younger, and more open-minded. Member of the 
2002 family law drafting committee Zīnat al-Manṣūrī considers this a watershed 
moment when the climate in Bahrain changed, and issues involving the sharīʻa courts 
came out in to the open: “There is more transparency now. People exposed the 
corruption and indiscretions. People are not afraid anymore to talk in the open about 
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these things.”392 Al-Manṣūrī also said that the character of the courts had changed as 
well, much for the better: “Some of the new generation of judges are more engaged with 
society. In the past they held themselves above society. The new judges don’t just sit 
and advise, they listen instead.”393 Although the king did not offer any explanation to 
the public for his dismissal of the judges, observers attributed his decision to the work 
of Ghāda Jamshīr, and especially, her exposure of the divorce case of Badriyya Rabīʻa, 
a woman who lost custody of her two children due to a particularly poorly handled 
case.394 
 At a press conference marking the occasion of Arab Women’s Day on February 
1, 2005 Chairwoman of the SCW Shaykha Sabīka bint Ibrāhīm Ᾱl Khalīfa announced 
the council’s intention to promote the promulgation of a codified family law.395 She said 
that, according to the opinion poll conducted by the SCW, the enactment of the law is 
an urgent demand of Bahraini society. Shaykha Sabīka asserted that the law would 
solve many problems faced by Bahraini women, and would help support family 
stability. She said it would also be based on sharīʻa, and would preserve the character 
of the Bahraini family.396  
 
A SECURE FAMILY = A SECURE NATION 
                                                
392 Interview with Zīnat al-Manṣūrī. 
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 Secretary-General of the SCW Lūlwa al-ʻAwaḍī officially launched the SCW 
family law campaign, “A Secure Family = A Secure Nation” in a press conference on 
October 9, 2005.397 Al-ʻAwaḍī announced that the goal of the campaign was to raise 
awareness of the role a family law can play in increasing social stability, preventing the 
violation of litigants’ rights in the sharīʻa courts, and eliminating discrimination against 
women. She said that the campaign would especially target housewives who may not 
fully understand their rights or the way in which a codified law could secure them. The 
campaign was designed in three phases. The first phase consisted of a series of public 
seminars, press interviews, and the distribution of informational materials in public 
spaces such as malls and plazas. The second phase analyzed the results of the first, and 
the third would be based upon those results.  
During the course of the announcements made by al-ʻAwaḍī and by the 
Chairwoman Shaykha Sabīka, the SCW was careful to address those who stood on all 
sides of the debate. Al-ʻAwaḍī noted the ʻulamā’’s rejection of the Parliament’s role in 
future amendments to the law, and their fear that those amendments could entail the 
removal of sharīʻa rules from the law, but said that the SCW was in the process of 
negotiating with the government to secure regulations in the law that would prohibit 
members of Parliament from making any amendments to the law without the approval 
of leading Sunni and/or Shii judges and religious scholars. She stated that a focus of the 
campaign would be to discourage people from closing their minds to the idea of a 
codified law because of the objections that had already been raised against it by some of 
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the ʻulamā’. She referenced the 2002 drafting committee and said that it was forced to 
cease its activities because it was rejected by women who were influenced by the 
ʻulamā’.  Al-ʻAwaḍī stated that the SCW does support one, unified law that would 
cover both sects because it would enhance national unity. However, she said that if 
there is too much opposition to the idea, then having a separate law for each court 
would be better than having no law at all.    
In her press statement made on October 21, Shaykha Sabīka paid special tribute 
to the women activists who had worked for the family law.398 She described their efforts 
and reiterated their demands and goals, affirming their importance. She also portrayed 
the SCW campaign as a national, inclusive project: “The Supreme Council for Women 
welcomes the participation of everyone in the national campaign for the family law.”399 
Both Shaykha Sabīka and al-ʻAwaḍī addressed the interest of those who support the law 
in reform. Shaykha Sabīka spoke of the importance of regulations to “ensure a fair 
judiciary system,” and that “such positive developments will help consecrate the 
principles of the state of law based on the national reforms.”400 ʻAl-Awaḍī described the 
family law as a legal obligation of the state: “The 1973 constitution and its amendments 
highlight the government’s duties to protect family stability and the law is part of the 
kingdom’s keenness on fulfilling its obligations.”401 That al-ʻAwaḍī referenced the 1973 
constitution rather than the more recent 2002 one speaks to the discontent with the 2002 
document that was still present. This important issue had to be handled carefully, as the 
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women activist supporters of the family law as well as its Shii ʻulamā’ opponents 
tended to agree on the fact that the 2002 constitution was a disappointment that belied 
the king’s reform project. 
In many of the SCW’s public statements, it was made clear that although the 
SCW was a government agency, it did not have the authority to pass the law or to 
dictate its contents. As mentioned above, al-ʻAwaḍī explained that the SCW was 
negotiating with “the government”402 on the issue of the ʻulamā’’s concern with future 
amendments of the law made by Parliament. She also highlighted the SCW’s role in 
illuminating some of the problems occurring in the sharīʻa courts, and that the council 
“had contributed to motivating the government to hold pay inspection visits and to 
courts and evaluate judges’ performance.”403 In her statement, Shaykha Sabīka called 
directly on members of Parliament to “initiate steps to promulgate the family law,” 
making it clear that the law would not be forced on the country.404  
 Throughout the month of October, the SCW held seminars during the weekly 
salons of members of Parliament, religious scholars, and women activists. In its 
monthly newsletter, the council published quotations that supported, or seemed to 
support the family law. Judges, ʻulamā’, members of Parliament, and prominent 
members of society of every political and religious perspective were featured as being 
in agreement with the campaign’s goals.405 Unfortunately for the council, the campaign 
did not succeed in winning the public’s support. On November 5, al-Wifāq and the UIC 
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brought over 100,000 demonstrators out in the streets to reject the law. This was not 
merely a symbolic action. Shaykh ʻῙsā Qāsim issued a statement in the press asserting 
that the Shiis would fight the law to the death if necessary: “our faith is more valuable 
to us than our blood.”406  
 In November, the SCW admitted defeat. Secretary-General al-ʻAwaḍī cited two 
primary reasons for the failure of the campaign. For one, the approach did not reach the 
grassroots, such as housewives in the villages. As for the other, al-ʻAwaḍī blamed the 
influence of the ʻulamā’: “The majority of women rejected the bill not because they 
were against it, but because scholars did not want it. I thought that reaching out to the 
entire population would be a simple mission because of Bahrain’s size, but I came to 
know that some segments in society are unreachable because of their dependence on 
their leaders…Most women who took part in rallies against the law don’t know much 
about it.”407  
 
CONCLUSION 
 As the SCW campaign was dying a quick death, two legal committees were 
busily working. One Sunni, one Shii, the committees were formed by the king after the 
results of the SCW’s opinion poll reflected that the country was divided on the issue of 
unification. Separate laws were drafted for each sect, and rumors suggested that they 
would be submitted to the Parliament for a vote before the 2006 elections. Responding 
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to these rumors, members of the Shii ʻulamā’ together with members of al-Wifāq 
convened an emergency meeting in which they discussed strategies for action. Speaking 
to the press, Deputy Secretary-General of al-Wifāq Shaykh Ḥuṣayn al-Ḍayhī said that 
submitting the laws to Parliament would be an undemocratic move on the part of the 
government since the Shiis had already expressed their views on the subject: “During 
the meeting, we declared our anger at the government’s move to send this issue to 
Parliament without taking into consideration our views…We believe that this is a 
dangerous proposal which is disrespectful of our sect and its views.”408 The 2006 
elections came and went, and the laws were not submitted until January 3, 2009. Again, 
Shiis resisted, and on May 14th the Sunni law was passed alone.409  
 As the shining symbol of a new, progressive era and the solution to many very 
real and serious social problems, the government’s family law was supposed to be one 
of Hamad’s crowing achievements. Unfortunately for the law’s supporters, the project 
proved too contentious. Varying interests of the actors and institutions responsible for 
bringing the law to fruition could not be resolved. Although the National Action Charter 
promulgated in 2001 promised a truly representative government, the 2002 constitution 
enacted on its heels belied this promise. After such a move, all initiatives were met with 
suspicion. The family law plan generated even more mistrust, as it proposed to enter the 
only area in which Shiis still had autonomy – the sharīʻa court. As the king responded 
to the realities of Bahrain’s demography, the expectations created by an increase in 
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political participation, and the pressures of public debate over the issue, the family law 
became a political tool rather than a political goal.   
 
